No hope for the Arab League

The organisation has failed to tackle the region’s most pressing problems

Saudi Arabia will host the 32nd Arab League summit in Riyadh on May 19. The primary focus of this year’s talks will be reinstating Syria’s membership and normalizing relations with the regime of President Bashar Assad after 12 years of isolation.

At least five Arab countries (Qatar, Morocco, Kuwait, Yemen and Egypt) oppose Saudi Arabia’s efforts to rehabilitate Assad without the regime agreeing to a powersharing deal with the opposition or repatriating Syrians who had escaped to neighboring countries. The Saudis’ handling of the issue angers many Syrians. Though Assad is eager to restore relations with the Arab world, he has shown little willingness to introduce political reforms or include in the political process the social forces that have emerged since the 2011 uprising.

The bid to readmit Damascus reveals the fundamental flaws in the Arab political order and the general inability of Arab states to engage in collective action.

Arab League’s Founding

At the turn of the 20th century, Arab national consciousness began to take shape, leading to the first Arab National Congress in Paris in 1913. It included Christian participants from Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon and observers from Egypt and the Zionist movement.

The attendees viewed European colonialism as the biggest danger to the Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire, given the occupation of Egypt by the British, of Libya by the Italians and of other parts of North Africa by the French.

In a bid to enlist Arab support in the fight against Nazi Germany, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden proposed in 1941 that the Arab world unite under one economic and cultural bloc. He said the British government would provide complete support to any plan that had Arab approval.

Egyptian King Faruk enthusiastically endorsed the idea of an Arab union, hoping to use it to assert Egypt’s leadership of the Arab region under the pretext of resisting Jewish immigration to Palestine and promoting the liberation of Arab lands from British and French control.

The project gained support from two of the king’s Arab allies, Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli and Saudi King Abdulaziz. The three leaders formed a bloc to challenge Iraq and Jordan’s staunchly pro-British Hashemite royal family.

Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa AlNahhas also discussed the idea with the six independent Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon), which gave their approval, leading to the establishment of the Arab League in March 1945.

The organization declared its objectives of strengthening ties among Arab countries, maintaining independence and preserving political, economic, cultural and social wellbeing. In April 1950, the League Council agreed to conclude a treaty on joint defense cooperation to deepen the scope of Arab solidarity.

The treaty provided for the establishment of a military advisory board under the supervision of the Arab armies’ chiefs of staff, concerned with preparing plans to defend Arab countries and supervise the activities of the Egyptian-led Unified Arab Command, which had large and well-equipped armed forces.

Turbulent Beginnings

From the beginning, however, Arab countries never had a shared political vision. Their pursuit of divergent policies has weighed on the Arab League since its founding.

In the 1950s, it came under the control of nationalist movements, further dividing Arab countries. Its slogans divided the Arab region into republican and monarchical camps, describing the former as progressive and the latter as reactionary. It also adopted a hostile stance toward neighboring countries, especially Turkey and Iran.

In the 1960s, the Baath Party’s two competing branches dominated Iraqi and Syrian politics. They clashed with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arab nationalist perspective, leading to political fragmentation that undergirded Arab relations.

After Nasser’s death in 1970, the Arab nationalist movement joined the opposition, as Arab countries turned their attention to domestic issues, either to focus on economic development or to address the devastating results of the 1967 war.

Arab countries started to look inward, digging for relics of history as they struggled to build a distinct national character.

The 1970s also saw the rise of the Gulf states thanks to the oil boom and a gradual shift in the center of Arab politics from the Cairo-Baghdad-Damascus axis to the fastgrowing cities of Riyadh, Dubai and Abu Dhabi. No attempts were made to build confidence among the regimes and peoples of the Arab League.

Just as the governments displayed divisions and apprehensions, the political currents in Arab countries failed to agree on a common ground for collective action. Tribal, clannish and regional affiliations dominated Arab political and social thought despite the rhetorical support for a common identity.

Competitors Emerge

The Arab League could not function as a homogeneous organization and failed to play a decisive role in the region’s various crises.

Egypt’s signing of a peace agreement with Israel in 1978 created political disarray in the Arab world, which was further exacerbated when Iraq went to war against Iran in 1980.

