The situation turned against the Greeks and for the cause of Turkish nationalism
Winston Churchill, serving as secretary of state for the colonies for the coalition government of David Lloyd George, was keenly interested in the conflict between Greeks and Turks in Asia Minor. He commented that “Venizelos is entitled to plead that in going to Smyrna he acted as mandatory for the four greatest Powers. But he went as readily as a duck will swim.”
Churchill was closely aligned with British Prime Minister Lloyd George, even if they often disagreed as happened with the Asia Minor Campaign. These disagreements did not deter Lloyd George from implementing a policy that supported Greece, but they surely impeded it. And it was not the only problem. Other British ministers and officials also opposed the Greek landing and subsequent military campaign. I am focusing on the British case, as without British support the Greek operation was doomed. Venizelos was aware of this. Allied support was the cornerstone of his policy. However, gradually all other allies distanced themselves, leaving Britain and Lloyd George alone in supporting him.
Conflict between the Greeks and Turks began when the Hellenic Army disembarked at Smyrna in May 1919. The idea can be traced back to a proposal by Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary, for important concessions of territory in Asia Minor to the Greek state. Grey's proposal took place in January 1915, amidst the pressing concerns of the First World War and the British search for wider alliances.
King Constantine opposed Grey's offer and it was eventually rejected. However, it had created a new possibility that led Venizelos to insist on his policy and support for the Entente. This sequence of events cuts from January 1915 straight through the manifestation of the National Schism, the conflict on the Macedonian Front and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. There, Greece as one of the victorious allied states, could claim western Asia Minor. In May 1919, Lloyd George, French Premier Georges Clemenceau and US President Woodrow Wilson authorized Venizelos to land troops in Smyrna. This was the point of no return. This would not change when Venizelos was defeated in the elections of November 1920, as Dimitrios Gounaris and his unfortunate government continued the same policy that was dependent on British support. It was not the burning of Smyrna that ended this affair, but the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and the subsequent exchange of populations.
On the one hand, military operations on the field were decisive. The collapse of the Hellenic Army in the summer of 1922 was what led to the retreat from Asia Minor. However, the military dimension was always closely linked to the fields of politics and diplomacy. Politics and diplomacy are what gave Greece the opportunity to disembark troops in Asia Minor. Venizelos had cultivated good relations with Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Wilson. The disaster of 1922 had many causes, among them financial exhaustion. Subsequently, it is several factors that led to the failure of the Greek military operation.
Lloyd George, who looked omnipotent in Paris in 1919, lost much of his power as time went on. He continued to believe in the Greek cause. However, he was very isolated in his own coalition government, and had several other issues to confront. Ultimately, Greek control of Asia Minor was not a vital British interest. There were others, if not more, vital concerns: relations between Britain and France, Russia, and Ireland, the promotion of social peace, and the process of reintegrating discharged soldiers back home.
Differences that erupted during meetings of the Allies worked against Greece. France completely turned against Greece after the elections of 1920 and the return of King Constantine. It was always more concerned with Syria and issues further east than Asia Minor. By the end of 1920, France was ready to sign a treaty with the Turkish nationalists and withdraw its troops from Cilicia. The US exited the stage after President Wilson returned home and his health deteriorated. Above all, the diplomacy of Mustafa Kemal was also an important factor, as he took advantage of Soviet Russia's policy of turning against the Entente. Additionally, the concentration of Turkish forces and diplomatic resources in the interior of Asia Minor reached a point in the summer of 1922 where it could threaten a mass counterattack.
The situation, as it developed between 1920 and 1922, turned, fatefully, against the Greeks and for the cause of Turkish nationalism. This made the success of the Greek military operations impossible. Diplomacy won out over arms.