The army was an instrument of diplomacy and politics

The Asia Minor Campaign was one of the consequences of the successful participation of a (divided) Greece on the side of the victorious Great Powers of the First World War. However, for the Great Powers the campaign coincided with the end of the war and the settling of issues that were left in its wake, like serious geopolitical concerns associated with the collapsing Ottoman Empire. For Greece, the campaign meant the beginning of a new political, diplomatic and military phase. A completely new period that was not part of an international war, difficult and mystifying, in which Greece acted alone. A period that began as a diplomatic success and finally concluded as a military disaster, after the country was diplomatically shunned by its allies.

The disembarkation of the Hellenic Army in Smyrna in May 1919 set in motion two incompatible realities: that of the Allies and that of Greeks, and not only those Greeks who lived in the Greek state, but also those in Asia Minor, the Pontus region and Eastern Thrace. Two incompatible realities that only Greek diplomacy on the international stage and domestic politics could bring together. The Venizelos government had moved successfully in this direction up until November 1920, when in the aftermath of the Great War and Greece's participation in it it still maintained a positive dynamic for diplomacy and fruitful links with the Great Powers. Subsequent governments of the anti-Venizelist camp overturned this mild and tremendously cautious wartime policy of Venizelos when it came to the expansion of the Greek zone of control. Starting in March 1921, they moved to exterminate the fledgling Turkish Army by extending the zone of operations. This was a very difficult goal as the Turkish soldiers were fighting with high morale and possessed a feeling of national duty, due to the policies of Kemal, and were fighting on familiar ground and core territory. Additionally, they gradually started to enjoy the tolerance and even indirect support and recognition of several of the Allies, a reality that upset all Greek planning. This, in addition to their upgraded equipment, the concentration of numerous fresh military forces, and primarily the endless depth of field they possessed for retreats and maneuvers that wore down and exhausted the Greek forces, gave the new national Turkish Army absolute control of all initiatives and diversions on the field of battle.

Additionally, the post-November governments put out vapid optimism domestically and misinterpreted the stance of the Allies as served their needs, despite their clear distancing from Greek plans. The Greek governments judged that the military value of the Hellenic Army alone would present a fait accompli to the Allies as well as the young and powerful cause of Turkish nationalism over Turkish territory, and as a result they disregarded the political process of the issue at home and refused to adapt their policy in step with the international dimension that had changed drastically. After all, the unsuccessful expansion of operations in Asia Minor reinforced the Turkish position and led all negotiations toward an impasse, negotiations that could have potentially allowed for a more restricted Greek presence in Asia Minor or at least an agreement over the Greek populations, or in any case an agreement that would allow a relatively equal participation by Greece. Difficult decisions for governments that did not process and politically manage the visionary, but prickly, imperatives of Greek irredentism. Their work was difficult when they could not, and probably did not want to, shape the conceited idea of the Megali Idea that had been dominant for decades in a politically applicable framework. It was a difficult task for the anti-Venizelist governments who did not want to accept the fact that the successful policy of Venizelos that expanded Greece between 1912 and 1919 was based on regional and international alliances, political pragmatism, aligning with the interests of the Great Powers, and the ability to cultivate in the public a feeling of participation (at least until the elections of November 1920). To this end, the army was an instrument of politics and diplomacy and not an autonomous tool of stagnant national problems, as they wanted to use it.

The solution of “figuring it out as we go along,” which was implemented in Asia Minor by the Greek governments following the elections of November, 1920, that is taking action depending on the circumstances, deprived them of the ability of managing the developments in favor of the Greek presence in the region. It distanced them from the harsh reality, which stated that diplomacy was the precondition to materialize the visions of a small but ambitious country like Greece. It was the diplomatic stage that featured the national confirmation of 1919 and the Treaty of Sevres of 1920, it was also this same stage that would feature the national collapse. The fact that only politics and diplomacy could bridge the gap between the goals, capabilities and visions of Greece and the interests and intentions of the Great Powers was completely ignored.