The evolution of the BJP
This book is a calm, unhurried and adjective-free narration of how and why an ideological alternative to the Left, represented by the Congress since 1937, has evolved in India. That’s what’s good about it.
What’s bad is that Shantanu Gupta fails to explain when the flag bearer of that alternative, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), grown child of the Jana Sangh, turned left itself. Truth be told, today’s BJP is almost exactly like the Congress of the 1970s except in the matter of how to treat India’s 200 million Muslims.
Mr Gupta starts at the beginning but omits many details, perhaps because they are slight. But then, this is not intended to be a detailed history of the BJP but a sort of beginners’ guide. It performs that role admirably.
The 20 chapters are designed to answer the sort of questions that the English-speaking middle class occasionally asks. The answer may not satisfy it but the facts are laid out succinctly.
Thus, to cite just three examples, there’s a chapter called “Who Taught Muslim Appeasement to the Congress”. There is another called “How the RSS Came Into Being” and a third called “The Advent of Deen Dayal Upadhyay and the Jana Sangh under Him”.
Each chapter seeks to explain exactly what happened and what the context was for it. In that sense, the book seeks to set the record straight and, for that reason, is a valuable contribution. It shows how, politically at least, India’s greatness lay in allowing different ideologies to exist. Sadly, that is under serious threat now.
Mr Gupta has not seen it necessary to deal with this particular middle-class question about the threat to political pluralism. That weakens the book’s appeal.
Muslim appeasement: So why did the Congress “appease” the Muslims? After a long and accurate narration of the events leading up to the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the Congress and the Muslim League, Mr Gupta doesn’t offer what can be called a credible explanation.
But he is right in reminding us that the Congress gave Jinnah a disproportionate share of representation in the provincial legislatures. That gave Jinnah the first hint of Congress weakness, which he exploited when the Congress had to choose between political expediency and principle in 1946.
The odd thing is that in 1916 it chose to give in to Jinnah’s demands for greater than justified representation in order to present a united face to the British. In 1947 it chose to give in to him for a disunited India. Only Gandhiji resisted.
In that sense, it wasn’t really the