Countering the ‘rage of Islam’ theories

Not long after the end of the Cold War, the narrative of the “Clash of Civilisations” or its variant the “rage of Islam” acquired prominence in the West. Obviously, the absence of the central preoccupations of the Soviet Union and the division of Europe meant other concerns would enter the intellectual radar screens of many. While it is certainly the case that scholarship on Islam had a much older ancestry, from the nineties such scholarship acquired a contemporary relevance and flavour that was new. Afghanistan, 9/11, Iraq, Libya, Syria, the detection of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan are factors that gave a certain cutting edge to this interest fuelled equally by the popular association of Islam with extremism and terrorism.

The xenophobia this has fuelled in the West is felt with greatest intensity by those of the diaspora from Muslim countries who have sought to adopt a middle ground between their countries of origin and of domicile. Events of the past two decades or so have led many amongst them to examine both ends of this equation: The misconceptions, miscalculations and gross abuse of national power by many western nations while interfacing with Islamic countries on the one hand; and the drift to extremism, the absence of tolerance and a widespread acceptance of a narrative of victimhood and denial that characterises many in the Islamic world on the other.

The author of The House of Islam has sought to address both ends of this equation although his primary focus in on Islamic practice and thought. He does so by way of a rapid survey of Islamic philosophy and history beginning with the Prophet, the Shia-Sunni division, Islam’s expansion and contraction through medieval and early modern history and the Arab world’s experience of western domination and colonialism. The result is a readable condensation without being pedantic or simplistic.

Ed Husain’s main point is that a huge diversity had constituted Islamic civilisation and its sources include the Persians, the Mughals, the Turks etc. What has replaced this plurality of culture and thought is what he terms as the Arabisation of Islam and, alongside it, its “literalism”. He explains: “Historically the vast majority of Muslim jurists agreed, as have most Muslims with the principle that everything is Halal except for a few limitations…Now for Muslim puritans and their followers everything is prohibited — Haram — unless it is specifically permitted. Their slogan is: ‘Every action requires scriptural evidence’.”. Such thinking draws strength, the argument continues, from its association with Saudi Arabia whose rise to power was facilitated by the Wahabis and, in turn by the British through T E Lawrence (of Arabia) who found the Arab uprising of utility against the Ottomans.

The Salafis or the Wahabis draw their inspiration from the first three generations of Islam and believe that Islam then grew corrupted through Christian, Greek, Persian and other influences. The paradox is that while all Muslims deeply venerate the Prophet and strive to emulate him but most Muslims are not Wahabis. What has given Wahabism or Salafism its force is the enormous investment Saudi Arabia has made to propagating it. So literalism and the inability to accept other interpretations have combined with “a historical narrative of humiliation and indignity” to create the cocktail and the contagion that plagues many parts of the Islamic world.

The way out, according to Mr Husain, is to forge a plan of three fronts. First a Middle East Union — a supra-national body to tackle the region’s numerous issues that its nation states have manifestly failed to do. This will draw strength from ideas of a panIslamic identity and also combat radical Islam — which does not also, like the ISIS, recognise national boundaries — on its own turf. Secondly, such a Union should be supported by a kind of “Marshall Plan” — and if the mind boggles at the idea we are reminded that the costs would be a fraction of what has been spent in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. If Turks, Arabs and Iranians oppose these two steps on account of their own numerous differences then the “West cannot be held accountable for the failings of a divided people”. Finally, Muslims have to fight a battle of ideas and expel extremists – “deny their claim to Islam” and “oust them from the faith”. Only Muslims themselves can do this and not doing so and blaming the West will not solve the fundamental issue: “An organized minority is now in control of the discourse of the disorganized majority of Muslims”.

The book is an enlightened condensation of Islamic history and philosophy for those seeking a perspective on the conundrum in which many Muslims — and especially those living in the West — find themselves today. If some of the author’s prescriptions are excessively coloured by his own domicile in the West this does not detract from the readability of the book and his courage to speak the truth as he sees it.

THE HOUSE OF ISLAM

A Global History Ed Husain Bloomsbury 336 pages; ~599