River chiefs
An unorthodox chinese solution to managing water
Nine dragons managing water” — it’s a metaphor that the Chinese have long used to describe how their country manages its water resources. Clearly not a compliment, the metaphor refers to overlapping and unclear responsibilities that different agencies and governments have over the country’s aquatic resources. And it is a metaphor that, surprisingly, describes India very well too. In both countries, water management is split across ministries at the central and state level, and between different agencies handling different functions with regard to water management and water pollution.
The results of a complex and unclear system of management, coupled with rapid development and close-to-uncontrolled use of water resources has led to estimates that as much as a third of China’s surface water may be unfit to drink (according to a Greenpeace report).
To combat this, China unveiled an unorthodox, yet ambitious “river chiefs” programme across the country last year.
The programme appoints a single government official (a “river chief”), to manage water quality indicators for a given stretch of river or water body in their local area. Their performance and future career paths depend on how well those indicators improve over their tenure. According to a report in the China Daily newspaper last year, more than 300,000 river chiefs have been appointed across the country under different tiers of government. A further 7,60,000 have been appointed at village level as well, taking the total number of river chiefs to well over one million.
As China Water Risk, an organisation which promotes water conservation in China notes, the river chiefs programme means that local officials “face lifetime accountability for environmental performance in their jurisdiction.” Contact information of the official is posted on a sign next to the river stretch they have responsibility for; and locals can call that official if they spot a person or a company dumping waste in the water, or if a stretch of water is overrun with algae and needs cleaning. The larger and more important the stretch of river, the more senior the official appointed as river chiefs. This ensures that the officer is powerful enough to get different departments to work together.
The river chiefs system was actually first implemented back in 2007 in Jiangsu province by local officials to combat a massive infestation of green algae in a local water body. A Greenpeace official quoted in the South China Morning Post newspaper says that the province (roughly equivalent to an Indian state), has seen a sharp turnaround in water quality since the river chiefs system was established across the state following its initial success. The proportion of the state’s surface water fit for human use increased from 35 per cent to over 63 per cent.
Would such a system work in India? We too share many of the same problems — massive water pollution problems coupled with different organisations and government departments tasked with responsibility for different aspects of water management. India already has a range of specific legislation to deal with pollution (including water pollution) and Pollution Control Boards at both the state and central level to set pollution standards and enforce them.
The key innovation in the Chinese case, has been the devolution of responsibility right down to the grass roots level and thereby making local officials directly responsible for pollution control with the powers to take action across government departments. Local inhabitants, the ones who have the most to benefit from improving water quality, in theory at least, have ‘one throat to choke’ to ensure that the water they use is usable. Making environmental improvement an explicit part of officials’ targets and assessment, gives them a serious incentive to respond positively. Water quality improvement targets can be clearly set and monitored independently as well.
It is too early to tell what the results have been in China as the programme was implemented nationally just last year. But while water quality has improved in some of the areas where it was introduced earlier, in other areas it has remained unchanged or even worsened. If the river chief does not have the power to penalise industries that discharge effluents into the water body, it matters little that they have been given targets.
Currently, the State Pollution Control Boards in India already have that power. What matters is the political will from the top — more specifically the state governments here, which have a crucial role to play in making any such measure successful. Forcing a local factory, whose owner may be politically well connected, to comply with pollution norms, is something that can only be done if the state government wants it, whether or not river chiefs or their equivalent, exist in India.
But the broader lesson of the river chiefs programme still stands. Perhaps the best chance of ensuring that political pressure exists to penalise polluters, is to make local communities responsible for, and put them in charge of, environment management. India’s environmental policy has long had a top down approach with mixed results. A bottomup approach, where all the pressure for reform comes from those who are most affected, is what is needed.
River chiefs in China is one such approach.