Russia’s mobilisation may be game-changer
At no small cost, the Russian military managed to stop the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the northeastern Kharkiv region. Kyiv’s rapid success sent Moscow searching for an answer.
Officially, it decided on a partial mobilisation, though every piece of evidence says the mobilisation is overwhelming and widespread. It looks like Moscow is preparing a considerable force to enable it to fully dominate the war’s front line.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is signaling to Russians that the regime is ready to increase the tempo of the war and fight to the end, and to the West and NATO that Russia accepts their challenge of a prolonged conflict.
Russia’s mobilisation will keep its military options open and improve its position in Ukraine, particularly with regard to effective control of the front lines, during any attempts at reaching a settlement over the winter months.
Logic and Pitfalls of Mobilisation
Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced the partial mobilisation on Sept. 21. There are four critical aspects to highlight. First, in general Russia is mobilizing against the West.
Officially, it sees the war in Ukraine as against the “entire military machine” of NATO. Second, Moscow is anxious not to repeat the errors of previous Russian mobilisations; both in 1905 and 1914, they ended in defeat and revolution.
Moscow is trying to meticulously organize the process and avoid economic and political repercussions for the Russian state. Third, the decision called for the immediate mobilisation of 300,000 troops, but there are no indications that this will be the limit. Russia is capable of mobilizing several million soldiers, according to Shoigu.
Finally, the new troops will need several months of training, which means that in the short term, mobilisation is unlikely to significantly shift the balance at the front line.
Russia’s main tasks for now are to create a layered defense along the line of contact, reassert strict control of the occupied territories and control the Russian border. In addition, according to the Kremlin’s estimates, the mobilisation will enable Russian combat units to focus on fulfilling the objectives of the war: to gain strategic depth by seizing Ukrainian territory.
Russia long since recognized that it needed more troops to defend occupied areas and overcome Ukrainian guerrilla warfare. Integration of the new troops could free up experienced Russian units – currently tied up with patrols and so forth – to launch offensive operations in the late winter and early spring.
But there are downsides as well. First, mobilisation takes time. For new troops to pose a serious threat to the enemy, they need to be properly trained, which requires several months at a minimum. Therefore, any mobilized fighters will not be combat-ready until after the winter.
In the present circumstances, when Ukraine is conducting offensive operations in Donbas (along the Lyman-Oskil line), Russia is under intense pressure. As a last resort, it could send untrained men to the battlefield. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests this is already happening. Second, mobilisation has provoked a social backlash that challenges Putin’s grip on power. In the days following the mobilisation announcement, protests broke out in several cities across Russia, particularly in ethnically non-Russian regions.
For example, in the North Caucasus, anti-war protests turned violent in recent days. The turmoil has not disrupted mobilisation, but with time it could pose a formidable political threat. There are also many reports of hundreds of thousands of Russians leaving the country to avoid recruitment.
A potential advantage, however, is Russia’s ability to mobilize new forces beyond its national borders, as well as hybrid units. From the start of the war, Russia has used proxy forces from the breakaway Ukrainian republics along the front line. Mercenaries and convicts have also helped to plug gaps. This isn’t always a good thing.
For example, one explanation given for Russia’s shocking defeat in Kharkiv was its reliance on a concentrated proxy force of Ukrainian separatists. By contrast, the infamous
Wagner Group mercenaries employed better supplies and weapons to take ground near Bakhmut in northern Donetsk. Already, the Luhansk and Donetsk separatist forces have announced an increase in their training efforts, and the Wagner Group has launched its own recruitment drives in and around Russia. Moscow also intends to find recruits in soon-to-be annexed parts of Ukraine.
Moreover, anticipating further mobilisation efforts later, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov recently called on the heads of all 85 Russian regions to prepare at least 1,000-2,000 soldiers – in addition to those called up by Moscow – over the next several months. Separately, the Kremlin decided to recruit foreign soldiers with Slavic backgrounds, such as Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans. Some non-Slavic men will likely join Russia’s side in the war in hopes of acquiring Russian citizenship.
