Dial down tensions
Chee Yik-wai says Asean leaders must go beyond centrality if the region is to avoid ending up a graveyard of China- and US-backed military misadventures
For the first time, a majority in Southeast Asia favour alignment with China over the United States, according to “The State of Southeast Asia 2024” survey by the ISEASYusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. The survey’s accuracy in reflecting mass opinion has been questioned, given its elite group of respondents – which included government officials, researchers, pundits and businessmen – and the weighting applied to each country’s response. But it still offers valuable insights for leaders in the US, China and especially the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
My biggest takeaway is that Asean centrality as a diplomatic approach should be re-examined. To keep Asean safe and prosperous, asking the US and China to respect the bloc’s centrality is not enough. To survive, Asean must be pro-China and pro-US in different ways, but not seen as against either side. After all, should push come to shove, some Asean members under domestic pressure may not have the luxury of avoiding a choice.
For the superpowers, the annual survey also helps point out areas they can improve upon in courting Asean.
For China, although it was favoured over the US by one percentage point, the region’s distrust of Beijing also ticked higher. This is unsurprising given the South China Sea tensions.
That fewer would choose to align with the US over China in the latest survey is also likely to be a reflection of a growing disapproval of the US, whose pro-Israel stance in the Gaza war has made it extremely unpopular in Muslim-majority countries. Consumers in Indonesia and Malaysia, for instance, have boycotted products by companies seen as pro-Israel.
However, the harsh reality is that Asean members do not get to pick who they would most like to work with. Japan, for instance, is well and away the most trusted major power but Asean clearly needs China for economic growth, and the reverse might also be true.
Asean also needs US security support. Beijing has been ramping up its action in the South China Sea while there have been few breakthroughs in negotiations on a code of conduct in the sea. The Philippines, a long-time US defence ally, has even tried to rally support for a separate code of conduct with Malaysia and Vietnam, bypassing China.
Asean is at the forefront of the US’ efforts to preserve its global dominance through China containment strategies so it is more than happy to provide military support to its regional treaty allies. Even Malaysia and Indonesia, for all the harsh rhetoric about US hypocrisy in the Gaza war, are unlikely to shy away from seeking US support to defend their territory.
In the absence of territorial disputes with China, the Asean region would be likely to be staunchly pro-China, given the massive trade benefits.
When China feels its core interests are being threatened, it tends to employ economic sanctions, and when Beijing withdraws its trade, the US-led West struggles to fill the gap – as seen with Lithuania and Australia.
But the coercion also has the effect of pushing “punished” countries closer to the US. Australia, for instance, has deepened military cooperation with the US through the Aukus alliance (which also includes Britain), irking China even more.
The Philippines has also drawn closer to the US as disputes with China grow in the South China Sea. The US’ operations in the area are usually conducted under the banner of “freedom of navigation”.
Relations between Washington and Beijing appear to be stabilising, with US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen recently visiting China, but core differences remain and both sides can be expected to continue to aggressively advance their interests in Southeast Asia.
Despite both China and the US officially endorsing Asean centrality, the reality is that a strong and unified Asean should favour neither. To maximise their interests, it will always be easier for superpowers to divide and conquer by singling out friendlier states. Asean leaders must not be naive and must explore ways to diffuse US-China tensions as a collective strategy.
Asean cannot and must not expect to reap the benefits of US-China rivalry – such as from companies reshoring out of China – without being prepared to pay the price should the rivalry spiral out of control.
From Beijing’s perspective, reshoring, “friendshoring” and “de-risking” are all forms of “decoupling” in disguise, aimed at weakening China. Beijing may not view Asean as an entirely innocent bystander that just happens to profit at its expense. Unfortunately, however, for most Asean leaders, this seems to be their strategy, or lack thereof.
That said, there is still hope that Asean can mediate US-China differences and reduce tensions. The Shangri-La Dialogue, one of the world’s biggest defence diplomacy platforms, has been hosted in Singapore for more than two decades with increasing representation from China.
Singapore has also hosted leaders’ meetings credited with diffusing tensions, such as the first summit between President Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s then-president Ma Ying-jeou in 2015, and the historic summit between US president Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in 2019.
Besides Singapore, all of Asean must promote the bloc as an honest broker and a neutral platform to seek solutions to the US-China rivalry. The last thing the region wants is to end up a graveyard of China- and US-backed military misadventures. It is time for Asean leaders to realise that security comes not from a passive centrality but from an active mediation.