Ocean is the solution to problems in mountains THE ASIAN BALANCE
Why India should rely on sea power to manage China’s provocations
We now have a much better idea of what happened at the India-Bhutan-China trijunction last month. Early June, Chinese troops attempted to build a road in territory claimed by Bhutan. Bhutanese troops challenged the Chinese’s, but were outnumbered and hence had to withdraw. Bhutanese and Indian armed forces work very closely, so nearby Indian troops entered the scene and “persuaded” their Chinese counterparts to stop building the road and step back a bit. There the situation stands, with Indian and Chinese troops using banners and loudspeakers to stake out their positions. No shots have been fired so far. The Chinese foreign ministry and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) spokespersons have gone on the offensive; as has the Indian media. In contrast, India’s external affairs ministry has taken a sober but firm position: Emphasising China’s violation of agreements with India and Bhutan, to not unilaterally change the status quo in disputed areas.
From a purely military strategic standpoint, allowing China to get closer to Siliguri incrementally weakens India’s defences in the region, by raising the vulnerability to the “Chicken’s Neck” (a graphic but unfortunate term) connecting India’s northeastern states. Occupying high ground in the area also allows Indian troops to dominate the bit of Chinese-held territory separating India and Bhutan. So, there are good military reasons to hold the ground, literally, in the Doklam area.
More broadly, China’s recent strategy has been to “peacefully” resolve disputes in its favour by leveraging its neighbours’ reluctance to allow incidents to escalate into outright conflict. Beijing first makes an extravagant claim — like the nine-dashed line in the South China Sea, or the map of tri-junction it released after the June jostling. Neighbours seek to use bilateral diplomacy, multilateral forums and international law to negotiate with China. This is time-consuming and China ensures that it becomes even more time-consuming. In the meantime, it builds islands, roads, runways and military bases in the disputed areas. The only way this can be stopped is through the use of force, but which of its smaller, less powerful neighbours wants to start a shooting war with China? Before long, China has changed the status quo and is in physical control of the once-disputed territory. Occupation is nine-tenths ownership.
The developments along the India-BhutanChina tri-junction fit this pattern. Left unchallenged, China will repeat the trick in place after place. Game theorists call this salami slicing. Brahma Chellaney estimates that India might have already lost hundreds of square kilometres of territory in this manner.
How should India tackle this problem? The dominant view in New Delhi is that of a continental power: That we should strengthen our Himalayan defences by deploying the army in greater strength. While India should reinforce the current position and not back down unilaterally as Beijing demands, we should not create circumstances for tensions to rise along the Himalayan land frontier. Overly focusing on the frontier comes with unnecessary, undesirable and avoidable risks of getting into a direct military conflict with China. A direct military conflict is not in our interests (neither I would argue. Is it in Beijing’s?).
India should respond to Chinese moves in the Himalayas and the subcontinent with countermoves in the South China Sea and beyond. From its inception seven years ago, this column has argued that India should project power in the waters east of Singapore to deter Beijing from moving in the Himalayan frontiers or among India’s immediate neighbours.
For almost a decade, the small and medium powers in East Asia wanted a stronger Indian role to help them balance China. That didn’t happen fast enough, causing many of them to jump onto the Chinese bandwagon. But there are important holdouts: Viêt Nam, Singapore, South Korea, Australia perhaps, and most importantly, Japan.
For instance, New Delhi’s response to the face-off at Doklam could be a signal that it would participate in joint freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea. That is likely to cause concern in Beijing. In other words, by using sea power in a geography that China is sensitive about, India could raise the costs of Beijing’s Himalayan enterprises.
In contrast, using land power means responding in a manner China wants us to. Beijing would like India to be preoccupied with defending remote Himalayan peaks and plateaus, locking down large amounts of manpower and money, raising risk of war and attendant tensions. That’s probably why Beijing sought to test its new tank in Tibet. Whether it is used in battle or not, if it causes India to ramp up its land defences, it would serve China well. New Delhi should not end up doing what Beijing wants it to. On land, China has an ally in the form of Pakistan. India has none. In the waters of East Asia, China has few allies. India has several.
In the current standoff, India must hold firm precisely to bring about a mutual de-escalation. In the coming weeks, Beijing is likely to raise rhetoric and attempt political and economic coercion. It is unnecessary for New Delhi to respond to these provocations. Diplomacy is the art of not asking what the other side cannot give. China’s rhetoric and actions constitute bullying, not diplomacy. That is why India must not yield, and simply hold the current position until the snows fall in September.
It’s important to demonstrate that we won’t be bullied into submission, not because of juvenile egoism but because reputation matters. Indian diplomacy will be much more difficult if other countries come to see us as folding to China. Likewise, China’s diplomats will have to work harder if other countries realise you can successfully stand up to China. Those are the stakes.