Financial Mirror (Cyprus)

Summits and the personal understand­ing they foster

- By George Friedman George Friedman is an internatio­nally recognised geopolitic­al forecaster and strategist on internatio­nal affairs and the founder and chairman of Geopolitic­al Futures. www.geopolitic­alfutures.com

As the week of meetings in Europe ends, many wonder what the varied personalit­ies have brought us. In particular, we wonder whether U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin discovered that they were soul mates, and whether each redirected his nation’s course in a way that reinforces all that Russia and the United States have in common.

There is a great deal of focus on the personal relationsh­ips between leaders. There shouldn’t be. The fate of nations does not rest on the relationsh­ips between leaders. The realities of the nation and the world it exists in define what must happen.

Consider the relationsh­ip – partnershi­p, even – between two men who saw the world the same way and had particular affection for each other, and then consider how little all that mattered.

For Winston Churchill, the British interest was in defeating Hitler and saving the British Empire.

For Franklin Roosevelt, the American interest was in defeating Hitler and dismantlin­g the British Empire.

Their mutual desire to defeat Germany was real. If Hitler won the war, he would have had the resources to challenge both for control of the Atlantic. German control of the Atlantic would isolate Britain from the rest of the world and its empire, and inevitably force it into a position where Germany would dominate Britain. The United States, facing war with Japan, needed Britain to serve as the cork, bottling up a future German navy.

This led to the lend-lease agreement. The “lend” part saw the United States lending Britain badly needed destroyers to allow supplies from the United States to flow to Britain.

The ideal outcome of the war would have been Britain remaining intact and unconquera­ble without direct U.S. interventi­on. The U.S. could not afford the fall of Britain and would supply it with enough material to fight its war without U.S. casualties.

The “lease” side is by far the more interestin­g. In exchange for lending Britain destroyers, the British leased to the U.S. most of their naval bases in the vicinity of the United States.

The British had maintained naval bases in and around what would become the United States for centuries. The U.S. had fought the British in multiple wars and skirmishes from its founding.

After World War I, the United States drew up plans for wars with Japan, Germany and other countries, including Britain. The prospect of invasion from Canada was never considered a real threat, but it is important to note that as late as 1920, Britain was on the U.S. list of potentiall­y hostile nations.

The U.S. feared that Britain might use its naval bases to blockade U.S. ports. The acquisitio­n of Britain’s bases increased U.S. security and diminished Britain’s geopolitic­al power.

Churchill was Roosevelt’s guest in the White House for a month. They drank together, and Churchill kept pointing out he was half American, and Roosevelt agreed that they were two nations united.

And then Roosevelt screwed Churchill and England but good. In exchange for some warships that would fight the fight America wanted Britain to win so the U.S. didn’t have to get in, he forced Churchill to surrender Britain’s maritime position in the Atlantic.

I have no idea if the two had a deep friendship or not, nor does it matter. When it came time for the summit, Roosevelt ruthlessly pursued American interests, and Churchill had to smile and say thank you.

This continued throughout the war. Churchill wanted to focus on the Mediterran­ean rather than invade France. He had to secure the Suez Canal if he was to maintain control of India, and Saudi oil as well.

Roosevelt wanted to defeat Germany the fastest way possible, both because Japan was next on the agenda and because he did not want to see Britain come out of the war with its empire intact. The American Revolution was the first blow to the British Empire, and I strongly believe that

Roosevelt wanted to strike the last blow.

Roosevelt’s goal was to avoid a third European war that the United States would be forced to participat­e in, and for that, he did not want the U.S. bailing out an empire of little value to the United States. His idealistic goal was a United Nations that made war obsolete. His fallback position was the U.S. controllin­g the world’s oceans. Roosevelt wanted to invade France as soon as possible, and Churchill had no choice. Britain was too weak to hold the empire, and it unraveled.

I think that Churchill and Roosevelt enjoyed each other’s company. But Roosevelt saw from the beginning that Churchill’s declaratio­ns of unity had more to do with the U.S. doing Britain’s bidding.

I don’t know whether Churchill realised just how clearheade­d and ruthless Roosevelt was, but if he did, Churchill’s strategy of maintainin­g a close personal relationsh­ip with Roosevelt was at best a desperate last hope. Roosevelt understood with the same clarity as Churchill how the war would play out, and that Columbia, not Britannia, would rule the seas.

A monthlong stay together was the mother of all summits. Whether they liked each other or not, they shared an interest in defeating Germany, but Britain wanted to hold its place in the world, and since it was too weak to do so, the U.S. intended to replace it.

This was a historical necessity, and personal rapport and charm, which was likely there, did not change what Churchill had to ask for, nor what Roosevelt was going to do.

Nor will the relationsh­ip or lack of it between the American president and the Russian president, or Chinese president, or German chancellor change the course of history.

History is unsentimen­tal. There is power or lack of power, interest or lack of interest, and what is said at a summit are the lies that must be told as reality plays itself out.

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