Russian invasion may push fearful nations to go nuclear

Liam Gibson says Moscow’s war in Ukraine puts non-proliferation agreements under a cloud

Among the many casualties of the unfolding war in Ukraine, two hold a special place in the heart of the global order – international agreements and nuclear non-proliferation.

Ukraine, which once had the third-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, gave them all away in the Budapest Memorandum in exchange for signed assurances from Russia not to use force to threaten its independence. The result is now here for all to see, and world leaders are watching.

Many states will draw a sobering lesson from Ukraine’s misfortune and conclude that, when it comes to the survival of their nation, nuclear weapons trump international agreements every time. The world is already witnessing an uptick in proliferation sentiment and will become more volatile for it.

Ukraine signed on to the Minsk II agreement in February 2015 in an effort to end hostilities with Russian-backed forces in the Donbas region. The last-minute calls by Western leaders to invoke the agreement as war approached last month, as well as Putin’s denial of its existence, only highlighted the deal’s fragility and the danger of basing one’s security on the abstract principles of international law.

The deal’s undoing was that Moscow was party to the negotiations and influenced its outcome on paper, but since Russia claimed to not be directly involved in the conflict, it could shirk implementing the agreed changes.

Essentially, it had all the power and no responsibility. If things did not proceed as Moscow wished, it could ditch the agreement as void and resort to violence again, which it did.

Worse, the undefined size of the “special status territories” gave pro-Russian separatist leaders in Donetsk and Luhansk scope to claim authority over areas in those provinces still under Kyiv’s control. This ambiguity provided the legal pretext under which Russia launched its offensive last month.

The takeaway for vulnerable states is that peace accords signed with hostile actors who are impervious to international norms offer no protection. The infinite interpretative wiggle room of international agreements allows aggressors to walk back commitments signed on paper while marching into your territory.

The same is true for the Budapest Memorandum, the violation of which has now damaged the cause of nonproliferation. In 1994, under pressure from a Washington high on its post-Cold War moment, a newly independent Ukraine did what seems unthinkable now. It handed over its entire nuclear arsenal to Russia in exchange for commitments from Washington, London and Moscow to “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine”.

These were security guarantees Washington or London were never ready to enforce, but in the rosy 1990s, they probably believed they would never have to. Now Ukraine is being invaded by Russia and neither the United States nor Britain are expected to intervene.

Ukrainian leaders publicly lamented their decision in Budapest as Russian tanks rolled into their country last month, reminding world leaders of what happens when you give up the ultimate deterrent.

The situation has a precedent in Libya, which abandoned its nuclear programme in 2003. When strongman leader

Muammar Gaddafi met his downfall in 2011, dictators in North Korea and Iran learned to never repeat his “leap of faith”.

Yet with Ukraine, a vibrant democracy, the audience is broader still. The real risk is what lesson it will teach the growing cohort of vulnerable states, including liberal democracies, that are steadily coming around to the idea of going nuclear.

Self-reliance doctrines are on the rise among US allies in the Middle East and

East Asia. Saudi Arabia has made clear that it will work hard to build nukes if Iran acquires them. Turkey has also railed against non-proliferation restrictions and the “unacceptable monopoly” nuclear states have on the weapons.

Meanwhile in East Asia, countries are exploring new options amid a regional arms race. New polls show nearly three-quarters of South Koreans are in favour of building nuclear weapons as the threat from North Korea grows.

In the days since Russia’s attack on Ukraine, former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe has called for his country to explore hosting US nuclear weapons, citing a need to discuss “the reality of how the world is kept safe”. Even in Taiwan, which walked away from its nuclear programme in the 1980s, former legislators have prompted discussions in the media for a limited arsenal of five warheads to deter conflict with China.

Though it remains unlikely that Putin will deploy nuclear weapons against Ukraine, the conflict has already raised the risk of their development and potential use elsewhere in the world. That, along with the damage done to the international agreements that undergird peace in the international system, will have far-reaching consequences.

The world must do what it can to heal the wounds of these two casualties of this war and restore credibility to the rules-based order.

The conflict has already raised the risk of [nuclear weapon] development and [their] potential use elsewhere in the world