The Aukus effect

Alliance could bolster the Quad’s impact

The timing of the pact among Australia, the UK, and the US (Aukus for short) has proven providential for India just as Prime Minister Narendra Modi heads to Washington for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, summit on September 24. The fact that this will be the first inperson meeting of the Quad leaders since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic — a virtual summit was held in March this year — has upped expectations for the summit, especially against the background of the US’S abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan and growing concerns around China’s expanded influence in that region and the Indo-pacific. The Quad, a loose geo-political grouping involving the US, Japan, Australia, and India, was a mechanism designed to offer a counter to China’s expansive strategy in defining its naval borders. Though initially formed in 2007, it gained momentum in 2017 under President Donald Trump as part of his broader strategy to counter China.

Regional military exercises off the coast of India in 2020 saw the re-inclusion of Australia into the dialogue and the exercises. Beijing has derisively described this reactivated forum as the “Asian Nato”, an inaccurate descriptor that, nevertheless, indicates that it has taken the grouping seriously. The Aukus agreement, signed on September 15, represents a doubling down on that strategy by President Joe Biden. It is one of the biggest defence partnerships between Australia and the US, enabling the former to build nuclear-powered submarines for the first time, using technology provided by the US. The agreement will also cover AI and other technologies. Though China was not explicitly mentioned in the joint virtual press conference by the three countries’ leaders, references to growing regional security concerns made their strategic intent clear. Predictably, the Chinese have condemned this alliance too, accusing Washington of retaining a “Cold War mentality”. But the imperatives have been compelling enough for Australia and the US to risk the ire of France, a key Nato ally, with the former cancelling a major order of Barracuda class submarines placed with French shipyards.

The Aukus is demonstrably a more robust alliance than the Quad, which remains a somewhat ambiguous network of bilateral agreements among members on issues of common interest — including responses to Covid-19, vaccine diplomacy, and so on. This bilateralism is evident in the pre-summit itineraries of the leaders. On September 23, for instance, Mr Modi will hold a bilateral meeting with US Vicepresident Kamala Harris, followed by similar talks with leaders of each of the other Quad partners. In turn, each of the partners will hold bilateral meetings with other partners. Though these meetings have value, they underline the fact that the Quad, so far, amounts to the sum total of bilateral interests rather than an alliance that articulates a common shared agenda. This much is evident in the fact that each of the leaders issued separate statements after the March summit rather than a single communique. This is particularly critical for India. Despite the belated signing of three foundational agreements, the country remains outside the US military umbrella, which covered Japan and now Australia. Aukus, thus, could easily supersede the Quad. A transition to a robust multilateral forum would enable sharing technology and information, which would transform the Quad into a more meaningful and cohesive grouping to counter the China threat. Multilateralism, therefore, would be a useful agenda for Mr Modi to advance in Washington.