By keeping off Ukraine, India hits the right note

It is a positive sign that, mindful of its interests, India refrained from endorsing the US-led Western position on Ukraine at the first meeting of the Quad foreign ministers in Melbourne last Friday. As a consequence, the joint statement that was issued altogether skipped any mention of the crisis in Ukraine although the senior officials of the US, Australia and Japan expressed themselves strongly against Moscow at the confabulation.

External affairs minister S. Jaishankar, quizzed by the media about the Indian position, reminded all concerned that this had been made clear at the January 31 meeting of the UN Security Council. At this forum, called to discuss a procedural issue in the Ukraine context, New Delhi took the view that the security interests of all countries ought to be taken into consideration.

This did not necessarily please pro-West hawks who might wish India to be in with the US and its allies on all matters of international politics, irrespective of the merits of the case or how the dice will turn for India’s interests. India has an old security relationship with Moscow in terms of arms purchase, civil nuclear energy cooperation, and close coordination on important political issues, most notably Kashmir. To suit its regional concerns, Russia has indeed warmed up to Pakistan and China at times, discomfiting India somewhat, much as New Delhi may have shown its irritation when the Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan.

However, in view of the larger picture, neither side has rocked the boat. Both have taken care to buffer their bilateral dynamics from being torpedoed by the larger play on the international chessboard. India’s progressively warming ties with the United States since the late

1990s — its participation in the Quad is a reflection of this key reality — have not stopped New Delhi from buying S400 Triumf missiles from Russia in the face of the latent threat of US sanctions.

Also, in its dealings with Russia, India cannot but factor in the regional situation as defined by Afghanistan and New Delhi’s ties with Central Asia as well as China, with which India’s relationship is far from easy. Although a close ally of China at the present juncture, Russia did not hold its hand in selling the S-400 system to India. Looking at the overall picture it can hardly serve India’s interest to alienate Russia, in the process send it fully into the Chinese camp in the emerging world scenario. The ineluctable picture of the present day is that plurilateral relationships are for real.

On a question such as Ukraine, India’s counsel of peace and diplomacy was somewhat delayed, but it came eventually. Non-confrontational postures between major powers serve the interests of all regions in the world. Indeed, this has been India’s fundamental message and the continuing theme of its foreign policy since it attained independence, although there have been hiccups along the way and interregnums of short-sightedness.

Being in the Quad is important for India and for the other three countries as well that make up the non-military grouping. And just as the other countries spoke their mind on Ukraine at the Melbourne meet, India did too. This makes for a healthy relationship. It is good to keep in mind that an identity of interest across the board is not the reason for the formation of the Quad. Mr Jaishankar put it well when he said that the grouping was “for something, and not against anybody”. That is a sensible working proposition.

Although a close ally of China at

the present juncture, Russia did not hold its

hand in selling the S-400 system

to India