The M&CC does not have the technical, financial and scholastic rigour of a Ministry of Public Infrastructure

Dear Editor, The conceptualization of the parking meter project is not known to the people. We do not know which meeting, which policy or what data have informed the conclusion that parking meters ought to be implemented. What this means is that the solution of parking meters is without a clear problem definition. This ushers in the second issue.

If the parking meters are a solution, then what is the problem? What exactly are we trying to solve? Is it traffic congestion? What other solutions have been contemplated in solving that problem? How do they compare when evaluated? Have those solutions been ranked? If so, then how? Is it by that which is most affordable? Is it by that which has the capacity to be most effective in deterring people from the capital?

We know that the exclusive role of the Major and City Council is not to generate revenue. If that was the real mandate then what other alternatives have been considered?

In the management of projects, the contemplations of the above are usually addressed in pre-feasibility and feasibility studies.

The administrative structure of the M&CC is unaccustomed to operate at the equivalent technical, financial and general scholastic rigour of a government body such as the Ministry of Public Infrastructure, for example. Perhaps that is why the parking meter project, which seems like a rabbit pulled out of a hat, has progressed so far without the employ of credible standard practices. The conspiracy theorist in me wonders if whoever decided that the M&CC was the best administrative vehicle to execute this plan also knew of this vulnerability and elected to exploit it strategically.

A project of this nature, ideally born out of economic and social metrics, which are usually covered in a feasibility study, must be accompanied by an environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA). This is only in keeping with Chapter 20:05 The Environmental Protection Act which mandates a complete and thorough impact study. This assessment itself comprises several areas of attention of which the social aspect is inescapable. For this type of project in particular, the social reach and its ability to change behaviour and how that will impact the cultural and economic reality of the capital must be understood.

This is not the kind of thing to be simply deduced from meeting with a few people at the National Library, enjoy pastries and then label that as public outreach. It is far more intricate and far more complex.

Part IV of the Act details the requirements for an ESIA. The developer has to publish in at least one daily newspaper the intention to carry out the ESIA before it is done. Was this ever done? When? In which newspaper?

The developer must allow 28 days for written submissions from the public. Was any written submission received? Where is it? What did it address? What response was given?

The developer must make available to members of the public the project summary. Did anyone request this? Who? Was the summary given to them?

Again we are left wondering why the M&CC was allowed to deploy a project that requires the competency of traffic and transportation engineering which is a specialized branch of civil engineering.

If we were to assume that the feasibility studies and requisite permission from EPA have been fulfilled, the next step would be procurement. Here again, we have legislation in the form of Chapter 73:05 The Procurement Act of Guyana 2003 that addresses this. There are also procurement policies, some of which are written and practised and some of which are practised alone. These polices tend to feature in agencies which are not under the purview of the National Procurement and Tender Administration Board, the structure of said policies which ought not to deviate from the spirit of the legislation and the general potential for mischief that it seeks to remedy.

If the policy that exists at the M&CC justifies sole sourcing, as was done, then it does not meet the procurement sophistication required for a project like this. This project involves the procurement of works, goods and services, all in one. Usually contracts tend to be one of the three, and sometimes a combination of two, and in a rare and complex scenario, like this, where all three are combined. Someone at some point ought to have recognized the level of complexity involved and try to do what is in the best in the interest of the country.

I am only left to conclude that the reason for sole sourcing was to circumvent the process of competitive bidding and exclusively allow Smart City Solutions the liberty to submit whatever they wished.

This sentenced the project to be deprived of the technological and economic refinement which is naturally infused when multiple bidders seek competitive advantage ‒ the competitive advantage of doing the right thing to solve the problem at hand coupled with the competitive advantage of implementing that right thing with as little wastage of resources as possible. This is what economists refer to as value for money. This is what is known in American parlance as getting the best bang for the buck. This is what is known in Guyana as getting de right ting pon de best shot.

In public procurement, when bids sought have been received, the next step is to evaluate those bids. They are evaluated based on common criteria that is known to the bidders since it is usually in the invitation to tender document. We know there were no multiple bids and as such no comparative evaluation was done. What prevailed instead was a sham of a procurement process.

The contract. This is supposed to have been readily available to the public. It was only a few hours ago, through presumably clandestine means that this document was obtained and exposed on social media. The nature of the agreement itself is overtly imbalanced in favour of Smart City Solutions and I am completely confident that a court of law would find that the M&CC in representing the citizens of Guyana, was doing so from a diminished and compromised perspective and competency.

The contract must be quashed. If the project is to still be analyzed for fitness of use then it must use the best related competencies available, which I believe reside in the Ministry of Public Infrastructure. They must start from point of conception and work forward.

In closing, I believe the people have adequately represented that they will resist this deal, born out of cronyism, disguised as a project and forced upon them. They have resisted and they will continue to resist.

By way of the social interaction facilitated by the rapid contact that technology now offers, a growing segment of the people of Guyana over recent years have decided that they will demonstrably play their role in charting a democracy for which they believe they must hold themselves accountable. They have done so by first transcending traditional voting patterns and now they have done so in standing up against this blatant unlawful contract. I am of the opinion that their next move will be to consider that every official who has been involved in this project, who gave their approval, is undeniably complicit and no longer fit for office. To begin with, I believe Patricia Chase-Green has betrayed the office of the Mayor and Royston King has betrayed the office of the Town Clerk. Yours faithfully, Arun Sudesh Richard