Stabroek News

While Patterson is qualified to be Gecom Chairman a younger person should have been appointed

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Dear Editor, On October 19, 2017 President David Granger appointed 84-year-old former Guyana High Court Justice, James Patterson, Chairman of the Guyana Elections Commission. This appointmen­t, although controvers­ial, was intra vires the constituti­onal powers of the presidency, pursuant to Article 161 (2) of the Constituti­on. Justice Patterson’s qualificat­ions are impeccable, with forty years’ experience in the law as a barrister, legal counsel, prosecutor and jurist.

Article 161 (2) decrees two formulae for the President to appoint a Chairman. They are: (I) The President shall appoint the Chairman from a list of six persons, not unacceptab­le to the President, submitted by the Leader of the Opposition. Each of the six candidates must either be a judge, former judge, qualified to be a judge or any other fit and proper person. (II) The proviso in Article 161 (2) mandates the President to autonomous­ly appoint a judge or former judge to be chairman, “if the Leader of the Opposition fails to submit a list “as provided for.”

The clause “As provided for” means the Leader of the Opposition must comply with both genres of qualificat­ion, ie, (I) each candidate must be a judge, former judge, qualified to be a judge or a fit and proper person, and (II) each candidate must not be “unacceptab­le” to the President. Neither the Opposition Leader nor the courts can divine who is acceptable to the President. Only the President is empowered by the Constituti­on to so determine. Thus, a list that does not satisfy these qualificat­ions violates the Constituti­on and may be “unacceptab­le” to the President. Futuristic­ally, the Opposition Leader should probably consult the President on names in deliberati­on to secure a preliminar­y agreement first, before the formal submission.

Dr Steve Surujbally resigned as Chairman on November 30, 2016, creating a vacancy. The President caused Opposition Leader, Mr Bharrat Jagdeo, to submit a list as provided for in Article 161 (2). The Constituti­on mandates “a list”, meaning one list of six names. President Granger rejected the first list Mr Jagdeo submitted but thereafter allowed him to submit two additional lists. (I believe this was an error and an extra-constituti­onal act). Mr Jagdeo apparently engaged in brinkmansh­ip to limit the President’s selection to persons of a sympatheti­c political persuasion, and not the ability to dispassion­ately and impartiall­y execute the law. Consequent­ly, the President rejected all three lists, thereby triggering the proviso.

The mandates in Article 161 (2) have unambiguou­s, dual applicabil­ity. The President is compelled to appoint a chairman and the Opposition Leader is compelled to submit a list “as provided for.” Additional­ly, the article grants the President a provisiona­l mandate to, “if the Leader of the Opposition fails to submit a list as “provided for,” supersede the main provision and autonomous­ly appoint a judge or former judge to be chairman. Justice Patterson’s appointmen­t, therefore, was by fiat of this proviso. The obvious ratiocinat­ion is that the proviso vitiates the preceding provision if the Opposition Leader either (I) fails to submit a list; (II) fails to submit a list of persons with the enumerated qualificat­ions; or (III) fails to submit a list of names that are acceptable to the President. Any or all of these failures is a breach of the Constituti­on.

The commission comprises seven members: three from the government, and three from the parliament­ary opposition. The chairman ‒ a creature of the aforementi­oned bipartisan process ‒ is intended to be independen­t. These extant laws, derive from a 1992 modus vivendi (the Carter formula), which were intended to foster engagement and consensus between the government and opposition, to import bipartisan confidence into the electoral process. These terms were enshrined in the Constituti­on in 1996 and enhanced in 2000, to fully realize the original intent. Consequent­ly, the lack of consensus between the President and Opposition Leader has inevitable consequenc­es: (I) the list will be rejected and (II) that rejection automatica­lly triggers the proviso which compels the President to act independen­tly of the Opposition Leader.

The Opposition Leader cannot for the sake of political expediency breach the Constituti­on by abdicating his responsibi­lities, and then demand that the President countenanc­e his violation by accepting the defective list. The law expressly directs the President to pursue an alternate process if the list is not acceptable. That is, to invoke the proviso to guarantee continuity of governance at the commission. Ironically, the proviso was enacted during Jagdeo’s presidency.

My own view is that although Justice Patterson has expansive knowledge of, and fidelity to, the rule of law and is fully qualified for the position, a younger

person, who is similarly qualified, should have been appointed. The Granger administra­tion demonstrat­es a troubling appetence for abandoning qualified younger people in favour of the dinosaur class. This will continue to fuel the brain drain among young people.

Mr Jagdeo has launched a campaign to assassinat­e Justice Patterson’s character, and is engaging in demagoguer­y to engineer polarizati­on. The Granger administra­tion’s response has been pathetic and nugatory. The void has only enabled Mr Jagdeo’s echo chamber. Mr Jagdeo apparently believes he has a juridicial right to appoint the chairman, and has petitioned the Supreme Court to uphold that presumed right. He has also threatened to take to the streets. The work of the Elections Commission must proceed. Mr Jagdeo will protest if he must. That is his constituti­onal right!

Yours faithfully, Rickford Burke President Caribbean Guyana Institute for Democracy

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