Hezbollah’s waning Shiite support
The group’s popularity has declined markedly since the country’s financial collapse began two years ago
Last month, prominent Hezbollah figure Nawar al-Sahili held a lavish wedding for his daughter in Lebanon.
The swanky affair, complete with ornate decor and Western-style clothing, caused a national stir as many saw the flagrant display of affluence as insensitive at a time when many in Lebanon are suffering under one of the worst financial crises on record.
The incident demonstrates the changing perception of Hezbollah, which was once held up as a defender of religious values and is now seen as a primary example of the corruption of Lebanese politics.
Humble Beginnings
Hezbollah has come a long way since 1985, when it emerged as a political party committed to altruism, self-sacrifice and community service. Its followers wanted to impose an Islamic state and were skeptical about the Lebanese political system. Hezbollah, too, initially preferred to stay out of politics, believing that getting involved in political affairs would derail the group from its mission. It focused on setting up its own infrastructure, which helped Hezbollah communicate directly with its community of supporters.
Entering Lebanese politics requires abiding by its rules and norms, including joining alliances, which could come at the expense of a party’s ability to engage directly with the people. That’s because, in Lebanon, sectarian leaders act as the conduit for interaction with their constituencies, based on uneven patron-client relations. Lebanon has what’s called a confessional political system whereby political positions and resources are allocated to certain religious and ethnic groups, based on an agreed-upon formula, to avoid sectarian friction and civil strife.
Hezbollah faced the choice of clashing with its rival Shiite party, the Amal Movement, or striking a deal with its leader, Nabih Berri, who is currently the speaker of the house. In the 1980s, the two parties fought fiercely, a result of their conflicting political plans: Amal wanted to become an integral component of Lebanese politics, while Hezbollah wanted to impose drastic reforms to conform the state to its religious ideology. In a bid to build up its institutions and win over Shiites, Hezbollah decided to work with Amal and split the resources allocated to Shiite constituencies.
To keep the alliance intact, Hezbollah turned a blind eye to Amal’s corruption. But as it became more of an established component of the government, Hezbollah too grew increasingly corrupt, especially after joining the Cabinet following the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon in 2005. The expansion of the mandate for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in 2006 meant that Hezbollah’s anti-Israel activities had ended, leading to its transformation from a jihadist party into a money-making organization.
This worked in Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s favor. He was able to accrue resources he otherwise wouldn’t have access to, but at the same time, the infrastructure the party had built to organize its relations with Shiites began to look increasingly like the inept state bureaucracy to which the Lebanese people had grown accustomed. Nasrallah understood that controlling Hezbollah’s finances would strengthen his position within its ranks and with Iran. He was impressed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s control of a business empire, and he wanted to build his own. He also drew on Yasser Arafat’s management of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which to a considerable measure depended on his total control of its treasury.
Split With Shiites
When Israel withdrew from south Lebanon in 2000, Shiites rejected Sunni and Christian demands to disarm Hezbollah. They accepted Hezbollah’s claims that its military wing could defend Lebanon against Israeli attacks. But the clampdown on protesters over the past two years, the assassination of sectarian activists who opposed Lebanon’s subservience to Iran, and Hezbollah’s wheeling and dealing in the local oil market finally convinced most Shiites that Lebanon would be better off without Hezbollah.
Despite Lebanon’s acute energy crisis, local Hezbollah officials often hoard gasoline and withhold it from the market, claiming it is a strategic commodity they need to defend the country against Israel. This comes as a new class of wealthy Hezbollah personnel is emerging. They receive their salaries in U.S. dollars when most Lebanese barely get by on the local currency, which lost more than 95 percent of its purchasing power in less than two years. Many Shiites resent these officials’ public displays of affluence, including driving around in luxury cars, as average Shiites increasingly struggle to meet their basic needs.
The country’s financial crisis was exacerbated by the sanctions incurred as a result of Hezbollah’s involvement in the region’s armed conflicts, especially in Syria. The sanctions made it difficult for Lebanon to access foreign aid, which contributed to the country’s hyperinflation. Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council are also unwilling to rescue Lebanon from its financial problems unless the government in Beirut bans Hezbollah. Thus, many Shiites see the group as responsible for the country’s current state. In fact, activists and community figures believe more than 80 percent of Shiites oppose Hezbollah’s policies and see it as a significant contributor to Lebanon’s political and economic collapse.
Nasrallah’s own popularity has also been waning. For years, he had been surrounded by an air of invincibility. When the economic meltdown began, he assured Shiites that he would not let them go hungry, and they believed him. But the party has fallen short of Nasrallah’s promises, providing aid to only 20,000 Shiite families out of more than 220,500 registered households. He even recently suggested that people grow food on their balconies and rooftops to deal with the food shortages. Such comments have invited criticism and even mockery. His decision to procure fuel from Iran was lauded by the head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council, who said it broke the U.S. blockade on Iran, Lebanon and Syria, from where the oil is delivered to Lebanon. Nasrallah’s prestige has steadily declined, and his long speeches have turned into tedious political sermons. Shiites no longer see him as a leader capable of combating corruption; on the contrary, many see him as a major part of the corrupt political establishment.
Ready for Change
Many Shiites have a different perception of Hezbollah today compared to the 1980s, when it presented itself as an impeccable, disciplined and God-fearing party. For example, Hezbollah’s involvement in the drug trade – part of a practice called “narcojihad,” which justifies drug smuggling to enemy states to fund its own activities – is well known. One of Nasrallah’s security advisers oversees the trafficking of drugs, and a deputy in Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc owns a factory that manufactures lowquality amphetamines, which are labeled with the brand name Captagon. It defends these activities by claiming that they’re necessary to protect the resistance against infidels – which include, in addition to Christians and Jews, Sunni Muslims and Shiites who do not subscribe to the Iranian Revolution’s Islamic doctrine and worldview. Amid a worsening fuel shortage, Shiites have also accused Nasrallah and other Hezbollah officials of profiting from state-subsidized fuel that’s smuggled into Syria from Lebanon and sold at market prices. (Hezbollah’s smuggling of fuel to Syria is a significant cause of fuel scarcity in Lebanon.)
Most people now view Hezbollah’s claims to being the “party of resistance” as insincere and misleading. For a while, their frustrations, which began with Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian war that led to thousands of casualties, were often spoken about only in private. But in recent months, critics have begun to voice their anger publicly. It’s unlikely that Shiites will revolt against Hezbollah because its opponents, even though widespread, lack leadership and organization. They would, however, welcome its ouster by foreign intervention, seeing this as the only means of effecting change in this part of the world.