Russia signals a long war
The Kremlin is seeking partners as it digs in for a protracted standoff with the West
Beyond the grinding war in Ukraine, Russia’s diplomatic moves suggest it envisions no negotiated settlement in the near future. Since the war’s first days, Moscow has been engaged in alliance building efforts.
The target of Western economic warfare, Russia needs to keep exporting to gather the funds to support its budget and struggling domestic industries. And cut off from Western high-tech, it needs partners to help it import strategic goods through third countries.
The Kremlin’s efforts to rebuild a stable economic base that excludes “unfriendly” countries are no less important for the future course of the war than what happens on the battlefield.
Lines of Defense
Russia’s first line of defense is the familiar post-Soviet space. The Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union plays a critical role. Despite the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin has still taken the time to develop and oversee the economic policy guidelines for Eurasian Economic Union member states for 2022-23. The bloc has also stepped up efforts to expand its trade ties, most recently with Indonesia and Iran. Last week it signed an agreement on expanded cooperation with the government of Uzbekistan, which holds observer status.
Moscow is also looking to cooperate more with the Caspian region, particularly in energy. Putin’s first trip outside the country since the start of the war was to the Caspian regional summit in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, at the end of June.
The Kremlin plans to host the Caspian Economic Forum in October, part of its longer-term drive to assume a greater leadership role. The U.S. and Europe have tried to reach out to Central Asian countries to challenge Moscow’s influence in the region, but for now Russia has the dominant position.
Farther afield, Moscow is cooperating more within the BRICS framework, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Discounted energy has helped it attract
support.
In June, Russia became the leading supplier of crude oil to China. India increased its imports of Russian oil by 50 times from April to June, making Russia its second-largest source of oil. Finally, Brazil agreed to buy diesel fuel from Russia at lower prices.
All three countries boast large economies, and their neutrality on the war – if not outright support – gives Russia a diplomatic boost.
All three are of strategic interest to the United States, limiting Washington’s ability to impose secondary sanctions to stop them from helping Moscow.
Discussions are also underway to expand the BRICS to include Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The BRICS could form the foundation for an alliance to help Russia weather the sanctions storm over the long term.
Now, Russia is seeking even more backers. This week, Putin travelled to Iran for a trilateral discussion on Syria and regional peacekeeping. He also met individually with his Iranian and Turkish counterparts for discussions on economic cooperation.
Turkey has used its location and status as a NATO member to position itself as a mediator between Russia on one side and Ukraine and the West on the other. These interactions are intended to show that Putin is still engaged in other matters of strategic interest to Russia and that Moscow can communicate with NATO with or without the U.S. present.
In North Africa, fierce competition is taking shape. Europe has turned to the region as a potential replacement for Russian energy.
Last month, Israel, Egypt and the European Union signed an agreement for Israel to ship natural gas to Egypt, which will convert it to liquefied natural gas for shipment to Europe. On Monday, two days after meeting his U.S. counterpart, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi met with EU officials to discuss cooperation to address the energy crisis.
Meanwhile, Algeria has been in talks with Italy about supplying more natural gas.
The two agreed in April that Italy would increase gas purchases, and on Monday they announced a deal for Algeria to supply $4 billion worth of energy to Eni, Total and Occidental Petroleum.
Not content to play defense, the Kremlin sent a delegation to Algeria in May to discuss an offer to build a pipeline – with Russian gas giant Gazprom exerting control over its use – to transport gas from Algeria to Europe.
In June, Russia and Egypt agreed to conduct trade in local currency, and Russia’s state-owned Rosatom announced that it would start producing equipment for Egypt’s first nuclear power plant in Dabaa.
Finally, this week two Russian military vessels – the Kildin hydrographic survey vessel and the Vice Adm. Paromov tanker – docked in the port of Algiers as part of general military cooperation between the countries.
Flying under the flag of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the ships have been operating as part of Russia’s permanent Mediterranean group at the Tartus port in Syria since late 2021. Notably, the Kildin functions as an intelligence ship, hosting reconnaissance equipment like the Don radar and Bronze sonar systems.
No End in Sight
Russia’s recent actions aim to communicate to the West that Moscow is not paralyzed by the fighting in Ukraine. Its diplomatic outreach in the Middle East and North Africa raises the possibility that it could support a widening of the conflict with the West.
It’s possible this is part of a campaign to gather leverage ahead of negotiations, but more likely it indicates that Moscow is settling in for a protracted standoff over Ukraine.
A negotiated settlement to the war in the near future, though desirable for economic reasons, is highly unlikely because of domestic political constraints on all sides. Russia occupies about a fifth of Ukrainian territory, including areas it controlled before Feb. 24.
This is too much land for Kyiv to give up, and yet it doesn’t include strategic cities like Odesa or the crown jewel,
Kyiv itself.
A settlement under these conditions is currently intolerable for all sides. The West would be accepting Russia’s seizure by force of another country’s sovereign territory and the risk that the war will restart. Russia would be accepting minimal strategic gains for massive bloodshed and military costs.
And Ukrainians have given no indication they’re prepared to consider ceding territory for peace.
Therefore, Ukraine and Russia are indicating preparations for a protracted conflict. On July 14, Ukraine’s military leadership met in Kyiv to discuss the city’s defense. They noted that appropriate forces have been set up to defend the city, suggesting that they expect Russia will have to try again to take the city in order to end the war and that they intend to draw it into extremely costly urban fighting.
For its part, Russia is focused on wearing down Ukrainian forces, who increasingly depend on Western resupplies and have little hope of foreign troop reinforcements.
This wasn’t Moscow’s preferred plan, but it’s the best strategy available.
Though Russia has made progress in creating economic blocs to support it in an extended conflict, Russian diplomacy faces serious challenges both in the post-Soviet space and beyond. Formerly Soviet countries tend to prefer nonalignment to avoid one-sided economic dependence.
Distant countries, meanwhile, are attracted by energy discounts, but these are short-term measures. There’s no assurance that higher volumes of trade will remain high over the long term, especially if Russian resources are sold at higher prices.
If Moscow intends to continue playing the long game, it will likely need to involve more and more economic inducements to attract partners.
Allison Fedirka is the director of analysis for Geopolitical Futures.
www.geopoliticalfutures.com