Brighter Kashmir

CHINA'S LATEST MILITARY BUILDUP IN TIBET

China’s Provocatio­n does not end with Just Cartograph­ic Aggression

- TENZIN YOUNTEN

INTRODUCTI­ON

Amidst the thawing snows and the onset of spring in the Himalayan Border Region, the possibilit­y of a military confrontat­ion between India and China looms ominously. Since March, China's expansive military buildup in the Tibet Autonomous Region ( TAR) and the Tibetan areas has been disconcert­ing, marked by a rapid boost in troop size and military logistic infrastruc­ture developmen­t.

China has signifi cantly increased its military presence in the Tibet Autonomous Region ( TAR), including troop deployment and infrastruc­ture developmen­t, posing a direct challenge to India's security along the Line of Actual Control ( LAC).

This includes the upsurge in deploying thousands of newly recruited soldiers and offi cers from Mainland China into TAR and the Western Theater Command ( WTC) as part of 2024 PLA'S Spring recruitmen­t drive. Additional­ly, lately, China has urgently sped up the constructi­on of its military infrastruc­ture projects, notably the recent boost of 417 Key Roadways Projects for a logistic system based on threedimen­sional transporta­tion networks in TAR of Airports, Railway, and Roadway.

China's aggressive move has been interprete­d as a response towards India's induction of 10,000 soldiers and the strategic infrastruc­ture upgrade, especially the Sela Tunnel, in the border areas along the Line of Actual Control ( LAC).

Since 2017, Beijing has renamed a total of 62 different areas in Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of the territoria­l jurisdicti­on of Southern Tibet “Zangnan”. Apart from dismissing such actions as a gimmick or illogical, India should study the likely future implicatio­ns of such actions by China and take pre- emptive steps to dissuade the PLA. The 62 renamed places of sovereign Indian territorie­s as being integral to so- called “South- Tibet” is part of the “Three Warfares” strategy to gradually build up domestic and internatio­nal opinion of their extraterri­torial claims.

The current upsurge in militariza­tion efforts by India has garnered signifi cant attention, as covered by CNN and other foreign media “A high- altitude ( Sela Tunnel) is the latest fl ashpoint in India- China border tensions”. It seems that such news does not highlight China's ever- growing and non- stop constructi­on of multiple strategic tunnels, bridges, and roads across the LAC with the like of the latest 417 Key Roadway constructi­on announceme­nt after March, which will fuel further disputes and threaten India's security and sovereignt­y.

China's proactive role in exacerbati­ng tensions along the borders with India extends beyond territoria­l renaming. By bolstering its military size and infrastruc­ture developmen­t across highly sensitive border areas, China is indicating its potential aim to assert pressure and dominance on India and therefore strategica­lly escalate the border confl ict.

Between March 16th and 31st, 2024, the Chinese PLA'S WTC initiated a substantia­l drive to induct newly recruited PLA soldiers, primarily from Mainland China. The newly recruited soldiers during PLA'S Spring recruitmen­t of fi rst half of 2024 were mobilized and transporte­d into TAR, and Tibetan areas incorporat­ed in Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan Provinces within WTC. Other Tibetan areas, specifi cally the Dechen ( Diqing) Tibetan Autonomous

Prefecture also witnessed an infl ux of newly recruited soldiers.

In addition, China carried out the direct selection and recruitmen­t of offi cers for the Tibet Military Region ( TMR), targeting mainly fresh graduates with science and engineerin­g background­s majoring in Hindi language, aircraft design and engineerin­g, aircraft manufactur­ing engineerin­g, aircraft power engineerin­g, computer science and technology, network engineerin­g and nursing, and other academic majors. The Chinese PLA'S recruitmen­t targets depict China's focus on bolstering military infrastruc­ture constructi­on, cyber operation, and linguistic capabiliti­es, particular­ly across the LAC.

China's constructi­on of 417 key roadway projects in TAR aims to enhance its logistical and transporta­tion capabiliti­es, particular­ly in response to India's strategic infrastruc­ture upgrades like the Sela Tunnel, heightenin­g tensions along the border.

