Regime evolution in Uzbekistan

The country’s president is pursuing an ambitious reform agenda

On May 1, Uzbekistan held a long-delayed national referendum on major constitutional amendments. According to the country’s election commission, 84.5 percent of the country’s 20 million eligible voters cast a ballot, and 90 percent of voters approved the reforms.

The changes, which offer citizens greater social and legal protections and affect about two-thirds of the national charter, are part of the country’s reform drive, which has been underway since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev assumed office almost seven years ago following the death of his predecessor, Islam Karimov.

International coverage of the vote has focused on the expansion of presidential term limits, which allow Mirziyoyev to seek two additional seven-year terms in office. But this offers a very limited view of the scale and potential of change underway in the country.

Beyond Autocracy

That the 65-year-old president, whose current term ends in 2026, could now remain in office until 2040 underscores a key problem facing ruling elites seeking to undertake reforms.

They realize that they need to make changes that allow for greater public participation in the affairs of the state in order to avoid major public unrest in the future. But the question is: How can they bring about such changes without undermining their own hold on power?

Many of us who live in advanced democracies tend to be skeptical about such transformations. The expectation is that the reforms must be either genuine or bogus. They can’t be both, and they’re more likely the latter, or so the thinking goes. Reality, however, is much more complex.

Having served as prime minister under Karimov for 13 years, Mirziyoyev knew that the old order was untenable, but until he took over and was able to consolidate power, he couldn’t initiate changes on his own.

He also realized that he couldn’t rule in an autocratic manner the same way Karimov did for 27 years, but there were limits to how much he could change the status quo. This explains why he has pursued a complex reform agenda since taking over as president in late 2016.

Transitions in countries that were long ruled by authoritarian regimes are always mired in uncertainty. Even after formally assuming power, successors do not know if they will be able to maintain support from all key stakeholders.

For Mirziyoyev, the immediate challenge came from two of his former colleagues – the former finance minister and deputy prime minister, Rustam Azimov, and the former intelligence chief, Rustam Inoyatov – both of whom were extremely powerful associates of Karimov.

Consolidating Power

Let’s begin with Inoyatov. A colonel-general in the Soviet military who later became a senior KGB officer, Inoyatov served as the head of Uzbekistan’s State Security Services for eight years before Mirziyoyev became prime minister in 2003.

Having held the position for two decades in total, the former intelligence czar was in a position to assume power when Karimov died. At the very least, anyone who succeeded Karimov would be heavily dependent on Inoyatov. The fact that Mirziyoyev was able to remove him from his position 16 months after becoming president was a key indicator that Mirziyoyev had consolidated power.

In the case of Azimov, Mirziyoyev faced a different kind of challenge in that the former deputy prime minister had been part of the Cabinet for five years when Mirziyoyev became prime minister.

By the time Mirziyoyev became president, Azimov had been the country’s top economic and financial manager for 18 years. Having positioned himself as the one spearheading economic liberalization and given his very close relationship with the former president, Azimov was seen as a likely successor to Karimov.

Advancing a broader social and political reform agenda, Mirziyoyev was able to sideline Azimov first by not appointing him prime minister in 2016 and then by removing him from his post as deputy prime minister in 2017.

With both contenders out of the way, Mirziyoyev not only consolidated power but also began in 2018 to push what has emerged as an ambitious reform campaign.

The changes included macroeconomic reforms; a transition to a market economy; strengthening social protection and citizen services; enabling the private sector; and promoting environmental sustainability.

Over the next two years, the scope and pace of economic transformation was so significant that, in December 2019, The Economist declared Uzbekistan the country of the year.

The pandemic slowed down the progress, but Mirziyoyev had moved the needle far enough to win a second term in the October 2021 presidential election. Having consolidated power, he felt comfortable expanding his agenda from largely economic reforms – as well as, notably, broadening social freedoms – to pushing for political changes.

Overhauling the constitution has been the hallmark of this cautious but deepening national transformation. It will be difficult, however, to find the right balance, effecting enough change to satisfy the critical masses while avoiding unleashing forces that could undermine the political system itself.

Challenges Ahead

The Mirziyoyev government got a taste of this problem last June when protests broke out in the western region of Karakalpakstan after the new draft charter sought to strip it of its autonomous status.

Security forces cracked down on demonstrators in the regional capital of Nukus, leaving 21 dead. In an effort to restore calm, Mirziyoyev flew to Nukus in early July and met with regional officials and community leaders. This led to the government to abruptly scrapping the amendments to the articles that recognized regional self-governance.

Though the unrest didn’t last long, the fact that it happened and forced the government’s hand shows Tashkent’s sensitivity to public opinion. Neighboring Kyrgyzstan has seen bouts of unrest in 2005, 2010 and 2020.

Meanwhile, Kazakhstan managed to quell violent unrest just 16 months ago. A key difference between Uzbekistan and these two other Central Asian countries is demography. With a population of 35 million people, Uzbekistan is the most populous country in the region.

Uzbekistan’s entire reform agenda is heavily informed by this demographic reality and is thus an effort to preempt social unrest. However, if the reforms engender a climate in which the masses are emboldened to demand even greater political change, the government’s strategy could undermine its grip on power.

The reform initiative is thus designed to maintain continuity while allowing for greater public engagement. Because the process isn’t yet fully institutionalized, Mirziyoyev has played a large role in driving the reform himself. Hence the move to ensure that he will be in office long enough to see the changes through. It’s still unclear, however, how long the transformation will take.

The additional terms maybe the simplest way to ensure continuity of the state and its transformation. However, it could also create the conditions that undermine the strategic objective of state stability and reforms.