Developments in the region thus convinced the architect of Saudi foreign policy, Crown Prince Fahd, to push for the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, having lost faith in the Arab League’s credibility.

In 1989, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania established the Arab Maghreb Union to promote economic, cultural and defense cooperation and coordinate their international functions. However, the union was doomed by the long-standing territorial conflict between Morocco and Algeria.

Also in 1989, the Arab Cooperation Council emerged as an improbable alliance of countries that had been preoccupied with domestic issues, especially Egypt and Iraq.

Egypt desired to return to the Arab world’s mainstream following a decade of ostracism imposed by the Arab League when it made peace with Israel. Iraq wanted to claim a leadership role in regional politics after winning its eight-year war against Iran.

A few months before the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait in 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein addressed the leaders of the ACC at its fourth summit in Cairo, saying that Arab interests were opposed to Western interests.

To the astonishment of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Saddam argued in favor of beefing up Arab militaries before the impending collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a U.S.-dominated international system.

These three blocs suffered from the same limitations as the Arab League. Unable to coordinate policies, rationalize objectives and work collectively, they too failed to act as cohesive groups.

Failures and Inconsistencies

The Arab League was founded seven months before the United Nations and four years before NATO. The difference between the Arab League and other modern organizations is that it continues to operate with an old mentality and resist change.

Arab League summits usually end with the release of statements expressing condemnation or support for various actions but offer very little substance. They are a forum for disagreement, talk and accusations and usually conclude with recommendations that never get implemented.

The Arab League faces four structural problems: Egypt’s demise as the leader of the Arab world; the disintegration of many Arab countries, which has precluded joint action on many fronts; the conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Libya and elsewhere, which have overshadowed common interests; and Iran’s intervention in Arab affairs and forging of strategic alliances with some Arab states.

In 1990, Mubarak played a decisive role in thwarting Arab League efforts to resolve the crisis that followed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. He proposed a resolution supporting the measures taken by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to protect their territories – which included inviting foreign forces, specifically American, to the Arabian Peninsula.

Nine Arab countries rejected or abstained from voting on the proposal, which the Arab League nonetheless adopted in violation of its rules requiring unanimity regarding collective security.

The Arab League has adopted inconsistent positions on similar regional issues, pointing to the desire of some of its members to dominate the group. In the Libyan case, the Arab League encouraged foreign military intervention when in 2011 it called on the U.N. Security Council to impose a no-fly zone and establish safe zones to protect civilians. It also declared the Libyan government illegitimate, calling on the Security Council to communicate with the National Transitional Council instead.

In the Syrian case, the Arab League decided in November 2011 to suspend the country’s membership but still considered the Assad regime the legitimate government of Syria. It did not criticize the presence of Iranian-commanded Shiite militias and Russian forces there, which tipped the balance of power against the rebel forces.

Most Arab countries preferred that the Syrian uprising end, fearing its triumph might encourage their populations to demand political reforms. The organization also did not protest the presence of U.S. bases in the country, despite the insistence of the regime in Damascus that they violated Syria’s sovereignty.

When Turkey launched its military offensive in northeastern Syria in 2019, the Arab League tried to rally the international community to oppose the intervention and consider it a hostile act, thus entitling the Syrian government to defend its territory.

Lastly, Saudi Arabia preempted the issuance of an Arab League decision regarding the war in Yemen, despite presenting it for discussion at the Sharm elSheikh summit in 2015. It also launched

Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthi rebels without the approval of its Arab allies.

Unfit Institution

The Arab people have criticized the Arab League since its founding for its persistent failure to shoulder its professed responsibilities. The organization no longer has a political role and has devolved into a diplomatic forum that avoids action on critical issues. It has failed to address the region’s most important developments, including the disintegration of Libya, the Tunisian crisis, and the chronic conflict between Algeria and Morocco.

A third of Arab state leaders did not attend last year’s summit, held in Algiers under the slogan “Arab reunification.”

In 2019, the ruler of Qatar was the only Arab head of state to attend the summit in Beirut. Morocco refused to host the summit in 2016, seeing it as an impending failure due to its disappointment with previous meetings.

Ultimately, the prospects for founding an effective Arab order within the framework of the Arab League faded many years ago.