-sets aside Guyana Court of Appeal decision

The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) has allowed an appeal by two Essequibo farmers over a rice land dispute and set aside a Guyana Court of Appeal decision.

Handed down on Monday in Port-ofSpain, the decision revolved around whether the Rice Assessment Committee for Essequibo was right in declining jurisdiction in proceedings brought against the two rice farmers Chandra Babulall and Winston Harry. The CCJ ruled that the committee was right in declining jurisdiction when the matter came before it and that the Guyana Court of Appeal had erred on several counts when it took the case up.

The Public Trustee as the administratrix of the estate of Mary Chan (deceased) had in May, 2001 begun proceedings before the Rice Assessment Committee against Babulall and Harry seeking to have them quit the land pursuant to the Rice Farmers (Security of Tenure) Act. Before the committee, both farmers testified that at varying points they had purchased rice land from the Public Trustee. They tendered some receipts into evidence.

The CCJ noted that the applications by the Public Trustee were heard by the Rice Committee over 27 hearing days and an oral determination was made on July 17th, 2002 followed by a written memorandum of reasons. Declining jurisdiction, the Rice Action Committee said “The Landlord gave evidence as to their ownership of the said land. The tenant showed the Committee an Agreement for Sale of the said land and claims the status of a bona fide Purchase for value. The Committee failed to find the relationship of Landlord and Tenant and in this respect declined jurisdiction to hear this instant matter”.

Dissatisfied, the Public Trustee appealed to the Full Court. The CCJ said that without making any finding over the Rice Committee’s decision to decline jurisdiction, the Full Court found that the appeals were procedurally misconceived and struck them out and dismissed the matter.

The Public Trustee then appealed the decision of the Full Court to the Guyana Court of Appeal. The CCJ said that the Guyana Court of Appeal made two key findings i.e. that the Rice Committee was wrong to find that it had no jurisdiction and that the applications before the Rice Committee had been decided on their merits. The Guyana Court of Appeal then proceeded to direct the Rice Committee to issue notices to quit to Babulall and Harry. These two then appealed both the decisions of the Guyana Court of Appeal and its order.

Asking itself the question whether the Rice Committee was wrong to decline jurisdiction, the CCJ noted that the common thread running through the regime established by the Rice Farmers (Security of Tenure) Act 1956 is that the powers and duties of the Committee only become exercisable where a landlord and tenant relationship exists among the parties before it. Such a relationship was in dispute as Babulall and Harry had claimed to be owners before the Committee. Further, the CCJ said that any determination as to whether a person is a tenant or owner falls outside of the jurisdiction of the Committee and is really a matter for the High Court.

The CCJ however noted that the Guyana Court of Appeal held that the Committee was wrong to find that it had no jurisdiction and the Court of Appeal further said:

“There was a hearing before the Rice Assessment Committee on the collateral issue as to whether there existed the relationship of landlord and tenant between the Appellant and the Respondent but the Committee instead of determining the issue erroneously ruled that they had no jurisdiction. The evidence before the Committee was overwhelming and unchallenged that there exists the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The decision of the Committee runs contrary to the provisions of the Rice Farmers (Security of Tenure) Act Cap. 69:02 which specifically provide it with exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the whole question of the relationship of landlord and tenant in and over rice lands. The decision of the Committee was arbitrary, oppressive and not in accordance with the statutory provisions, settled principles of law and authority and must be set aside.”

Particularize

The CCJ then proceeded to dismantle the Guyana Court of Appeal decision. It said:

“With respect, we do not think that this assessment does full credit to the decision of the Committee and it is unfortunate that the court did not particularize the evidence it regarded as overwhelming. The issue of the ownership of the rice lands having arisen from the submissions of the parties, it was incumbent upon the Committee to establish that it had jurisdiction to determine that issue of ownership. The Respondent gave evidence as to the deceased landlord’s ownership of the land but the Applicants claimed the status of bona fide purchasers for value. They both testified that they had purchased the rice lands from the Respondent and were placed in possession. There was some

evidence to support the contentions of the Applicants in the form of numerous receipts and items of correspondence between the parties which evidenced the sale…

“It is conceded that the evidence for the Applicants was by no means incontrovertible. During the course of the hearing before the Committee, Miss Hudson, the Trust Officer of the Public Trustee’s Office, testified that there were no records supporting the claims by the Applicants that they had purchased their lots. In testifying before the Committee neither Applicant was able to produce the agreement for sale. It is to be noted that by the time it gave written reasons for its decisions the Committee stated that the tenants had showed the Committee agreements for sale of the lands. In the High Court action instituted by the Respondent (Public Trustee) seeking possession on the grounds that the Applicants were squatters, the Applicants admitted that they were tenants of the estate of the deceased Mary Chan, albeit simultaneously averring that they were entitled to conveyance of the transport on the basis of adverse possession. Babulall also averred that he had purchased the land.

