The US makes inroads into Russia’s periphery

With Moscow distracted, Washington is forging ties in the South Caucasus and Central Asia

Countries at war tend to use all the resources they can realistically spare to achieve their desired outcome. The obvious drawback is that the war effort can de-prioritise other important affairs, or can leave the state vulnerable to elements at home and abroad that would like to challenge its power.

Such is the case with Russia in Ukraine. The West in general, and the U.S. in particular, is probing Russian positions at other points in the country’s periphery, including the Caucasus and Central Asia, where Russian power is as much economic as it is martial.

Opportunism

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is no small matter. Fuel and supplies must be procured and sent, soldiers must be rotated, and injuries and damaged equipment both require repair. It demands vast sums of money that for the Kremlin are increasingly in short supply.

Put simply, a lot of Russia’s time, attention and materials are concentrated to its west.

This leaves other areas in Russia’s periphery less attended to. These include the Central Asian countries that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, prioritised building their economies and practicing neutrality so that international conflict wouldn’t hurt their unstable economies.

These also include the South Caucasus, a transit hub between Asia and Europe and a supplier of resources to Western countries. All of these areas are critical to Russia’s security, so given Russia’s military operation in Ukraine, the question is for how long, and to what extent, Russia can ignore them.

In general, the U.S. has had no direct interest in either Central Asia or the South Caucasus. That’s beginning to change somewhat as Europe looks for alternative routes for energy deliveries, but in reality the West cares about these regions mostly because Russia cares so much about them; they insulate Russia from outsiders and depend on Russia economically.

This gives Moscow a ton of influence there, but the flip side is that countries like the U.S. can use Russia’s strategic needs against it.

This is precisely why Washington is maintaining its positions in Georgia, looking for new opportunities to pry Armenia away from Russia’s sphere of influence, strengthening cooperation with Azerbaijan, and providing financing in Central Asia that Russia cannot.

Diplomatic activity over the past month attests to Washington’s opportunism. The senior adviser of the U.S. State Department for negotiations in the Caucasus was in Baku from April 24 to April 29 to discuss the NagornoKarabakh dispute, while the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs met with Azerbaijani authorities on April 27-28.

On May 2, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to launch a strategic dialogue. During the talks, Armenia and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening bilateral relations in all areas.

Shift in relations

This is notable, in that Washington heretofore has seen Armenia as too close to Russia to be pried away. It’s possible we are seeing the beginning of a shift in bilateral relations.

Just last week, the U.S. announced that it had completed the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle training course for Kazakh border guards. New UAV operators will use U.S.provided Raven drones to assist in monitoring Kazakhstan’s borders.

Considering Kazakhstan has a long border with Russia and that Russia has been a strong security partner of Kazakhstan before, Russia is wary of this program, to say the least.

The U.S. undersecretary of state for civil security, democracy, and human rights visited Kyrgyzstan on April 14 after spending time in Kazakhstan, where she discussed strategic engagement.

Elsewhere, the United States announced it will allocate more than $60 million in security assistance to Tajikistan and transferred $2.3 million worth of trucks to the country. This is a low-risk, high-reward play for Washington, especially if it can persuade some Central Asian officials that they have other choices than partnering with Russia.

Notably, the U.S. isn’t acting alone,

using key NATO allies that have a direct interest in Central Asia. One such ally is Turkey, which wants the region’s resources so that it can become a transit hub for Europe, sees it as an untapped market brimming with economic potential, and aims to regain influence with Turkic peoples outside its own borders.

To that end, it has developed extremely close relations with Azerbaijan that were further strengthened when Ankara sided with Baku in the most recent Nagorno-Karabakh war.

To secure Turkey’s help, Washington has indicated that it may approve an arms deal that includes F-16 fighter jets, having previously denied Ankara certain aircraft for buying Russian-made S-400 missile defense systems.

Turkey has also been using the Ukraine conflict to build its influence in Russia’s periphery. Ankara started the process of normalising relations with Armenia and strengthening cooperation with Central Asia, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussing with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev the prospects for developing Kazakh-Turkish strategic partnerships.

Erdogan also discussed the expansion of Tajik-Turkish cooperation during a call with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and earlier signed an agreement on military cooperation, and spoke with Kyrgyzstan’s president to hash out bilateral relations.

Cause for Concern

It’s possible that none of this will shake Russia. Moscow is already deeply integrated into the Central Asian and Caucasian economies and security systems. It remains a key economic partner for these countries, directs investments and provides military assistance when needed. It has firmly entrenched itself in the buffer zones by deploying peacekeepers into Nagorno-Karabakh and by demonstrating the effectiveness of the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation in Central Asia.

More, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia are included in the Eurasian Economic Union customs union and have their own advantages from membership – preferential energy resources, easier access to the Russian market, and so on.

Central Asia and the Caucasus are clearly in need of huge and constant flows of investment and an effective mechanism for suppressing unrest and regional conflicts. The United States is unlikely to spend the resources needed to provide everything this region requires.

Still, Washington’s renewed activity is an unwelcome development for Russia. Some Central Asian and Caucasian countries, being transit, financial or technological hubs, are concerned that they will be adversely affected by the raft of Russian sanctions. Because their fragile economies couldn’t withstand another shock, they’re trying to keep the door open with the West just in case.

It’s simply getting harder for Moscow to balance all the interests at its border, and the U.S. is acting accordingly. Though Russia understands there’s only so much Washington is willing and able to do to help the countries in its buffer region, it can’t afford to ignore it. With much of its forces diverted, the rest may not be enough for everyone all the time.