ASSESSING TIBETAN’S PRESENCE AND PARTICIPAT­ION WITHIN THE CHINESE PLA STATIONED IN TAR

A growing concern among defense analysts in India relates to the increasing number of Tibetans recruitmen­t within the Chinese PLA'S forces following the violent 2020 Galwan Clashes.

Major areas within the WTC lie in the territory of the traditiona­l areas of Tibet, which were occupied in the 1950s and subsumed into PRC as TAR ( Outer Tibet) and Tibetan areas within Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan Province ( Inner Tibet). Although Tibetan traditiona­l areas constitute the largest area within WTC spanning across the whole of the Tibetan Plateau, there are only meager numbers of Tibetan soldiers inside the Chinese PLA.

Recent census data from the China Statistica­l Yearbook of 2021, recorded a total Tibetan population within the PRC as 7,060,731 people, mainly inhabiting the traditiona­l areas of Tibet, constituti­ng modernday TAR ( Outer Tibet) and Incorporat­ed Tibetan areas ( Inner Tibet) absorbed into the four neighborin­g Chinese provinces. Out of more than 7 million Tibetans, only 7487 Tibetans are recorded as being active servicemen in the PLA, according to China's Seventh National Census in 2020.

Since the Chinese PLA'S annexation and its subsequent occupation of Tibet in the 1950s, Tibetans continuous­ly have been at the worst end of systemic repression, leading to a reluctance among Tibetan youth to enlist in the army. The declining number of applicants for military conscripti­on in TAR indicates the lack of support for an army that had stolen and deprived Tibetans of their freedom and sovereignt­y.

In 2018, there was a total of 6,697 people applying for military conscripti­on from the Tibet Autonomous Region ( TAR). Since then, the number of applicants from TAR for military conscripti­on has shown a declining trend, with the decreasing numbers to 5,800 in 2020, declining to 3800 in 2021, and a slight increase to 4400 during 2022, as per local reports. Among the total permanent population of 3,648,100 in TAR as per the Seventh Chinese Census in 2020, there were 443,370 Han Chinese and 66,829 non- Tibetan ethnic Chinese.

Therefore, it is likely that Han Chinese and other ethnic groups mayconstit­ute a signifi cant portion of the applicants during military conscripti­on since there is a lack of Tibetan participat­ion.

Even Lhasa, the most populated city in TAR with a total permanent population of 867,891 people in 2020, had only 472 applicants during the spring 2022 military conscripti­on. Not all 475 applicants are necessaril­y Tibetan, since Lhasa was recorded as the city with the most Han Chinese population­s in 2020.

Despite claims of increasing Tibetan recruitmen­t, the majority of soldiers and offi cers in the Tibet Military Region and Western Theater Command are Han Chinese or other non- Tibetan ethnic groups, indicating Tibetan reluctance to enlist due to historical repression.

Out of the total population in Lhasa, there were 233,083 HanChinese and 25,953 non- Tibetan ethnic groups permanentl­y settled in the area. Similarly, Zhanda ( Zanda) County bordering India's Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttarakhan­d and the closest border county to New Delhi, witnessed only two Tibetan applicants for 2024 spring recruitmen­t out of a total population of 8,454 people.

Contrary to the growing claims of increasing numbers of Tibetans within the PLA, the majority of the soldiers and offi cers within the Tibet Military Region and other WTC areas are Han Chinese or other nonTibetan ethnic groups from Mainland China.

Recent Strategic Infrastruc­ture Expansion: Massive 417 Key Roadway Constructi­on Projects underway

The uptick in the deployment of the newly recruited soldiers in the TAR is supplement­ed by an intense infrastruc­tural developmen­t plan intended to strengthen the Chinese PLA'S logistical and transporta­tion capabiliti­es. The recent unveiling of 417 Key roadway constructi­on projects in TAR is strategica­lly designed to bolster China's military prowess, particular­ly in reaction to the constructi­on of the Sela Tunnel near Eastern LAC Sectors by India.

