P.L.A. SETS SAIL FOR AFRICA IN REVIVED DIPLOMATIC PUSH
Port visits help Beijing cement security relations, display nation’s naval capabilities and provide opportunities to market military hardware
The Chinese navy has stepped up its port calls around Africa as part of Beijing’s growing military diplomacy with the continent.
After the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) paused many of its African port visits during the pandemic, it is getting back to full strength in a bid to cement diplomatic ties as well as show off military hardware, observers say.
China’s 45th naval fleet, including guided-missile destroyer Urumqi, missile frigate Linyi and comprehensive replenishment vessel Dongpinghu, visited Madagascar last week.
On March 23, the ships arrived in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, for a five-day stopover before heading to Maputo in Mozambique on April 1 for another five-day tour. Before that, the fleet completed an anti-piracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia.
It has since been replaced by the 46th Chinese naval escort task force, which includes the Type 052D guided-missile destroyer Jiaozuo, the Type 054A missile frigate Xuchang, and the Type 903A replenishment vessel Honghu, with over 700 crew members and two helicopters.
State broadcaster CCTV reported in December that by the end of 2023, the PLA Navy had escorted more than 7,200 vessels in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia in over 1,600 missions.
Recent deployments to the region come at a time when Red Sea trade routes have been paralysed after attacks on commercial ships by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who are protesting at Israel’s military operations in Gaza.
During 2023, the PLA navy also made port calls in Nigeria, Gabon, Ghana, Congo-Brazzaville, Angola and South Africa.
David Shinn, a China-Africa expert and professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, said the PLA Navy was resuming a practice it had institutionalised before the pandemic when its ships would make calls at Indian Ocean and African ports, usually after completion of a three or fourmonth anti-piracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden.
The port calls did not resume until February 2023, Shinn said, with a trilateral exercise involving naval vessels from China, Russia and South Africa off the South African coast, dubbed Mosi, which means smoke in the local Tswana language.
This was followed by naval visits at ports in West Africa in July 2023, he said, and now the visits to Tanzania, Mozambique, and probably a few more African ports before this series is finished.
Shinn said some of these visits involved exercises with other navies, and often gifts of low-cost items such as sports equipment were given. “[The visits] provide positive publicity for both China and the African host.”
He noted that most of these countries also welcome visits by naval ships from Western nations, allowing leaders to demonstrate their “non-alignment”.
For China, though, it is about building alliances.
“China wants to cement the security relationship with African governments and port cities so that it can access them quickly in times of need,” Shinn said.
Paul Nantulya, a China specialist at the National Defence University’s Africa Centre for Strategic Studies in Washington, said the visit of the 45th naval fleet to Tanzania and Mozambique “forms part of what I like to call the PLA’s multipurpose employment of its naval task forces”.
Nantulya said the missions began in 2008 and had grown in duration, sophistication and tasks – with their main mission being anti-piracy patrols, primarily in the Gulf of Aden.
But he said the Chinese navy had used them for other missions, such as citizen evacuations in Libya, Yemen and Sudan, military exercises and drills with African forces, the delivery of humanitarian aid and military diplomacy, as seen in the visits to Tanzania and Mozambique.
“These port calls reinforce Chinese strategic diplomacy, strengthen military to military ties, demonstrate China’s improving naval capabilities, and afford the PLA opportunities to market its military hardware to African customers,” Nantulya said.
Algeria, for instance, has bought Chinese submarines.
Another benefit for the PLA Navy, Nantulya said, was the operational experience it gained, as well as the ability to test and field new equipment.
“All the assets China deploys into African waters are new or upgraded. The operational experience is critical as China has not fought a war since 1979.”
And while not all the operations China conducted in African maritime domains were necessarily transferable to high intensity combat scenarios, he said they were better than nothing.
There were also bonuses for the African countries, Nantulya said. They demonstrate their strategic and diplomatic ties to China, expose their forces to foreign military practices and doctrine, and achieve a level of interoperability that also benefits China.
In addition, they “increase their leverage to negotiate economic agreements with China in exchange for permitting the PLA to dock in their yards”.
Port visits are a recognised role for navies as they spread goodwill and show military prowess, according to Francois Vrey, a professor emeritus of military science and a research coordinator at the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa at South Africa’s Stellenbosch University.
They also give an indication of China’s diplomatic intent. Vrey said while China kept ships on station in the northwest Indian Ocean, they were not the same vessels that visited Tanzania and Mozambique.
The ships that made those visits were, however, recently involved in an exercise in the Arabian Sea with Russia and Iran. Also, amid the Red Sea crisis, Russian ships conducted exercises with the Djibouti Navy, at the southern part of the Red Sea.
“This is about the diplomatic value of naval power to extend political influence given that the current Chinese administration elevated the oceans and maritime interests very close to the top of its overall policy plans and programmes architecture,” Vrey said.