WHAT MENON HAS SAID

| India’s current nuclear doctrine has far greater flexibility than it gets credit for | There is a potential grey area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first against another nuclear-weapon state | Circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first | If Pakistan were to use tactical nuclear weapons against India, even against Indian forces in Pakistan, it would effectively be opening the door to a massive Indian first strike retaliation options in two ways over the 1998 version. One, India would retaliate with nukes not just to a nuclear attack, but to an attack with any WMD: nuclear, chemical or biological. Two, an attack on Indian forces anywhere in the world (including inside Pakistan) would be regarded as an attack on India.

NFU’s further erosion continued through public pronouncements by serving and retired officials. In 2014, former strategic forces command chief, Lieutenant General BS Nagal, wrote an article suggesting NFU be replaced with a policy of ambiguity, leaving open the door for pre-emptive nuclear use. Nagal cited six reasons, including that India’s leadership would be morally wrong in placing its own populace in peril.

In November 2016, the then defence minister, Manohar Parrikar, stated: “India should not declare whether it has a NFU policy”. It was later clarified that this was his personal view.

Now, Menon, known for his sobriety and restraint, has argued for pre-emptive first use: “There is a potential grey area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first against another nuclearweapon state. Circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first, for instance, against an NWS that had declared it would certainly use its weapons, and if India were certain that adversary’s launch was imminent. But India’s present nuclear doctrine is silent on this scenario.” Menon clearly believes that doctrinal silence allows the space for a preemptive strategy.

Rebuttals of this interpretation of Menon’s book have presented varied counter-arguments. Some of the more curious responses have included that Menon did not know what he himself meant by “comprehensive first strike”, which, for a strategic thinker of his sophistication, is downright insulting. Others claim that analysts are reading too much into two short paragraphs in Menon’s writings. But important nuclear strategies and doctrines have been presented in less space: India’s 2003 doctrine is only eight sentences; John Foster Dulles’ famous “massive retaliation” doctrine was contained within two short paragraphs; and, in December, President-elect Donald Trump signalled a major shift in America’s nuclear posture in 140 explosive characters.

Manpreet Sethi of the Centre for Air Power Studies and Rajesh Rajagopalan of the Observer Research Foundation observe that a comprehensive counterforce strike would require an arsenal that India does not have: high-accuracy, nuclear-tipped missiles, nuclear targeting coordination and sophisticated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to locate Pakistan’s nuclear weaponry. In fact, India is developing precisely these capabilities: a larger inventory of more accurate missiles, multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles and a missile defence shield to guard high-value objectives against retaliatory Pakistani strikes.

Sethi also argues that retaliation makes for a more credible doctrine than first use because the first use of a nuclear weapon is never an easy decision for any leader. In fact, a first strike against enemy nuclear forces might well be an easier decision than “massive retaliation” that kills millions of innocent civilians.

Rajagopalan also says new strategies being discussed might just be the “personal views” of people who have not considered the “serious problems that comes with a first strike or first use strategy.” This is hard to sustain about Menon, who is known to carefully weigh his words.

Are Menon’s radical new proposals just a cat’s paw, a trial balloon to assess reactions to Indian nuclear assertiveness? There is little to support that view. It would appear as if Menon, a creative thinker who realises the infirmities in India’s traditional nuclear doctrine, has interpreted it anew to create a wider menu of options for Indian decisionmakers in a nuclear crisis. While declining comment on interpretations of his book, Menon revealingly commented: India’s current nuclear doctrine has far greater flexibility than it gets credit for.