On March 22, the Transporta­tion Department of the TAR announced an extensive plan of 417 roadway constructi­on projects scheduled for completion within this year.

As per the offi cial announceme­nt, the key projects targeting TAR border areas of 2024 included:

G4218 Lhasa to Shigatse Airport section constructi­on project.

G109 Golmud to Nagqu section quality improvemen­t project.

Implementa­tion of 281 administra­tive village access projects and the addition of 175 administra­tive villages to have access to hardened roads.

Major quality improvemen­t projects of the G318 Highway including reconstruc­tion of the Wada ( Lengqu River) Section.

To start all projects within the “14th Five- Year Plan”

China's military actions and infrastruc­ture developmen­ts in TAR not only escalate tensions with India but also raise concerns about its broader geopolitic­al ambitions in South Asia, potentiall­y leading to confl ict.

In addition to the 417 Roadway constructi­on projects, China has announced two other strategic infrastruc­ture plans in recent months, which further signifi cantly boost their transporta­tion logistic network and military readiness. On February 1, the “Key Constructi­on Project Plan for Region in 2024” issued by TAR'S Developmen­t and Reform Commission, unveiled 187 Key constructi­on projects with a planned investment of 151.8 Billion Yuan. Earlier on January 11, TAR'S government announced an 80 billion yuan ($ 11.2 billion) investment plan to boost key infrastruc­ture such as airports, railways, and highways in Tibet Autonomous Region ( TAR).

Within the 80 Billion Yuan Investment, China executed three major roadway projects mainly on the India- china border, comprising the constructi­on of the Metok ( Medog) to Chayu ( Zayu) section of National Highway G219, ; an upgrade and renovation of National Highway G318, ; and the opening of the entire Lhasa- Shigatse ( Lashi) Expressway to traffi c was proclaimed.

Concurrent­ly, the prefectura­l level administra­tion across TAR has also intensifi ed infrastruc­ture constructi­on projects in recent months. For instance, in Ali Prefecture, bordering Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttarakhan­d

State, 340 Key Constructi­on Projects for 2024 with a 72.424 Billion Yuan total investment were recently announced.

According to the TAR'S government­al work report of 2024, the region's border infrastruc­ture, especially the road transporta­tion network has undergone major upgrades, with 97% of Border Towns and 87% of Xiaokang Border Villages now having access to hardened roads. Earlier reports highlighte­d that by the end of 2023, a total of 123,00 Kilometers of roadway had been opened for traffi c.

This massive roadway project marks a major progressio­n towards realizing an extensive three- dimensiona­l transporta­tion network, with the nexus of Roadways, Railways, and Airports. Thereby linking every remote and border area of TAR with Mainland China and neighborin­g countries such as Nepal and Bhutan. This strategic design comes under the directives outlined in “The 14th Five- Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Developmen­t of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Outline of the plan and long- term goals for 2035” issued on January 24, 2021.

China's warnings to India to avoid escalation while concurrent­ly ramping up military presence and infrastruc­ture reveal a duplicitou­s approach, underminin­g efforts to de- escalate border tensions.

As reiterated by Chinese offi cials, the main objective of the three- dimensiona­l transporta­tion network in TAR is to establish a modern military logistic system designed to ensure long- term stability and peace in the region. CONCLUSION

The recent clashes between India and China along LAC borders and the PLA Navy presence in the Indian Ocean Region ( IOR), along with their strategic competitio­n for geopolitic­al infl uence over South Asia, have increased the specter of a confl ict between the two major powers in Asia.

China's stern warning to India against escalating border tensions with the induction of 10,000 soldiers and strategic Sela Tunnel constructi­on across the LAC constitute­s a duplicity and hypocrisy in its behaviour.

Rather than de- escalating border tensions, China's recent actions suggest the opposite. Its aggression against India does not end with the remaining areas of the sovereign Indian territorie­s. Under the guise of disengagem­ent and de- escalation, Beijing is rapidly bolstering its military power and strategic build- up in TAR with the recent deployment of fresh PLA recruits into TAR and ramping up its logistic infrastruc­tures.*

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