“Faced with these competing claims and documentary evidence, including especially the receipts tending to establish purchase of the lands by the Applicants and the letters from the Respondent, the Committee was justified in its decision to decline jurisdiction to hear the applications for leave to issue notices to quit, given its misgivings as to whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties.”

Estoppel

The CCJ went on to contend that “We are of the opinion that, on the assumption (yet to be proved) that the Applicants entered into agreements for sale with the Respondent, paid the purchase price and were allowed to continue in possession, the Respondent is not entitled to bring an application seeking leave to issue notices to quit against the Applicants on the ground that the Applicants are mere tenants. Whatever may be the position of a third party bona fide purchaser for value under the Roman- Dutch land law in Guyana, the Respondent as vendor must, under general law, be estopped from treating a purchaser in possession as a mere tenant who may be evicted for non-payment of rent. Such as an estoppel might not create an interest in the land but it does constitute a bar to the vendor acting unconscionably towards the purchaser.”

On the matter of the Guyana Court of Appeal’s finding that the applications by Babulall and Harry had been decided on their merit, the CCJ disagreed.

“These matters were not considered or pronounced upon by the Committee and we therefore disagree with the decision of the court below that the applications were decided on the merits. It is true, as the Court of Appeal held, that there was `an abundance of evidence that formed part of the proceedings before the Committee.’ However, that evidence was primarily concerned with the jurisdictional question of whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties and not with whether all the grounds for the substantive applications had been made out to the satisfaction of the Committee”, the CCJ said.

The CCJ pointed out that Chang CJ (ag), delivering the judgment of the Full Court, held that as the Committee had not determined the applications on the merits but had merely declined jurisdiction, the appeals by the Public Trustee were procedurally misconceived.

The CCJ also dealt with the subsidiary issue of the method of approach to the court by Babulall and Harry. They had approached the CCJ by way of special leave to appeal the Guyana Court of Appeal decision rather than by way of right of appeal. The respondent had opposed the method of approaching the court by arguing that an important condition for special leave – a realistic prospect of success – had not been attained. The CCJ in its consideration of the issue noted that Section 8 of the CCJ Act permits an applicant to seek special leave directly from the CCJ to appeal any decision of the Court of Appeal. “A litigant may apply for special leave after the Court of Appeal has refused his application for leave to appeal. Alternatively, he may by-pass the Court of Appeal entirely, even in an appeal `as of right’, and seek special leave directly from the CCJ. However, in doing so the litigant runs the risk that his application may be dismissed if this Court is not satisfied that there is a realistic possibility of the appeal succeeding. Furthermore, where the litigant foregoes his `as of right’ appeal by seeking special leave before this Court and his application for special leave is dismissed, any attempt to resuscitate the same by applying to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal `as of right’ is likely to be regarded as an abuse of process”.

The CCJ said it was clear that the Applicants in this case were perfectly entitled to apply to the CCJ for special leave to appeal. The real question was whether they satisfied the Court that they had a realistic possibility of the appeal succeeding and in the case the court found that this was so.

On the need for clarity in procedures in the Guyana jurisdiction, the CCJ said “As a general proposition, this Court is reluctant to dispose of proceedings on the purely technical ground that the wrong procedure was employed by the parties in approaching the courts. We anxiously await the coming into force of the new Civil Procedure Rules for Guyana which will do much to simplify and thereby improve the law in this area. In the interregnum we consider that it is appropriate to give as generous an interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions on procedural access to the courts as would permit consideration of the dispute brought by the parties unless there is some express statutory provision or strong reason of policy that prevents the adoption of such an interpretation.”

R Satram, C V Satram and M Satram appeared for Babulall and Harry and Robin Stoby SC, Mohamed Khan and Kashir Khan for the Public Trustee.