Beijing must rise above the rhetoric as peacemaker

Klaus W. Larres and Lea Thome say China’s friendship with both Russia and Ukraine can help with shuttle mediation between the warring neighbours

For more than a week last month, Li Hui, Chinese special envoy for Eurasian affairs, travelled through Europe in a second attempt at Chinese shuttle diplomacy. This follows Beijing’s announcement of its support for and participation in a peace conference. Switzerland plans to convene such a conference in the near future.

However, despite its efforts, Beijing has been unable to position itself as a credible mediator in the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war. Given China’s “no limits” partnership with Russia, Beijing’s advocacy for a peace conference potentially hosted by Switzerland can be understood as strategic posturing rather than a credible commitment to resolving the war.

China clearly wishes to develop an image as a peacemaker and global mediator. Most Western countries, however, fail to see how what some have called China’s “pro-Russian neutrality” and its strong support of Moscow could possibly enable it to mediate in the war. China has continued to prop up Russia’s sanctions-hit economy. \

In 2023, China bought significant and increasing amounts of oil and gas and delivered urgently required dual-use products to Russia, including drones, semiconductors and spare parts.

Since the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, Beijing has been taking part in more multilateral dialogues. During the last decade, China has, in fact, attempted to act as a mediator in conflict areas on several occasions, such as in Afghanistan, Myanmar and South Sudan, but with only very limited success.

On Ukraine, Beijing’s 12-point-peace plan has been dismissed by the US and most Nato members as largely siding with Russia.

As part of this plan, Beijing envisioned not only the ceasing of hostilities and resolving the devastating humanitarian crisis, but also the large-scale lifting of sanctions on Russia. While Russian President Vladimir Putin formally welcomed China’s 2023 peace plan, Moscow has yet to engage with the proposal in any practical way, despite its close ties with Beijing. This, however, has not stopped Beijing from trying again.

Li’s visit to Europe last month was billed as China’s “second round of shuttle diplomacy on seeking a political settlement of the Ukraine crisis”. He visited Russia, Ukraine, France, Germany and the European Union headquarters in Brussels.

In a press conference held in Beijing on March 22, Li said that as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a common friend of Russia and Ukraine, China can use its “shuttle mediation efforts” to convey information between the two countries. While Li’s announcement expressed peaceful sentiments, it does not appear that either of the warring parties and their supporters were impressed with this rhetoric.

As far as can be discerned, Li’s shuttle diplomacy in Europe has not led to any direct outcomes until now. China must realise the lack of confidence in the Swiss effort.

Putin has remained unconvinced too, it seems: Russia has rejected its own participation in the peace conference. Aware of this sentiment, Beijing’s efforts may well be more concerned with the building of its global image than with an actual commitment to ending the war in Ukraine.

Taking part in the envisaged Swiss peace conference would be China’s third attempt to put itself forward as a mediator in the Ukraine war. If China wants to make a credible effort to end the war, Beijing ought to exert pressure on Russia to offer concessions regarding the eastern Ukrainian territory Moscow has conquered since February 2022, including a proposal on Crimea. Moscow seems to have recently warmed to Beijing’s peace proposal.

Beyond Russia, China also needs to work closely with both the United States and Nato’s European members in creating the necessary conditions for an end to the military action in Ukraine. But most importantly, Beijing needs to reflect on its own assumed neutrality in direct contradiction to its partnership and support for Russia.

There have been few signs of China going beyond its non-committal rhetoric of peace to becoming involved in a more concrete and practical way to help end the devastating war in Ukraine.

Li’s shuttle diplomacy in Europe does not seem to have convinced European leaders yet of China’s ability to act as a mediator to end the Ukraine war.

Klaus W. Larres, PhD, is the Richard M. Krasno distinguished professor of history and international affairs at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill Lea Thome is the Schwarzman fellow at the Wilson Centre, affiliated with the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States