Ratchet up the risks

Mark J. Valencia says Washington and Manila are playing a dangerous game in the South China Sea

On August 4, 1964, the United States claimed that North Vietnamese patrol boats had attacked the US naval destroyer Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin. This led to the passage by Congress of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution less than a week later that became then president Lyndon Johnson’s legal justification for sending forces to South Vietnam. That led to the open involvement of the US in Vietnam’s civil war.

We now know that the attack never happened and the fateful decisions were based on naval intelligence shaped to fit Johnson’s political needs and preferences. He was looking for an excuse to take the country to war without a formal declaration by Congress. That was then. But history has a way of repeating itself, especially if lessons go unlearned.

Could recent developments set the stage for an excuse for the US military to enter someone else’s conflict – this time, between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea? Such an incident could – like before – suck in US allies Australia and South Korea into a wider fray.

A version of this scenario could develop at Second Thomas Shoal where the Chinese coastguard recently blocked a Philippine coastguard vessel from approaching the shoal. According to an international arbitration panel established under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the submerged shoal is part of the Philippine continental shelf and within its exclusive economic zone.

The Philippines, therefore, has exclusive sovereign rights to its resources. Technically, no country can claim sovereignty over a submerged feature. Nevertheless, the Philippines sees it as a sovereignty issue. China also claims it as part of its historic claim to much of the South China Sea that was rejected by the same panel. Thus, this dispute is coloured by nationalism, and inaction could threaten the legitimacy of both governments.

The blame for the recent near-collision is not as black and white as most Western media would have it. Beijing said the incident was a premeditated provocation by Manila. Yes, the resources belong to the Philippines and the Chinese vessel violated international convention by blocking the path of its Philippine counterpart.

But the Philippines may have been trying to provoke an incident. The two Philippine coastguard vessels broadcast their intention to enter the shoal and warned the Chinese vessels to “stay clear from our passage”. Manila knew from previous experience that China would react aggressively to such a move. But it may have wanted to instigate a Chinese response for the international journalists conveniently invited along on its “sovereignty patrol” as part of a campaign to publicise China’s depredations.

Curiously, the incident happened to involve the Philippine vessel not carrying the journalists, allowing them to observe without being in danger. The journalists duly sensationalised the incident.

But what does this have to do with the US? It has a Mutual Defence Treaty with the Philippines that requires a formal consideration of military help if the other party is attacked.

Having previously prevaricated on the meaning of “attack”, the US State Department seems to have laid down a challenge to China. It now “reaffirms that an armed attack in the Pacific, which includes the South China Sea, on Philippine armed forces, public vessels or aircraft, including those of the coastguard, would invoke US mutual defence commitments under Article IV of the 1951 US Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty”.

Further, the commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Samuel Paparo, said the US was prepared to help the Philippines if China interfered with Manila’s efforts to resupply its forces on its grounded naval ship on the shoal.

The US has been issuing general warnings to China regarding such actions for some time. So far, the incidents, including the shining of a laser at the bridge of a Philippine coastguard vessel, has yet to trigger the US threshold for activation of the defence treaty.

Moreover, there is wiggle room in the requirements for giving military aid.

The treaty’s Article IV states that an armed attack on either party would be acted upon in accordance with its constitutional processes, and that this shall be brought to the immediate attention of the UN Security Council. Once the council has restored peace and security, hostilities must cease.

So the decision-making process could be drawn out and military aid is not guaranteed. Yet the US seems to have upped the ante by agreeing to joint patrols with the Philippines later this year. The first may well be near Second Thomas Shoal.

The US has generated public pressure on itself to make good on its threat. Otherwise, it will lose credibility and be considered a toothless tiger. This could cause China to miscalculate.

The situation is on the verge of becoming a game of chicken between the US and China with the Philippines in the middle and perhaps even a facilitator.

If neither side blinks first, a clash could ensue. To try to contain the conflict, the US is likely to use a coastguard vessel for any joint patrol – not its navy, which, like China’s, will be lurking over the horizon. Whether any clash intensifies and spreads depends on the wisdom of leaders.

I am optimistic that one or both sides will back off. But, given the anti-China mood in Washington, an incident like that in the Gulf of Tonkin – real or manufactured – may push Congress to demand military action. Hold on to your hat.

The situation is on the verge of becoming a game of chicken between the US and China with the Philippines in the middle