The curse of sectarianism in Lebanon

The country’s economic and political problems are rooted in its sectarian divides

In October 2019, a spate of protests erupted over the Lebanese government’s plan to impose a daily 20-cent charge on calls made through WhatsApp. The demonstrations abated a few months later when the COVID-19 pandemic began, but sporadic and low-key outbursts have flared up ever since.

The anger over the proposed tax was intertwined with long-standing frustration over government corruption and misconduct. Indeed, in Lebanon, these problems are as old as the state itself, but the level of corruption hasn’t always been this bad.

After gaining independence in 1943, the country’s sectarian leaders established an oligarchical political system that granted the people freedom of expression, though it concentrated power in the elite. Despite its inherent limitations, the system was effective enough to give Lebanon the pretense of democracy and established it as the only democratic country in the Arab world.

But in the 1990s, a new oligarchical class comprising people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds rose to power and in the process exploited public funds to expand their own wealth. They established an uneasy power troika between Sunni, Shiite and Maronite leaders and disbanded Lebanon’s historical concept of national accommodation. They also resorted to excessive borrowing to cover deficit spending and fraudulent public works.

By the end of 2019, Lebanon was bankrupt. People lost their life savings after banks lent their deposits to the central bank, which transferred its profits to foreign bank accounts. It’s a steep fall from grace for a country once celebrated as the Switzerland of the east and whose capital, Beirut, was the Paris of the Arab world.

Ineffective Civil Society

To understand the reasons behind Lebanon’s downfall, one needs to understand its sectarian political system. This system has allowed sectarian leaders to escape accountability in order to protect the country’s fragile unity.

Civil society, including Lebanon’s 1,300 nongovernmental organisations as well as other interest groups, was supposed to be a moderating force, but it has failed to limit the destructive influence of sectarianism.

These groups, which include labour unions, journalist organisations and medical associations, specialise in a wide range of social issues. But instead of holding those in power accountable, they have been co-opted by them.

Most voluntary associations owe their existence to foreign financial support. They evade government monetary controls, lack transparency and suffer from the same corruption that plagues Lebanon’s political system. After last year’s massive port explosion in Beirut, foreign aid poured into Lebanon.

Many donors, especially from Western countries, channelled donations to local NGOs, lacking faith in the government’s ability to dispense the assistance to people in need. But much of the aid ended up for sale at market prices in supermarkets, drug stores and elsewhere.

Local NGOs that spearheaded the ensuing protests demanded the ouster of political leaders but took no issue with Lebanon’s sectarian system.

The NGOs attributed Lebanon’s economic and political woes to corrupt politicians, not an unworkable political system. They paid little attention to the self-serving sectarian political cartel that dominates all three branches of government.

Lebanon’s civil society has therefore been unable to effect any real change. Though civil society groups increasingly attract members and audiences from a wide spectrum of society, they have failed to pressure the government to adopt, let alone implement, policies to address critical social issues that affect people’s daily lives.

For example, sanitation and garbage disposal are increasingly areas of concern. Existing landfills are overburdened, and garbage is often disposed of in open spaces or dumped in rivers or the sea.

In the 2018 general election, a candidate with a background in civil society won a seat in parliament but resigned two years later after realising that she could not deliver on her campaign promises.

Sectarian Divide

The Lebanese see themselves as unique among the Arabs. They pride themselves on their strong business and service skills and on the success they have achieved as immigrants in foreign countries. But despite this sense of Lebanese exceptionalism, the Lebanese have failed to foster a sense of national solidarity and a political community that cuts across religious and sectarian lines.

Most Lebanese people discover their national identity when communicating with foreigners, but they often view their fellow

Lebanese from other sects as outsiders. In the 20th century, economic development was concentrated in Beirut, a predominantly Sunni city on the coast, and Mount Lebanon, which is mainly Maronite Christian.

But the people of the coast and the mountains shared little in common ideologically despite their proximity, and the rest of the country remained on the fringes, increasingly isolated and dominated by medieval-style feudal leaders. The sectarian division fuelled a sense of alienation and susceptibility to violence and radicalism.

Another problem related to the sectarian divide is clientelism, a legacy of the feudal system. It’s a form of political control whereby members of the ruling elite preside over a sectarian constituency and provide it with essential services, such as education, medical care and employment The relationship between client and patron is uneven, as the former owes complete and unquestioned loyalty to the latter. This practice is common among political parties.

The late Kamal Jumblatt, the scion of a feudal Druze family, established the Progressive Socialist Party in 1949 to expand his base of popular support. In 1974, the Shiite-dominated Amal Movement was formed as the Movement of the Dispossessed to unseat the sect’s feudal leaders who treated the peasants like serfs.

When parliamentary elections resumed in 1992 after Lebanon’s 15-year civil war, Amal and another Shiite-dominated party, Hezbollah, formed a joint electoral list. They maintained their close cooperation in the five subsequent legislative elections, carrying all Shiite seats without a single loss.

In turn, Shiites depend almost entirely on the Amal-Hezbollah coalition to provide them with a range of services including food, health care and education. Some Shiites joined the protests in 2019, but Amal and Hezbollah quickly clamped down on the demonstrations and, simultaneously, expanded their material provisions to discourage further revolt.

Other sects use similar tactics to keep their bases loyal. Cash payments, food rations and jobs, especially in the public sector, are standard incentives in exchange for political loyalty and votes. Several politicians, including Prime Ministerdesignate Saad Hariri, have bribed voters with COVID-19 vaccines ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections.

The Lebanese Forces party, a Maronite rival of President Michel Aoun’s party, has appealed for donations from its wealthy supporters abroad. The government, meanwhile, remains idle, unable to address the economic crisis that has put more than 80% of people below the poverty line. Clientelism has contributed to the crisis. Lebanon’s public sector employs 320,000 people – twice the number of employees needed for a country its size – and cost the treasury $8 billion in 2019.

Elusive Citizenship

The European student movement of the 1960s had a tremendous impact on Lebanese college students and rising secular trends. New social movements sought to break loose from the tight grip of sectarian leaders, who saw the mere emergence of these movements during a period of regional and domestic turmoil as a threat. The elite’s apprehension soared as demands for secularism grew especially among the youth.

The civil war that began in 1975 derailed the rise of secularism and reignited primordial allegiances. More than 120,000 people perished in the war. Thousands more went missing and hundreds of thousands left the country or were internally displaced.

To prevent another war from breaking out, many Lebanese people wanted to unite the country’s myriad sects. But Syria’s 29year hegemony over Lebanon (1976-2005) gave Hezbollah ultimate control over the state under the pretense of preventing Israeli occupation. Thus, the Lebanese missed the opportunity to reform their political system after 15 years of bloody civil war.

The country is currently facing its worst economic crisis ever. It would be unfortunate if it doesn’t learn the lessons from this situation to construct a new political system.