Unlike India, China made war plan months in advance
On October 20, 1962, when China attacked Indian posts on the Namka Chu rivulet near Tawang, marking the start of the disastrous Sino-Indian war, the troops that conducted that attack — the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) 11 Infantry Division — prepared for it in three years of battling Tibetan guerrillas, called the Chushi Gangdruk.
Earlier, on August 25, 1959, the first-ever armed clash between Chinese and Indian soldiers took place, when an Indian patrol ran into a Chinese company (roughly 100 soldiers) stationed in Migyitun “for work with the masses”, as Beijing euphemistically termed operations against the Chushi Gangdruk.
PLA General Yin Fatang reveals that, on June 11, 1962, the Tibet Military Command constituted the “Advance Command Post for China-India Border SelfDefence Counter-attack” codenamed Z419 (Z stands for Xizang, or Tibet). Yin was appointed its political commissar.
Four days earlier, PLA General Tan Guansan, who had brutally put down the Lhasa revolt in March 1959, relayed orders from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and Central Military Commission to prepare to fight the Indian army. These are from a range of new details of the 1962 Sino-Indian war gleaned by Chinese scholar, Jianglin Li, from Chinese Communist Party (CCP) documents and interviews with People’s Liberation Army (PLA) veterans. Li’s research is posted on the War on Tibet website in a research article entitled “Suppressing Rebellion in Tibet” and the China-India Border War.
The war clouds began gathering in May 1962, when Beijing decided to “create conditions for peacefully resolving the border dispute” by “resolutely fighting back” against the advancing Indian army, says Wei Ke, director of Z419’s political department. Then itself, it was decided that the main front would be the eastern sector, specifically the Tawang and Walong areas.
By October, 10,300 Chinese soldiers were placed under Z419 Command Post, charged with attacking India in Kejielang (Nyamjang Chu valley) and Tawang, according to a PLA “Studies on Battle Examples”.
Yin says: “From mid-June 1962, Z419 Command Post started to collect intelligence in the battle zone and work on a battle plan.” Intensive military training and Luo Ruiqing. The next began, including individual day, Z419 received the pre-order training, unit training and battle for battle. The die was cast, exercises at regimental level. According to General Zhang Guohua, fighting Based on the the Chushi experience Gangdruk, of who the was battle; selected he flew tocommand back Z419 replaced physically unfit to Lhasa from Beijing on October officers and soldiers. Welltrained 13th. A “Frontline Command rocket launcher operators Post”, positioned at Tsona, were dispatched to Tibet replaced Z419 for the battle. from Wuhan, and artillery personnel The second meeting, at were sent from several which the final go-ahead was military commands. Beijing given, took place at 1:30 p.m. on Military Command sent communications October 17. The Central Military equipment and Commission and Mao himself operators. Over one approved General Zhang hundred English, Guohua’s battle plan. Hindi and Tibetan Besides the PLA’s overwhelming interpreters from different advantage in combat areas were sent soldiers numbers, Li’s research to Tibet for the coming reveals the CCP’s Tibet Work “self-defence counterattack”. Committee supported the Meanwhile, in frontline with a major logistic contrast with China’s effort. It dispatched 1,280 party formidable build up, cadres to lead civilian workers the Indian Army was functioning as logistical struggling to send to the border support teams. 32,237 Tibetans an inadequate formation of and 1,057 pack animals were 2,400 soldiers — the ill-fated 7 drafted to load, unload and Infantry Brigade — which was transport supplies, carry short of soldiers, arms, equipment wounded soldiers back from and acclimatisation for battlefront, and clear up battlefields, high-altitude combat. etc. Over 10,000 civilians
Beijing took the final decision were drafted to repair and to go to war in two meetings. construct roads. It is hardly surprising The first was on October 8, that, on October 20, Indian between Mao Zedong and China’s defences in the Tawang top leadership — Zhou Enlai, sector crumbled in hours. Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, He Long, Nie Rongzheng
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