Stabroek News

What the UNODC says about corruption risks in the manufactur­e, allocation and distributi­on of COVID-19 vaccines

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On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organisati­on (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic. This necessitat­ed the manufactur­e, allocation and distributi­on worldwide of various vaccines that have been approved for use. In recognitio­n of the corruption risks involved, to assist in mitigating such risks, and to help advance access to safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines, especially for the most vulnerable and marginaliz­ed groups, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has developed a policy paper on the subject. According to the paper, which can be found at https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/COVID19/Policy_paper_on_COVID-19_vaccines_and_corruption_risks.pdf, the corruption risks involved include: entry of substandar­d and falsified vaccines into markets; theft of vaccines within the distributi­on systems; leakages in emergency funding designated for the developmen­t and distributi­on of vaccines; nepotism; favouritis­m; and corrupted procuremen­t systems.

We note the controvers­y surroundin­g Guyana’s acquisitio­n of Sputnik V vaccines from Russia and its procuremen­t from an intermedia­te supplier - Sheik Ahmed Dalmook Al-Maktoum of the United Arab Emirates - at a price significan­tly higher than that recommende­d by the WHO. (Sheik Al-Maktoum had visited Guyana last year to explore investment opportunit­ies.) According to the Health Minister, amounts totalling G$1.283 billion were spent in the procuremen­t of 200,000 Sputnik V and 100,000 Sinopharm vaccines, and there are plans to source an additional 58,000 Sputnik V vaccines from the supplier at a cost of G$276 million. He explained that, faced with a high rate of infection, a global shortage of vaccines such as Pfizer, Moderna, Johnson and Johnson and limited supplies directly from India and through the COVAX facility, Guyana opted to buy the Sputnik V and Sinopharm vaccines from the above supplier.

While not seeking to get involved in the controvers­y, we highlight in this article the main points contained in UNODC’s policy paper on the subject. The text of the relevant sections has been retained, except for some minor adjustment­s.

Corruption risks in public procuremen­t

Among all government functions, public procuremen­t poses one of the greatest risks for corruption, considerin­g the large volumes involved and their related costs. In many countries, public procuremen­t is estimated to comprise as much as 15 – 30 per cent of the gross domestic product. Corruption scandals in procuremen­t are widespread, especially in the healthcare sector in the acquisitio­n of pharmaceut­ical and other supplies.

Corruption risks can be found throughout the procuremen­t cycle. During the pre-bidding phase, these include inaccurate­ly estimating the demand for a particular product or service, circumvent­ing tender procedures, and deliberate­ly tailoring tender documents to favour a particular bidder. During the bidding phase, there is the risk of government officials receiving bribes or kickbacks from suppliers, as well as of collusion and market division between bidders themselves. Such closed networks thrive by virtue of their exclusion and even more so when oversight is traded for speed and rapid impact. Lastly, in the post-bidding phase, corruption risks include false invoicing, changing contract agreements, and the failure to deliver procured goods and services.

In a public health crisis, corruption risks in procuremen­t become greater considerin­g the need for flexibilit­y in the applicatio­n of procuremen­t rules and the speed of action. This creates opportunit­ies for the use of individual discretion that can further increase the risk of corruption. Many countries have issued direct contracts without competitiv­e processes and face challenges in ensuring that controls are in place to detect and prevent abuses and corrupt practices. Unscrupulo­us government

officials may seek to enrich themselves, or those connected to them, through the procuremen­t process by demanding kickbacks from suppliers. Suppliers, on the other hand, may exploit shortages to demand grossly inflated prices from government purchasers and collude with other suppliers to their advantage. If suppliers bribe government officials to circumvent regulatory controls, there is also a risk that government­s may purchase substandar­d or falsified products, thereby underminin­g the health of their population­s, reducing citizens’ trust and confidence in public institutio­ns, and government­s’ response to the crisis.

Corruption risks in emergency funding

During a crisis response, large amounts of funding are directed to address a critical and complex problem rapidly. As of June 2020, the Internatio­nal Monetary Fund estimated that approximat­ely US$11 trillion was allocated globally as fiscal support to the COVID-19 response. Additional­ly, in October 2020, the World Bank approved US$12 billion for developing countries to finance, purchase and distribute COVID-19 vaccines as well as tests and treatments for their population­s. Large inflows of funding that are disbursed quickly may be vulnerable to corruption if appropriat­e due diligence measures are not in place.

For example, during the Ebola virus disease crisis in Sierra Leone the National Audit Office found a lack of documentat­ion of nearly US$3.3 million in payments from the Government’s Ebola accounts as well as many examples of apparent fraud and corruption, especially in the procuremen­t of supplies for Ebola response workers. In the aftermath of Ebola, there was an upsurge in maternal mortality rates. The explicit and causal relationsh­ip that corruption had on maternal mortality rates in Sierra Leone was subsequent­ly confirmed and elaborated on in a sequential mixed-methods study conducted from October 2016 to January 2017. Household surveys concluded that women who had given birth since the Ebola outbreak expressed mistrust of health-care workers primarily due to payments demanded for health care that would otherwise have been free. Women were therefore disproport­ionally affected during the Ebola crisis and its aftermath.

Production of substandar­d and falsified vaccines

With the urgent global demand for vaccines, there is a risk of substandar­d and falsified vaccines entering a market. Corruption may facilitate the involvemen­t of organized criminal groups in the manufactur­ing of and traffickin­g in falsified vaccines, and the production of substandar­d vaccines by others, particular­ly when supplies will be limited in the early stages of vaccine production and deployment. This risk is further compounded if quality assurance measures are absent or bypassed during the emergency response, resulting in adverse health outcomes for the population and an erosion of public trust in the safety and efficacy of a vaccine.

Organized criminal groups may take advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic by attacking vulnerabil­ities and gaps in health and criminal systems. This includes the manufactur­ing of and traffickin­g in falsified medical products, driven by the huge global demand and competitio­n in products for COVID-19 prevention, diagnosis, treatment and risk protection.

Nepotism/favouritis­m in access to vaccines

An estimated one billion people represent dispersed population­s without formal identities, primarily living in developing countries. Reaching these population­s will be particular­ly challengin­g when a COVID-19 vaccine becomes available. COVID-19 vaccine supplies will be limited in the initial stages of vaccine deployment, so it is vital that government­s ensure that they allocate the vaccine fairly and that each dose reaches its intended recipient.

Decision-making relating to the allocation of vaccines to priority groups is also vulnerable to corruption risks, such as conflicts of interest and nepotism. The principles of equal respect, reciprocit­y and legitimacy stated in the values framework of the WHO Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunizati­on for the allocation and prioritiza­tion of COVID-19 vaccinatio­n, should be applied early in vaccine allocation and distributi­on.

Transparen­cy

Transparen­cy – informatio­n about public decisionma­king – is critical here. Transparen­cy allows for the detection of corruption and lowers the likelihood of corrupt behaviour. It also lowers informatio­n barriers and permits scrutiny and monitoring. Government­s will need to ensure transparen­cy when establishi­ng the criteria used to determine priority vaccine recipients and also make sure that this is then communicat­ed widely to the population. Transparen­cy is vital in ensuring that people are made aware of how, where, and when to access vaccinatio­n programmes.

Corrupt vaccine policy decisions

The private sector, and other relevant stakeholde­rs, may seek to influence government decision-making concerning vaccine policy and deployment. Government officials may be vulnerable to payoffs and bribes from a company with a stake in which vaccine is purchased, for how much, from whom, and where it is distribute­d. Individual­s with close ties to the health industry may also be involved in the decision-making process regarding vaccine purchases and deployment. As a hypothetic­al example, a physician, on a national immunizati­on technical advisory group, may support a particular vaccine candidate developed by a company that has provided her/him with research or consultanc­y funding, and fail to declare this as a conflict of interest.

Given the public health crisis, government­s may directly determine the prices for vaccines and other essential medical products, which can create corruption risks throughout the supply chain. Transparen­cy in pricing of vaccine products is absolutely critical to avoid price gouging and other corrupt practices. The involvemen­t and inclusion of a diverse group of people – at a minimum both women and men – in the vaccine decision-making and deployment processes are key. Ensuring equity in terms of access to a COVID-19 vaccine will require that government­s adopt an inclusive approach in their recovery efforts.

Intermedia­te measures to reduce corruption risks

Considerin­g the above challenges, the policy paper suggested that Member States consider the following intermedia­te response measures to identify and mitigate corruption risks that may compromise the access to safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines by the population. In doing so, the paper noted that the United Nations Convention against Corruption is the only legally binding, universal anti-corruption instrument that provides a global framework and key tools to foster accountabi­lity, integrity and transparen­cy in times of crisis, as in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic:

Creating a specialize­d committee with a strong anticorrup­tion mandate to oversee the prioritiza­tion, distributi­on and monitoring of vaccine programmes, and related public policy. The committee can act as a critical oversight body during a public health emergency with responsibi­lity for monitoring the emergency disburseme­nts of funds, the purchase and distributi­on of vaccines and related processes in “real time” so that any red flags can be identified and addressed quickly;

Ensuring transparen­t and accountabl­e vaccine procuremen­t. Transparen­t and accountabl­e public emergency procuremen­t processes are vital during a pandemic and can be fostered through open contractin­g and eprocureme­nt. Open contractin­g may be effective at reducing corruption because it provides the public with informatio­n about who is buying what, from whom, at what price and quantity. In addition, e-procuremen­t can be effective at tackling corruption. It allows for the public disseminat­ion of relevant data, such as the bidding and awarding of contracts through a dedicated website, thereby ensuring the element of transparen­cy;

Providing secure storage and distributi­on systems to mitigate corruption risks. Secure storage and distributi­on systems are critical for the safe delivery of COVID19 vaccines and the mitigation of the risk of vaccines being diverted from public supply to black markets. Manufactur­ers are already developing strategies to prevent the theft of vaccines. This may include measures such as ensuring the storage of vaccines in undisclose­d locations, the use of a Global Positionin­g System tracking system to monitor supplies in transit, and the use of “dummy” trucks to confuse criminal networks. Hospitals may need to ensure that the rooms where COVID19 vaccines are stored have heightened security;

Conducting corruption risk assessment­s. When feasible and ideally before widespread vaccine deployment, a corruption risk assessment can be used by public institutio­ns to identify corruption vulnerabil­ities within their operations and to devise efficient, cost-effective strategies to mitigate those vulnerabil­ities or risks. Timely corruption risk assessment­s within health ministries or agencies entrusted with the procuremen­t and distributi­on of COVID-19 vaccines will mitigate corruption risks during vaccine distributi­on procedures;

Strengthen­ing civil society participat­ion. Civil society participat­ion in the formulatio­n of policies and monitoring of the overall health system is a necessary element in efforts to curb corruption in the health sector. During the COVID-19 pandemic, civil society, non-government­al organizati­ons and community-based organizati­ons can support government efforts to counter corruption. Promoting the active participat­ion of civil society should include enabling and encouragin­g civil society participat­ion in relevant decision-making processes on the allocation and distributi­on of COVID-19 vaccines, including those related to the prioritiza­tion of recipients, the procuremen­t of vaccines, and the flow of emergency funds for vaccine programmes. Civil society can assume a key role in monitoring and reporting any irregulari­ties in the vaccine deployment process;

Protecting journalist­s and whistle-blowers. Investigat­ive journalist­s assume an essential role during a crisis when false informatio­n may be used to protect those who engage in corrupt activities. Investigat­ions by journalist­s can help expose alleged corruption or corruption risks within a health system, thereby playing a critical role by bringing the issue to the attention of the public and decision makers. Measures to ensure the protection and safety of journalist­s are crucial for them to act without fear and bring vital informatio­n to the people. Similarly, during the pandemic, whistle-blowers are critical, given the ample opportunit­ies for corruption in times of crisis; and

Upholding the right to health. The United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, WHO and the Council of Europe, among other organizati­ons, recognize that a human rights approach is crucial to an effective public health response to COVID-19. The standards of the right to health hold particular importance for effective pandemic care and responses. Corruption infringes on the full enjoyment of the right to health.

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