Beijing is losing Europe’s goodwill over Russia, Taiwan
Emanuele Scimia says China is risking the image it has worked hard to cultivate abroad
When foreign vice-minister Le Yucheng met Russian ambassador Andrey Denisov last week, he hailed the Sino-Russian partnership with words that sounded positively eerie to those in Europe: “No matter how the international landscape may change, China will continue to strengthen strategic coordination with Russia for win-win cooperation.”
Beijing’s ambiguity towards Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its repeated threats about Taiwan are breaking apart the consensus China has worked hard to build in many European quarters. That is especially true for the China and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries cooperation mechanism, a 16+1 grouping that includes 11 European Union members.
China remains the EU’s largest trading partner with bilateral trade surpassing ¤695 billion (HK$5.78 trillion) last year, but China’s not-so-veiled association with Russia is angering Europeans.
The case of the Czech Republic is typical. Following in EU institutions’ footsteps, the Czech government recently told Chinese diplomats there would be significant consequences if their country were to violate or circumvent Western sanctions against Russia. Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský also emphasised that Europe should help “bullied” democracies such as Taiwan – a clear reference to China’s claims on the island.
European initiatives and stances against China’s position are multiplying.
Sweden’s parliament will soon debate a proposal to rename and upgrade the country’s representative office in Taiwan, a Swedish lawmaker said two weeks ago in Taipei during a visit.
It is worth noting that just allowing the word “Taiwanese” to be used in the name for Taiwan’s diplomatic mission in Lithuania has triggered a commercial retaliation from Beijing, which considers the island a “rebel province”.
While Sweden has often sparred with China over the Xi Jinping administration’s record on human rights, Finland had no major disagreements with Beijing until the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania are also taking a tougher approach to China.
The EU usually challenges China’s threats with sectoral trade tools rather than political measures. How the European bloc has been addressing the China-Lithuania dispute is illustrative of its traditional modus operandi.
The EU has reported China to the World Trade Organization for coercive practices against Lithuania, giving an economic-procedural response when the issue is in fact a political one. European chanceries and institutions must support Lithuania, but did not want to rile China.
In January, Matas Maldeikis, head of the Lithuanian Parliament’s Friendship Group with Taiwan, told me that many Europeans actually started realising the need to change their engagement with China before its dispute with Lithuania.
“This is a general trend caused first of all by China’s behaviour,” he said. “As Xi Jinping’s administration … is turning away from reform and opening-up principles, EU nations naturally have to redesign their approach to Beijing.”
Central and eastern European countries understand that Chinese investment has always gone to western Europe. In February last year, six EU member states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria) were represented by second-tier ministers at the annual summit of the China-CEE “17+1” group (when Lithuania was still part of the China-backed forum), in what several interpreted as an affront to Xi.
China’s outright assistance to Russia, especially any military support, would further harden Europe’s posture. After the EU’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is highly likely that an attack on Taiwan would cross Europe’s red lines in its relations with Beijing.
The EU could probably take a firmer position against Beijing if Taipei were willing to establish semiconductor foundries in Europe. Eric Huang, head of the Taiwanese representative office in Lithuania, said last month that Taiwan was ready to develop a project combining Lithuanian laser and Taiwanese semiconductor technologies.
Despite Le’s resounding words on the Sino-Russian partnership, China is in damage control mode. Last week, it sent Huo Yuzhen, the special representative for central and eastern Europe, to tour the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Poland. The reception was chilly, at least in Prague. Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Martin Tlapa told the Chinese envoy that Beijing’s close cooperation with Russia risks undermining ties with the EU bloc.
Then there is China’s ratification of two International Labour Organization conventions on forced labour last week, viewed as an attempt to reactivate the EU’s ratification process for the comprehensive investment deal agreed to in principle in December 2020.
Just as Russia’s attack on Ukraine has reinvigorated Nato, with previously neutral Sweden and Finland set to apply to join the alliance, China’s attitude towards the Ukrainian crisis could cement a vast anti-Chinese front within the EU.
Beijing-friendly industries in Germany and France might be unable to preserve China-Europe ties along the old lines. The sinking of Nord Stream 2, a German-Russian megaproject, proves that geopolitics now trumps economics.
The EU usually challenges China’s threats with sectoral trade tools rather than political measures