US ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy faces major hurdles
Some media reports on the possibility of Nepal joining the US’ State Partnership Program triggered speculation about a likely “military alliance” between Washington and Kathmandu. But the storm faded soon after the Nepalese government formally said “no” to the United States recently.
The State Partnership Program is a US Defense Department program managed by the National Guard that links US states with partner countries around the world for the purpose of supporting the security cooperation objectives of the US’ Unified Combatant Command.
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US started exploring options of establishing military-to-military contacts with former Soviet bloc countries, in order to extend its influence across Europe and ostensibly minimize geopolitical instability. Later, the US extended this operation to other regions.
For a long time, relatively small South Asian countries such as Nepal were not on Washington’s strategic radar, especially in terms of military cooperation. However, in recent years, the Pentagon has spread its tentacles to such countries. This reflects not only the expanse of Washington’s “Indo-Pacific” strategy but also its targeting of China as a competitor.
The Donald Trump administration made the “Indo-Pacific” strategy a top priority, because for the US, security comes first, the economy second. This was evident from the 2019 “Indo-Pacific” strategy report which was published by the Pentagon, rather than the State Department.
In the report, the Pentagon proposed a “3-P strategy” — Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region. The US thus proposed to “seek emerging partnerships with Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh and Nepal”.
Since then, the Pentagon has increased defense cooperation with those relatively small countries, including providing military training and equipment assistance for some of them. However, the overall result of the Pentagon’s move has been poor, because Bangladesh and Sri Lanka rejected the State Partnership Program for various reasons. The US still succeeded in extending its tentacles to these countries, though, as it initiated talks with Sri Lanka on a “Visiting Forces Agreement” and signed the “Framework for Defense and Security Relations” with the Maldives.
Perhaps encouraged by this, the Trump administration declassified the “Indo-Pacific Strategic Framework” document before leaving office. The document stresses the necessity of making Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives “emerging partners” in South Asia, and helping improve their interoperability and data sharing with the US.
This February, after more than a year’s deliberation, the Joe Biden administration issued its version of the “Indo-Pacific” strategy, which it claimed will become a cornerstone document, reshaping the direction of the strategy in the next decade. To address the “China challenge”, the document aims to strengthen the US’ position and investment in the “Indo-Pacific” and pay attention to every corner of the region.
But unlike the “Trump version”, the “Biden version” does not name any small South Asian country; it just refers to “South Asian partners”.
Because of this seemingly subtle change, it should not be assumed that the US no longer attaches importance to small South Asian countries in terms of security. It is more likely a deliberate lowering of expectations after reviewing the success and failure of the strategy, although the US still aims to promote security cooperation with such countries.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently said the US does not seek to start a Cold War with China, and instead aims to “shape” China’s neighborhood to “change its behavior”. Most of the small South Asian countries are partners of the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative, which naturally will be a priority target of the US’ efforts to “shape China’s neighborhood”.
Usually, bilateral military relations can tow political relations as well as support economic relations. Take Nepal for example. Just like the US’ Millennium Challenge Corporation aid helped increase the US’ economic influence in Nepal, the State Partnership Program would have helped build close security ties at the military level.
On the other hand, China and the small South Asian countries share friendly relations. And given their past lessons, the South Asian countries may have realized that high-profile promises do not necessarily result in positive action and rebuffed the US. For a long time, China and the small South Asian countries have shared good political, economic, trade, as well as friendly defense relations, because China does not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs.
Bangladesh, for example, imports nearly 70 percent of its main battle equipment from China, due to their high-quality performance and the absence of political conditions.
In terms of defense training, China’s cooperation with Sri Lanka has been extremely fruitful. In the past 20 years, the People’s Liberation Army has trained more than 110 Sri Lankan military officers. Colombo even has the world’s first China National Defense University Alumni Association outside China. And the Sri Lankan people know that, among the big powers, it is only China that upholds justice, and supports the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
That may explain why the small South Asian countries rejected the US offer of conditional military assistance. In fact, one of the main reasons for rebuffing the US is that they didn’t want to damage the traditional friendship with China.
The US may have planned to compete with China in every sphere and every part of the world. But given the US’ domineering image, many countries might feel it will force them to “take sides” vis-à-vis China. And judging by Nepal’s rejection of the State Partnership Program, it will certainly not be easy for the US to push ahead with its “Indo-Pacific” strategy.