Peace role for Beijing
Winston Fung says China can bridge the divide with West by offering to mediate in Ukraine
“Dialogue of the deaf” was how the European Union’s foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell described the recent EU-China summit, at which both sides talked past each other. Brussels tried to convince China to abide by sanctions on Russia. Beijing focused on EU-China trade.
This is symptomatic of the gulf between China and the West. The bigger question, though, is what is causing this gulf? Most analyses point to power politics or ideological competition, but there is something else which drives this gap: identity.
Increasingly, the West and China regard each other as the “hostile party” based on opposing identities. China must understand how this identity dynamic works and craft its policies accordingly if this gulf is to narrow.
Social identities are how people define themselves based on their group membership(s). Individuals distinguish between their own group(s) (the in-group) against an outside group (the out-group), highlighting negative aspects of outside groups to enhance the self-image of their own group.
An in-group differentiates itself from an outside group by its attributes, including norms – the rules and expectations about how members behave in a given context.
In the case of China and the EU, while “Western” countries are politically diverse with frequently conflicting goals, most share basic norms as liberal democracies, including holding elections and the protection of fundamental rights.
Though these norms are implemented imperfectly at best, the West is nevertheless increasingly highlighting them as part of their in-group shared identity while emphasising the opposing norms of China, framing it as a hostile out-group. For example, a recent EU-US Dialogue on China emphasised “shared values” between the EU and US, due to a “growing list of China’s actions that are of concern, including those that breach international law and run counter to the shared values and interests of the United States and the EU”. It stressed the need to coordinate “advance shared priorities” related to human rights and global standards.
Did the West always see China as a hostile outside group? In fact, China occupied an ambiguous position in the international community. Its authoritarian political system meant it wasn’t considered part of the “West”. However, the mere existence of political differences didn’t create the present enmity.
In fact, the West was encouraged by China playing what the West saw as a constructive role internationally. For instance, Beijing successfully promoted itself not as a challenger but as a partner to the liberal order, in the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
Beijing identified itself and its AIIB initiative as a complement to the established development banks, filling a niche and redressing inadequate infrastructure spending in Asia. The AIIB fits within the existing international liberal order.
So, what changed for the West to perceive China as a hostile outsider? Obviously, the US has framed China as a competitor in recent years, but China’s own actions have also contributed to the hostility. Contrast the AIIB with China’s “no limits” cooperation with Russia, announced just before Moscow’s Ukraine operation.
Even if China is providing only rhetorical support to Russia, the West sees Beijing identifying with a direct challenger to the liberal order. Because Moscow’s territorial aggrandisement by force is an existential threat to the rest of Europe, China’s attempts to qualify its agreement with Russia have fallen on deaf ears. The most important conclusion the West has drawn is that Beijing is supporting an aggressor.
Is in-group versus out-group hostility never-ending? Not necessarily. Perception of a threat to one’s own group can be alleviated. One way is to adopt a common goal for both China and the West.
For example, China claims it wants a peaceful end to the conflict in Ukraine. However, the West is unconvinced. While Beijing has supported peace talks, it has declined to mediate.
China’s claim would be more persuasive if it offered to mediate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. Questions about Beijing’s credibility as a mediator can be mitigated by China highlighting its strategic partnership with Ukraine and giving Kyiv a sincere hearing.
Although some Chinese analysts have said Beijing lacks sufficient influence over Moscow to mediate successfully, through the very act of mediation, China can show that it is playing a constructive role.
Having a common goal can be the first step for the West and China to recategorise themselves as members of an in-group. To achieve that, new norms which are acceptable to both sides have to be identified.
Existing norms that both agreed to previously, such as economic cooperation or combating climate change, have either lost their primacy or suffer from excessive polarisation. Something more fundamental to the international order is required – norms that determine war and peace.
The Ukraine conflict has drastically shaken the post-Cold-War order, but it may also be an opportunity for China. Beijing can request that all the great powers, including the West, its allies and Russia, come to the table and reveal what each side is prepared to accept to end the conflict.
This may only have a slim chance of actually ending the conflict, but it would be worthwhile for Beijing to play a positive role in trying to ascertain the norms necessary for peace. China can put the West on the defensive by challenging Western countries to offer norms that could end the war.
Surely this would be better than Beijing’s present defensive posture in the face of calls from the West for it to play a more helpful role on Ukraine.
China’s claim would be more persuasive if it offered to mediate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine