A combination of factors led to the defeat

There has almost never been a war in the entirety of human history that was decided by a single factor. War is the ultimate challenge for a society (particularly during the industrial era) and its outcome depends on several factors, including the material factor (economic and demographic) of the combatants, their access to cutting-edge technology, adequate planning and organization, the training of its officials, the morale and cohesion of its home front, geography, international support and alliances, and others. Even the consequences of a military defeat can be overturned by a society that possesses a strong economic, technological, organizational and ideological foundation, as well as international support. Even a significant victory in the early stages will not prove enough if a society does not meet these conditions and their enemy does. For example, it was not the defeat at the Battle of Manzikert alone that caused the collapse of Byzantium at the end of the 11th century, and the inconceivable disaster in France in 1940 was not enough to break Britain. To put it simply, a victory is only decisive if the opponent no longer has the forces, that is the other factors, to overturn its consequences.

The Asia Minor Campaign was no exception to this rule. The initial planning of this Ionian endeavor by Venizelos was grounded in such a combination of factors including Greece's identity as a victor of the Great War, the existence of a broad international network that Venizelos sought to utilize, the perceived decision of the Great Powers to carve up the Ottoman Empire (including the “core” territories of Asia Minor), the emergence of a friendly Armenian state, and the significant Greek military superiority against any Turkish reaction. However, until November 1920, it is accurate to refer to this as an Ionian endeavor by Greece – one that was certainly military in nature – but it must be differentiated from the large offensive actions that began in early 1921.

There are huge differences between these two phases. The elections of November 1920 and the return of King Constantine decisively contributed to the international isolation of Greece, while paving the way for the Kemalist movement to get international support, starting with the Soviet Union. This developing international isolation (that eliminated the initial Greek military superiority while exacerbating economic woes) pushed the post-November governments to undertake this huge military operation toward Ankara. Its goal was not to conquer and occupy these territories, but to trap and eliminate the Kemalist forces while also destroying their supply lines and lines of communication. Greece undertook that large offensive on its own at that point, with international support growing weaker. Thus, the goal of the 1921 campaign was to fight a decisive battle that would eliminate the enemy or throw them into disarray. Usually, this strategy is a sign of weakness as it means that the side utilizing it is trying to reverse a sequence of events and correlations that are increasingly turning against it.

We do not know, and we cannot theorize, what would have happened if Kemal had waited to be caught. He did not. Neither does this author believe that the occupation of Ankara would have led to a Turkish defeat. They could have always retreated further to the east. Kutuzov had done it in Russia in 1812 when Napoleon entered Moscow but lost the war. In other words, there was no military solution to the problem that was attempted to solve with military means in 1921. The great heroism displayed by the army during the brutal battles of 1921 could not overturn the fundamental issues.

There were of course military factors that contributed to the defeat. Among them were the long supply lines, the lack of initiative shown for almost a year, with the army spread thinly over a huge front (allowing Kemal to concentrate his forces in the most important sectors and achieve there the required military superiority), the lack of available reserves in crucial sectors, and of course the National Schism that led to the discharge of many capable officers who supported the “other” side.

However, this author must insist that the cause of the defeat was not solely a military issue. The post-November governments did not possess the overall perception of Venizelos when it came to the international system, nor did they possess his skills to manage its difficulties. The causes of the defeat indicate a combination of a factors, from the bad judgment of how international support would factor in the conflict, wrong decisions (both military and political), economic difficulties, and, perhaps most importantly, the inability to maintain a cohesive home front due to the National Schism.