Turkey and Israel’s partnership of necessity

Reeling from a wrenching economic crisis, Ankara is desperate for economic partners

Last week, Israeli President Isaac Herzog paid a two-day visit to Ankara at the invitation of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The trip – the first high-level visit by an Israeli official to Turkey since 2008 – underscores the push by Middle Eastern countries to restructure their alliances as the U.S. shifts its foreign policy focus elsewhere.

Turkish-Israeli relations had been strained since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey two decades ago, but Erdogan heralded Herzog’s visit as a turning point in their economic and political relationship. Except for a few protests in Istanbul and Ankara, there was little political opposition, including within the AKP, to the meeting. Though Israel remains generally unpopular among Turkish citizens, most Turks seem more focused on the country’s deteriorating economic conditions and their difficulty making ends meet. To that end, Erdogan is keen on repairing Turkey’s relations with other Middle Eastern countries so he can refocus on the economy and launch his 2023 presidential election campaign. Thus he reaffirmed during a visit to Abu Dhabi last month that he’s working to reestablish normal relations with Israel and Egypt. He’s anxious to reverse his foreign policy of the previous 15 years, which nearly made Turkey a pariah state in the region.

Derailed Relationship

The relationship between Turkey and Israel wasn’t always tense. Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949 and welcomed Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in 1958. For decades, military cooperation served as the backbone of Turkish-Israeli relations. Israeli technology made it possible for Turkey to launch its successful drone program after the U.S. withheld technical assistance. Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, who founded the Islamist Welfare Party and sought to improve Turkish relations with Arab countries, also maintained close ties with Israel. In 1996, he signed a military cooperation agreement with Israel to upgrade Turkey’s F-4 fighter jets and M-60 main battle tanks. Turkey also allowed the Israeli air force to use its airspace for training missions. Even in 2007, Turkey allowed Israeli jets access to its airspace during an operation to destroy an unfinished Syrian nuclear plant.

But Erdogan’s regional ambitions eventually derailed the relationship between the two countries. In 2005, he visited Israel to meet with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who welcomed him to what the Israelis called their “eternal capital.” Later, however, he decided to open to the Arab region and bolster Turkey’s economic ties with Arab countries. Whereas Erbakan managed to do this without antagonizing Israel, Erdogan, motivated by the Arab uprisings, entertained the idea of neo-Ottomanism to revive Turkey’s past imperial glory and endear himself to Arabs and Muslims.

Israelis had not forgotten Erdogan’s altercation in 2009 with President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum, where he stormed out of the meeting after the Israel Defense Forces launched Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. The two countries normalized relations in 2016 after eight years of tension over the situation in the Palestinian territories. Two years later, Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador over the killing of 60 Palestinian demonstrators trying to storm Gaza’s border with Israel. When Israel and the United Arab Emirates normalized relations two years ago, Turkey threatened to suspend ties with the UAE, arguing it had sold out the Palestinian people. Still, at the same time that Erdogan was promising not to abandon the Palestinians, he was pushing to convince Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to open a new chapter in relations with Turkey.

But his efforts had little success. Some Israeli security officials even considered Turkey a virtual enemy. In 2020, the IDF and Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency viewed Turkey as a strategic challenge, an even greater threat than Iran. The former directorgeneral of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alon Liel, characterized the Israeli-Turkish relationship as one of “mutual hostility,” saying there was total distrust in Erdogan’s leadership.

Israel’s Cautious Opening

Though Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has lauded Herzog’s efforts to restore ties with Turkey, he favors a slow and cautious approach. In 2013, he criticized Netanyahu’s apology to Turkey over the 2010 Marmara flotilla incident, in which Israeli commandos killed nine Turkish activists. For two years before leaving office in June 2021, Netanyahu was also wary of Erdogan’s bid to normalize relations. In the U.S., the election of Joe Biden, who was critical of Erdogan during the presidential campaign, hastened Turkey’s efforts to break out of its isolation. Still, the Turkish president has been persistent. Reeling from a wrenching economic crisis that began prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Turkey is desperate for economic partners.

To show that it’s serious about mending ties with Israel, Ankara has taken initial steps to tighten its grip on Hamas, for example by restricting Hamas’ activity on Turkish territory. Herzog then accepted Erdogan’s invitation to visit Ankara. Last year, Erdogan also earnestly initiated reconciliation with the UAE, Morocco and Sudan, three Arab countries that signed peace treaties with Israel. These moves are part of Turkey’s plan to restructure the region following the U.S.’ withdrawal.

The war in Ukraine has also presented an opportunity for Turkey. Since the beginning of the crisis, Erdogan has been reiterating his argument that Turkey is the best avenue through which to transport Israeli gas to Europe. The Biden administration’s withdrawal of support for the Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline project, which would deliver Israeli gas to Europe via Cyprus and Greece, revived Erdogan’s hopes that Turkey and Israel could be important partners on energy. This issue – in addition to defense, a topic that cemented their ties in the 1990s – came up in the two leaders’ inaugural talks. (Though it’s worth noting that Herzog’s role in Israeli politics is mostly ceremonial, and he can’t accomplish much on his own beyond an initial thawing of relations.)

Energy, particularly natural gas resources in the eastern Mediterranean, will be a key issue for Turkey in the years ahead. It’s gained increasing prominence in Turkish foreign policy – largely because of outstanding disputes over exclusive economic zones with Egypt, Cyprus and Greece. It’s also critical to Turkey’s economic development, which is why it needs to foster

good working relations with Israel and Egypt, and thus with the United States. Israel, however, has recently made it clear that improving ties with Turkey will not happen at the expense of its relations with Greece and Cyprus.

Then there’s the issue of Turkey’s relationship with the United States. Erdogan needs to end Ankara’s political isolation, especially in the Middle East, but he can’t fully normalize relations with countries of the region without restoring U.S. ties, which have declined since Barack Obama’s presidency. Relations haven’t improved under the Biden administration, but Erdogan thinks he can win U.S. approval solely by opening to Israel because of the close U.S.-Israeli partnership.

Pragmatic Politics

Erdogan recognizes that politics is about interests, not emotions or friendships. Despite his contempt for Israel, he’s willing to mend relations with the country, believing, not incorrectly, that this will stabilize his grip on power, give Turkey’s economy a boost, make him acceptable to the Biden administration, and improve his chances of winning a third term as president.

Still, he too is acting cautiously. He invited left-leaning Herzog, who believes in the two-state solution, for an in-person meeting rather than right-wing Bennett, an ultra-nationalist who has been antagonistic toward Palestinian statehood. He knows the Israelis won’t listen to him, but he doesn’t want the Palestinian question to block pragmatic solutions to state interests. In dealing with Israel, Erdogan has always separated ideology from business. After the flotilla incident, for example, a shipping company co-owned by Erdogan’s son, Ahmet, continued to transport goods between Turkish and Israeli ports. Even in the years during their diplomatic strain, the two countries’ economic relationship only grew. Turkish-Israeli trade increased from $3.4 billion in 2008 to $8.5 billion in 2021 and is expected to exceed $10 billion in 2022.

Israel developed strong ties with Ankara long before Erdogan came to power, and it will continue to pursue these links after he exits politics. Erdogan’s time is running out, and it’s unlikely he’ll get another opportunity to challenge Israel politically.