Germany is reshaping world in era of US-China rivalry
Richard Heydarian says under Olaf Scholz, Berlin has taken a more active role in global affairs
We want to do whatever we can to help settle tensions in a peaceful manner,” German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said of the South China Sea territorial disputes while standing next to Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr.
“This is about adhering to international law, ensuring the freedom of navigation. We are working to ensure that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is being adhered to by all its parties,” Scholz added, emphasising the utmost importance of de-escalation and the code of conduct negotiations for the South China Sea.
Crucially, Scholz also referred to the 2016 arbitral tribunal award, which invalidated China’s claims in adjacent waters. He made it clear that he believes it “to be very important that each and every one adheres to the legislation in place”.
During his visit to Berlin, Marcos made it clear he had “no choice” but to defend his country’s sovereign rights. But the Filipino leader also clarified he was not just rejecting any proposals China made and diplomacy was still his preferred option.
Scholz, who hosted three Southeast Asian leaders this month, positioned Germany as a global leader by expressing support for fellow democracies such as the Philippines, as well as underscoring the importance of diplomacy in resolving conflicts in Asia. However, he steered clear of criticising China or signalling alignment with the US strategy against Beijing.
If anything, Scholz is expected to visit Beijing next month to further buttress SinoGerman economic cooperation as well as exercise constructive diplomacy in areas of geopolitical divergence. Germany, now the world’s third-largest economy, is signalling its preference for a different approach to global diplomacy that seeks to both stabilise and transcend the US-China rivalry.
Scholz rose to national prominence when he served as finance minister under former German chancellor Angela Merkel. However, he initially struggled to escape the shadow of his predecessor, who dominated European politics for more than a decade.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced Scholz to up his statesmanship, leading him to declare an epochal turning point in Germany’s foreign policy. He promised to revisit the country’s post-Cold War strategy, which eschewed an assertive defence policy in favour of a “change through trade” to approach authoritarian powers.
Thus, Berlin began to reconsider its economic engagement with Moscow and adopted a more proactive defence policy. When it comes to Germany’s Asia policy, Scholz has held onto the country’s 2020 Indo-Pacific strategy, which underscored the importance of economic engagement and a proactive defence policy.
Berlin has largely resisted Washington’s approach in favour of constructive engagement with China. A little more than a year into office, Scholz became the first Western leader to visit China after the outbreak of Covid-19, a decision that drew sharp criticism from Germany’s transatlantic allies as well as coalition partners at home.
The visit also came on the heels of Scholz’ decision to overrule Germany’s defence and political establishment in favour of Chinese investment in a Hamburg port terminal. During his conversation with former premier Li Keqiang, Scholz made it clear that “we do not believe in ideas of decoupling”, though he did emphasise the importance of maintaining “economic ties as equals, with reciprocity”.
Far from ingratiating himself to Beijing, however, Scholz reiterated his country’s opposition to any coercive change in crossstraits relations and that “any change in Taiwan’s status quo must be peaceful or by mutual agreement”. Meanwhile, President Xi Jinping reassured Scholz he would oppose, in tandem with other major powers, Russia’s potential “use of, or threats to use, nuclear weapons” in Ukraine.
Scholz’s coming visit to China is likely to seek to build on his constructive approach to diplomatic engagement. In this sense, he is not only resisting the approach to China favoured by the United States but could also facilitate a more durable SinoAmerican detente by re-emphasising areas of shared global interests.
Crucially, Germany is also eager to develop ties with other emerging middle powers in the Global South. Based on my recent exchanges with the German chancellor and leading strategists in Berlin, it’s clear that Europe’s largest economy is seeking comprehensive strategic partnerships with rising powers, especially India as well as key Southeast Asian nations such as Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines.
Germany has an inherent interest in diversifying its economic partnerships to reduce its dependence on China as well as form deeper defence cooperation with likeminded players in Asia with a focus on maritime security and cybersecurity. To underscore its commitment, Germany is not only expanding its strategic investment footprint in the Indo-Pacific but also stepping up its defence policy and naval deployments there, albeit in a calibrated fashion.
The ultimate aim is to underscore Germany’s active contribution to a rulesbased international order, build a network of partnerships with fellow middle powers in the world’s most dynamic region and help create a pluralistic order that transcends the whims of any superpower.
It remains to be seen if Scholz will succeed in his global strategy, which rejects subservience to any superpower. What is clear is that few countries are betterpositioned than Germany in promoting a constructive and collaborative global order against the backdrop of intensifying superpower rivalry.
Berlin has largely resisted Washington’s approach in favour of constructive engagement with China
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