Rivals and partners
Zaki Laidi says Europe has come to recognise China’s centrality to the challenges it now faces
The last year has solidified China’s status as one of the most salient foreign-policy challenges facing Europe. But it has been a long time coming. China’s emergence at the forefront of debate in Europe is the product of three political realisations since 2020.
The first was the recognition, triggered by the pandemic, that Europe had become dependent on China for a wide range of goods. After decades of single-mindedly pursuing comparative advantage by relocating industries beyond its borders, Europe had to face hard facts.
Distance might not matter any more, but geopolitics does. A product that is not strategic can quickly become so if a crisis erupts, production or trade is disrupted, or a single producer gains monopoly.
The stakes have since risen considerably, because China has a virtual monopoly over the production and/or refining of raw materials essential to the clean-energy transition. There is no ready-made solution to this. Vigilance and political prudence will be necessary.
The second political realisation came after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Though China did not, strictly speaking, support Russia’s actions, it also refused to push back against the Kremlin, in hopes the war would weaken the United States and Nato. Having adopted a zero-sum mindset, Chinese leaders assumed any such weakening would benefit China.
With Russia struggling in Ukraine, China’s hopes of a major blow to the West are probably dwindling; its main objective now is to limit its exposure. Still, China’s leaders recognise that Russia is becoming practically a vassal state, which lends China greater strategic depth and enables it to extract economic benefits, such as favourable energy deals.
But what tacit support China has offered Russia has been enough to do severe damage to its relationship with the European Union. While China never crossed whatever “red line” would get it added to the list of countries violating Western sanctions, it has increased commercial relations with Russia.
The third realisation that propelled China to the forefront of European foreign-policy concerns arose from the intensification of the country’s competition with the US. Here, Europe walks a fine line. It cannot establish itself as fully neutral on issues such as Taiwan, human rights or conflicts in the South China Sea. But nor can Europe give up its room for manoeuvre, especially given the breadth of US sanctions and the rivalry’s impact on virtually all global issues.
For Europe, Sino-American competition does not drive every global trend or development, let alone justify every action or response. That is why the EU has assured
China repeatedly that it is not committed to a confrontational approach. Europe is willing to recognise and accept China’s systemic importance, and has no desire to block its rise or engage in strategic competition.
Europe has not struggled to clarify its position on Taiwan, which is based on non-recognition of the island’s independence and opposition to the use of force to change the status quo. The EU is willing to develop ties with Taiwan, as long as they do not imply recognition of sovereignty.
The EU has remained steadfast in its assertion that a systemic rivalry with China does exist. While China insists its only rival is the US, Josep Borrell, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, explained in Beijing in October that China and Europe disagree on several important issues and, fundamentally, on values.
By establishing the primacy of economic growth and eschewing civil and political rights, China aims to challenge Europe’s vision of such rights as universal, essential and inalienable. And it has worked hard to bring the countries of the Global South on side. This clash of visions shapes some of today’s most consequential debates.
Another political message the EU has been keen to send to China is that the favourable terms under which Chinese firms access the European market are not guaranteed. European firms are finding it increasingly difficult to compete with their Chinese counterparts, and not just because of their shortcomings.
China offers massive subsidies to its firms, while erecting high entry barriers for foreign companies. As China seeks to enlarge its footprint in industries that Europe has traditionally dominated, such as automobiles and chemicals, this imbalance is even more consequential. Unless China changes course, Europe may have to adopt measures to protect domestic industries.
Already, Europe is pursuing a “de-risking” strategy, which entails the diversification of its supply chains, especially in strategically important sectors. But this is a practical move, not an ideological one. The EU is attempting to mitigate the risks associated with excessive dependence on one source. De-risking is a shield, not a banner.
Ultimately, the EU is committed to maintaining a high level of cooperation with China. There is no denying China is a systemically important country with a huge market, or that many developing countries view it as a valuable political and economic counterweight to the West. It must be included in any effort to tackle global issues such as climate change, debt sustainability and public health. Even regional challenges, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, call for cooperation with China.
Over the past three years, Europe has been forced to abandon its geopolitical naivety and recognise that normative power is no longer sufficient to wield strategic influence, that multilateralism is giving way to transactional logic. If the EU is to thrive in a harsher, more conflict-ridden world, striking the right balance in its relations with China is essential. But that does not mean Europe has done so. Far from it.
If the EU is to thrive in a more conflict-ridden world, striking the right balance in its relations with China is essential