On the war in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova tread carefully

Both countries must be careful not to bend too far toward the Russian or western camp

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine spreads westward toward the strategic port city of Odessa, concerns are growing that Moscow will soon turn its sights to Ukraine’s western neighbor, Moldova. These fears intensified after a rally – meant to mark eight years since Russia’s annexation of Crimea – in a Moscow stadium last Friday where attendees sang patriotic songs including “Made in the USSR,” which opens with the line: “Ukraine and Crimea, Belarus and Moldova, it’s all my country.”

The event likely also raised eyebrows in Georgia. As the only EU and NATO aspiring country in the Caucasus – a region that’s also mentioned in “Made in the USSR” – Georgia shares the same concerns as Moldova, but for different reasons.

It doesn’t share a border with Ukraine, but Georgia has very real memories of Russia’s invasion and de facto takeover of two separatist regions in 2008.

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Georgia and Moldova intensified their efforts to build closer ties to Brussels, especially given that both countries have Russianbacked breakaway regions – Trans-Dniester in Moldova and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. Last May, the two countries together with Ukraine formed the Association Trio, aimed at developing closer economic relations with the European Union, a priority for all three countries considering their long-standing dependence on the Russian economy as former Soviet states.

Within days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, they also applied for fast-track EU membership. They were previously seen as unlikely candidates because of Russia’s occupation of part of their territories, but given recent events, Brussels is now more willing to consider their accession. Moldova and Georgia, knowing that membership is a long way off, are hoping the bloc will help them manage the influx of refugees from Ukraine.

They’re also worried that they will be Moscow’s next target and are thus trying to strike a balance between Russia and the West. For example, they’ve refused to apply the same sanctions that Western countries imposed after the war began in an effort to not seem too embedded in the Western camp. But Georgia and Moldova have different reasons for following this path – and different positions on the war in Ukraine.

Georgia

As a country sandwiched in between much larger powers, Georgia’s fate is very much tied to what happens in the rest of Eurasia. When a regional power on either side of this vast region pushes for more influence, as Russia is doing now, Georgia feels threatened and will seek to ally with the regional power’s competitors. This is why Georgia’s only possible way to escape Russia’s advances is to push the U.S., EU and NATO for economic, military and political support. But considering that their priorities lie elsewhere, they have been hesitant to help, which has pushed Georgia to engage with the Russians to keep them at bay.

The Russo-Georgian war of 2008 signaled Russia’s intent on reclaiming its buffer zones. It also underlined Russia’s resurgence as a regional power, ending in a frozen conflict with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia essentially under Russian control. According to reports, there are about 8,000 Russian troops currently stationed in the two provinces. Both territories claimed independence in 2008, and Tbilisi responded by imposing an isolation policy against them.

People in both breakaway regions can apply for Russian passports at consulates opened after Moscow recognized their independence – though these passports are not recognized by either Tbilisi or the international community, making travel outside Russia impossible for people living here. In 2011-12, Tbilisi offered “status-neutral” travel documents to residents of the two regions, but the take-up was minimal given that the people’s loyalties were already firmly established.

Though Georgia hasn’t given up on its EU and NATO aspirations, it has slowly started to reengage with Russia over the past decade. In 2012, it launched a normalization process with Moscow, in part to encourage tourism and trade. Their relationship has since grown. Russia is currently Georgia’s most important export market, and Russian wheat and foodstuffs account for more than 75 percent of Georgian imports. Revenue from tourism, remittances and trade with Russia accounts for about 9 percent of Georgia’s gross domestic product.

Still, hostilities deriving from Russia’s invasion haven’t faded completely. In fact, some factions in Georgia argued

that the normalization process should have been suspended in 2021 when tensions along the breakaway regions’ borders with Georgia escalated before elections. Anti-Russian sentiments increased after Russia’s most recent invasion of Ukraine when many Russians (reportedly in the 30,000 range so far) fled to Georgia because of increasing repression and economic problems at home. Most Georgians draw a distinction between Russia’s government and the Russian people, but reportedly, there were calls on social media not to welcome the Russian migrants.

The Georgian government, meanwhile, is in a tough position. Considering the strong economic ties between the two countries, Georgia can’t join the West in imposing severe sanctions on Russia. Some in Georgia even called for the country to join Russia’s equivalent to the SWIFT banking system to help the Russian economy survive its exclusion from SWIFT. But Georgians have also held rallies in support of Ukraine outside the Georgian parliament and collected humanitarian aid to be sent to Ukraine.

