Cyprus ‘hush hush’

IF YOU have come to the conclusion that there is much that could be described as “hush hush” about the decades of merry-goround “Cyprus talks”, you wouldn’t be far wrong. Past and present events prove it. Take for instance the reportedly “hush hush” meeting between the TRNC’s President Akıncı and the US’s President Trump about how to end the present stalemate in negotiations (asking Donald to find the solution to the “Cyprus problem” is about as hopelessly optimistic as expecting Boris Johnson to comb his hair when he gets out of bed).

I can just imagine the scene. President Trump: “Welcome Mr Akıncı. I believe you claim to be the president of some place called North Cyprus, which I’m told doesn’t exist”. President Akıncı: “Your State Department will know me better as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, sir”. President Trump: “Ah, I see. Do your people live in Brooklyn or Harlem?” President Akıncı: “Cyprus, Mr President”. President Trump: “Where’s that then? Arizona?” President Akıncı: “It’s an island off the coast of Turkey, sir”. President Trump: “Good, here’s a map of south-east Asia — can you point it out?” Enough said. OK, I admit it, I’m prone to exaggeration, but I’ll bet you know what I mean.

What interests me is the reportedly “hush hush” nature of their get-together. It’s a theme that has run through events in Cyprus ever since the Turkish intervention in 1974. Recently released British Foreign Office papers relating to that period prove it. In a 1976 letter, written by James Callaghan (then foreign secretary), addressed to the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, he said “no” to their request for him to appear before them and explain the nature of his discussions with the Turkish prime minister of the time (Bülent Ecevit) prior to the Turkish intervention in Cyprus. His reason for the refusal was that such a revelation would “make it even more difficult to progress the Cyprus talks”. You are not kidding, mate, and I know why.

I once paid an official visit to the TRNC as a member of the All Party Friends of Northern Cyprus, along with the late Jamie Cann MP (Labour, Ipswich) and John Taylor MP (Ulster Unionist, Strangford, now known as Lord Kilcooney) at the invitation of then TRNC President Rauf Denktaş. He wanted to brief us on the failing UN-sponsored talks then focusing on the Boutros Boutros-Ghali “Set of Ideas”(199294). At President Denktaş’s request, all three of us attended the Turkish Foreign Ministry in Ankara to witness first-hand the Turkish reaction to the unfolding failure of those talks in New York.

While there, at our request, we met the former Turkish prime minister, Mr Ecevit. We asked him directly if he could confirm that prior to him authorising the Turkish Army’s intervention in 1974, he had met with then British prime minister, Harold Wilson and his foreign secretary, James Callaghan. He confirmed that as Britain and Turkey were “guarantors” of the power-sharing “Republic of Cyprus” (then in the process of being overturned by an Athens-organised coup, aimed at uniting Cyprus with Greece), he had indeed met them. He even asked Britain to join Turkey in a joint operation to restore the power-sharing Cyprus Constitution. He said Wilson and Callaghan refused because Britain was pulling out of former colonial entanglements.

Mr Ecevit made clear to them that Turkey would therefore intervene alone, as a legal guarantor, to stop the ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Turkish Cypriots. He said Britain effectively gave a “nod and a wink” to that intervention as, at the time, no formal objection to Turkish intervention was forthcoming from either of them. The truth is that Britain failed in its obligations as a guarantor, much to the disgust of both Mr Ecevit and President Denktaş. For me, this explains why Callaghan didn’t want to appear before the British Foreign Affairs Select Committee in 1976.

Somewhere, hidden in the inner recesses of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, official confirmation of all this ought to exist. I suggest that the present British ministers responsible for Cyprus need to seek out those records, accept our abject failure and stop treating the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots as the villains of the piece and the Greek Cypriots as the only victims. Britain’s failure to support Turkey in 1974 was a prime cause of the Cyprus impasse and the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.

When the UK leaves the EU we will be free to pursue a completely independent policy on Cyprus. Admitting our past failure would be a start. Honour dictates it is long overdue. By now, “hush hush” should have long ago had its day.