According to Russian estimates, a total of 500,000 to 600,000 troops should be added to the Russian army as a result of mobilisation. This would triple the Russian force already in Ukraine and extend Russia’s numerical advantage.
The Belarus Factor
An additional card that Russia could play concerns Belarus. Given its location, Belarus could pose a major threat to Ukraine were it to enter the war. Belarusian forces could strike Ukraine’s rear and disrupt supplies of Western military aid.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has been vocal about leaving his country’s options open. At the same time, he has repeatedly said Russia has enough men and materiel to defeat Ukraine without Minsk’s direct assistance, and stressed Belarus’ contributions to the war by serving as the first line of defense to prevent NATO from “stabbing Russia in the back.”
Immediately after the Kremlin announced its mobilisation, Lukashenko declared that mobilisation was not on his government’s agenda and that Belarus was already prepared to respond in the event of a military threat. The secretary of the Belarusian Security Council added that the country was already mobilized and thus had no need to declare additional moves.
Belarus has conducted regular military exercises along its borders with Ukraine and Poland since the start of the war.
There is also significant disagreement among experts about Belarus’ actual military power. Officially, the country has nearly 48,000 soldiers and officers, with an additional 20,000 people listed as military personnel. Reserves are in the vicinity of 290,000.
In June, Ukraine’s General Staff said Belarus was planning to increase its army to 80,000 troops. In other words, Minsk may be conducting a quiet mobilisation.
Lukashenko’s first priority is clearly to preserve his room to maneuver. Minsk has not even decided whether it will support Moscow’s annexation of four Ukrainian regions. But Putin is sure to increase pressure on Lukashenko over time, and it may eventually become too much to resist.
Russia’s announced mobilisation was not a surprise in
Ukraine, but it creates two major challenges for the Ukrainian armed forces. First, Kyiv needs to answer Russia’s move by commencing its own next wave of mobilisations. Ukraine’s first mobilisation concluded in midsummer and brought in more than 700,000 troops, who now reinforce Ukraine’s defensive lines.
How successful an expanded mobilisation effort would be is hard to predict. More so than Moscow, Kyiv is limited by the need to leave a large enough population to carry out daily economic activities. On the other hand, new Ukrainian forces are likely to be trained in NATO countries and will likely be better prepared for combat than their Russian counterparts who were rushed to the front lines.
Second, Kyiv urgently needs to demonstrate the ability to strike Russia in the south, in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, and to continue the counteroffensive in Kharkiv. Despite Ukraine’s recent successes, Russia has managed to stem the bleeding.
Compared to Russia, Ukraine has fewer reservists to draw upon. Moscow believes it is gaining momentum through sheer numbers, and Kyiv needs to find a way to thwart this momentum. There is a window of opportunity for Ukraine. Russia expects to need the fall and winter to train and coordinate its new personnel, so they are not expected to tip the scales until late winter or early spring. It’s at this point that Russia may outnumber the Ukrainians along the line of contact, which would facilitate further Russian offensive operations.
A related dilemma for Kyiv is whether to press ahead with its counteroffensive to prevent Russia’s annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, or to hunker down for a longer war. While the former calls for urgency, the latter entails the accumulation of manpower and Western weapons through the winter.
The onset of winter will complicate offensive operations for both sides. Without foliage, it is difficult to move and also hide from drones and artillery. Winter weather can also blind satellites, hurting the side that relies on them more. These conditions will naturally slow the pace of fighting and give Russia time to train its new recruits, and it may put a time limit on Ukraine’s ability to disrupt Russia’s strategic pivot.
Unwilling to accept the status quo, both sides are preparing to fight well into 2023. Western arms stockpiles are nearing their limits, while Russia is zeroing in on new gains before considering any settlement. But Russia must be careful of two potential pitfalls: the risk that it draws the West deeper into the conflict, and the risk that Putin’s regime becomes Russia’s latest to fall victim to defeat and revolution.
Historically, when Russia mobilizes, it has had enormous implications for Europe and Russia. Today, a Russian mobilisation once again threatens European peace.