Moscow, however, doesn’t appear interested in invading Georgia again. In fact, it’s in Russia’s interest to maintain good relations with Georgia to block Western influence there and quash the notion that the South Caucasian country is part of the Euro-Atlantic community. Thus, Tbilisi needs to be careful not to cozy up to the West too much in order not to upset Moscow. As recently as March 1, the chair of the ruling Georgian Dream Party, Irakli Kobakhidze, said his country would not apply for EU membership until 2024, noting that a hasty move toward joining the bloc could be counterproductive. The Georgian parliament also denied an opposition proposal to invite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to address parliament.

The best thing Georgia can do right now is to not attract Russian attention. To do so, however, it needs to maintain its own internal stability, which will be harder to do the longer the war in Ukraine drags on. And this eventually may create friction in its relationship with Moscow.

Moldova

Moldova, meanwhile, has been somewhat keener on attracting Western support. The small, landlocked country wedged between Romania and Ukraine in the lowlands of southeastern Europe has long held conflicting loyalties. Numerous powers throughout history have sought to control this territory, which was repeatedly used as an invasion route between the Balkans and Russia. It was caught in the 19th century between the Russian and Ottoman empires, and after the end of the Cold War between the Russians and the West. In the early 1990s, it fought a war with Russian-backed separatists in Trans-Dniester, which resulted in Moscow’s de facto control over the region.

Russia also holds substantial economic influence over the country, in part because of Moldova’s dependence on Russian energy. Though Romania has built some infrastructure that can deliver European gas to Moldova, the country’s distribution network is still controlled by Gazprom, meaning European gas can move only as far as Russia allows it. Moldova’s electrical grid was synchronized with the Continental European Grid only on March 16, the same day as the Ukrainian electrical grid.

In addition, Moldova’s poor finances and the prevalence of the gray economy make it easy for Russian businesses to maintain a strong foothold in the Moldovan market. Both European and Russian banks operate there, and the country’s access to steel and other industrial materials coming from and through Trans-Dniester offers Russian companies cheaper and more covert access to EU markets. All these factors make it difficult for Moldova to cut ties with Russia.

Much like in Ukraine and Georgia, then, politics in Moldova are highly polarized, split between pro-Russian and proEuropean factions. Strong pro-Russian camps concentrated in the capital of Chisinau, the city of Balti and the autonomous region of Gagauzian dominated politics until 2021 when a proEuropean government took power.

The country never seriously considered NATO membership, but it is serious about joining the EU, partly because of its demographics: Its population has decreased by a third in 15 years, in part because of declining birth rates and in part because many are leaving for a better life in the European Union. Joining the bloc could persuade some to stay.

The war in Ukraine has brought new challenges, however. The country of roughly 2.6 million people has so far taken in 360,000 refugees, at least 120,000 of whom are still in Moldova. The EU has promised 15 million euros “to help manage the immediate crisis,” and Romania and others have also offered aid, but the Moldovan economy may not be able to cope with the crisis.

Meanwhile, Russian influence in the country doesn’t seem to be dissipating. In a recent poll conducted by BS-AXA-Center, half of respondents refused to say whether Russia or the West was responsible for the war, while about 39 percent said it was Russia. These internal divisions will only grow as the socio-economic pain of the war intensifies.

The government therefore needs to take the opposite approach of the one adopted in Georgia. Chisinau needs all the help the West will offer to manage its internal challenges and limit the reach of the proRussian camp. It has no intentions of joining Western sanctions against Russia or moving closer to NATO. But in the coming months, its stability will be tested, and the only way it can manage the problem is by pressing the West for more funding.

Western countries have thus far complied. Earlier this week, Romania, Germany and France announced the creation of the “Moldova Support Platform” with the EU’s support. The initiative aims to attract international funding to help Moldova cope with its many challenges: the refugee influx, energy, finances, border management and corruption. Chisinau is also currently in talks with the International Monetary Fund for financial support. Partnerships like these will help create the impression that Moldova is to some extent shielded from Russian aggression.

But Moldova, like Georgia, will be careful not to bend too far in either direction. In both countries, stability is dependent on the way the war in Ukraine advances.