Business Standard

Yet another commandmen­t

Though fair, the SC verdict denying compensato­ry tariffs for two mega power projects will add to the instabilit­y in the power, banking sectors

- GAJENDRA HALDEA

hou shalt respect the sanctity of contracts’ seems the commandmen­t emerging from the recent Supreme Court judgment that denies compensato­ry tariffs for meeting the increased costs of coal imported by Tata and Adani power projects. This casts an ominous shadow on the future of these two mega projects of about 4,000 Mw each — among the largest in the world. It will also have a significan­t bearing on the way we treat infrastruc­ture projects in India.

I happen to be one of those not surprised by the judgment. After all, the tariffs were determined through open competitiv­e bidding where all risks and rewards were specified upfront. If the two companies knowingly agreed to bear the risk of fuel price as part of their respective bids, the buyers of their power can legitimate­ly refuse to pay any additional costs of imported coal.

Consider a situation where the coal prices decline. Would these companies share the profits with their buyers? No way. By its very nature, a commercial risk is not shared with any other party, unless the contract says so. If this rule is not respected, an orderly conduct of trade and commerce would be impossible.

The format of Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) for these projects was mandated by the power ministry under section 63 of the Electricit­y Act, which requires the regulator to adopt the tariff determined by competitiv­e bidding based on this format. As such, the regulator had no jurisdicti­on to set or amend the tariff in these cases. Hence its award of compensato­ry tariffs was fundamenta­lly flawed, being contrary to law. Little wonder it was set aside.

India has an elaborate regulatory structure for the power sector comprising a regulatory commission in each state and one at the Centre. There is a dedicated Appellate Tribunal too. The principal role of these regulators is to oversee the implementa­tion of the Electricit­y Act, which primarily unbundles the various segments of the electricit­y industry with a view to enabling competitio­n and choice in the supply of electricit­y to consumers. That is the way power sector functions in the developed world. For example, if you are living in a flat in London, you can choose from among a dozen competing suppliers of electricit­y who would use a common network for transmitti­ng the power — very much the way it works in telecom.

India’s power regulators have steadfastl­y prevented any competitio­n in the supply of power to consumers. As a result, virtually all bulk power must be sold to the government-owned entities, who in turn supply to consumers through a chain of inter-connected monopolies. In internatio­nal literature, this arrangemen­t is referred to as a “single-buyer model” which some experts describe as an evil practice.

The lack of competitio­n essentiall­y benefits the entrenched interests, never mind the enormous losses that distributi­on companies make year after year. These losses have accumulate­d in the form of debt exceeding a whopping ~4,00,000 crore and are now being passed on to taxpayers through UDAY, much the same way it was done in 2002. The main beneficiar­ies would be the public sector banks who kept lending to bankrupt discoms. This can hardly be viewed as reform.

Successive government­s — be it United Progressiv­e Alliance (UPA)-I, UPA-II and now National Democratic Alliance — have failed to bring about the much-needed structural reform in the power sector, as contemplat­ed by the Electricit­y Act. On the contrary, they have willingly allowed the soul of Electricit­y Act to remain caged. The regulatory commission­s have also abandoned the interests of consumers for whose benefit they were created. The consequenc­es are predictabl­e.

So far as PPAs are concerned, they are very complex contracts that require a high degree of skills and an honest intent to serve public interest. These elements are often deficient in the governance of our power sector where the dominant sentiment is to somehow fix a deal and move on. In the process, unsustaina­ble and unjustifie­d benefits are cornered by influentia­l companies. Public sector buyers also demand some unreasonab­le clauses, one such example being the allocation of fuel price risk to private sector companies.

Any student of commercial contracts will testify that it is patently unsustaina­ble to pass on the inflation risk or commodity price risk to an individual company on a long-term basis because such prices are determined by market forces over which an individual company has no control. In essence, no person should agree to bear a risk over which he has no control, unless he is in the business of speculatio­n. Such provisions reflect poorly on all the contractin­g parties.

The standard bidding documents issued by the power ministry of UPA-I actually allocated the fuel price risk to private companies. Several other flawed provisions were also included in an environmen­t of crony capitalism that has ultimately destabilis­ed the power and banking sectors as we are currently witnessing. Objections raised by the author were often ring-fenced by the powers that were.

When these projects came under increasing stress, the power ministry approached me in the erstwhile Planning Commission to write the model PPAs afresh, which I did. These new model documents were notified by the power ministry in 2013 and have not faced any problems so far. In fact, several states (including Bihar and Kerala) have used them to their advantage in a fair, transparen­t and sustainabl­e manner.

The tragedy of governance in India is that we often brush aside knowledge, past experience and lessons learnt. A lack of accountabi­lity enables successive decision-makers to engage in experiment­ation, which I call governance by trial and error. It imposes huge costs on the economy and the citizens. Profession­alism and evidence-based policy making is often missing.

The power sector in India continues to be in a deep mess. Some window dressing has indeed given the impression of progress, but the initiative­s taken so far will only lead to marginal improvemen­ts. One can only hope that the Supreme Court judgment would ignite an in-depth introspect­ion for reform of this mother of all industries, which impacts the growth and welfare of all.

 ??  ?? ROOT OF THE PROBLEM India’s power regulators have steadfastl­y prevented any competitio­n in the supply of power to consumers. Virtually all bulk power must be sold to the government-owned entities who in turn supply to consumers. Experts have described...
ROOT OF THE PROBLEM India’s power regulators have steadfastl­y prevented any competitio­n in the supply of power to consumers. Virtually all bulk power must be sold to the government-owned entities who in turn supply to consumers. Experts have described...
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