Down to Earth

Vizag gas leak: the result of ignoring safety protocols

The Visakhapat­nam gas leak highlights the need for industries to be extra cautious while starting production after the lockdown

- SOUNDARAM RAMANATHAN, DIGVIJAY SINGH BISHT and NIVIT KUMAR YADAV

THE TOXIC gas leak incident at Visakhapat­nam, Andhra Pradesh, in the early morning of May 7 was not the only industrial accident in the country that day. In the evening, two boilers exploded at NLC India Limited’s thermal power station at Neyveli, Tamil Nadu, injuring eight people.

The previous day, on May 6, another gas leak accident had taken place at a paper mill in Raigarh, Chhattisga­rh, after which seven workers were hospitalis­ed. What’s common to the three accidents is that they happened while the factories were being prepped for opening after the COVID-19

lockdown. Poor operationa­l and maintenanc­e practices during the lockdown and shortage of skilled staff appear to be the common thread in all the incidents.

In its scope and damage, the styrene gas leak at Visakhapat­nam was the worst of the three. It left 11 dead while hundreds had to be hospitalis­ed due to difficulty in breathing, headache, fatigue and fainting. On May 8, the National Green Tribunal took suo moto cognisance and ordered the owner, LG Polymers India Pvt Ltd, to deposit R50 crore with the district magistrate as an interim penalty for the damage caused to life and habitat. As per an assessment by Delhi-based non-profit Centre for Science and Environmen­t (CSE), the accident can be attributed to the company’s negligence and failure to adhere to the safety protocol.

THE ACCIDENT

The plant uses styrene monomer (C8H8) to produce expandable plastics. Styrene monomer must be stored at temperatur­es strictly below 17oC. There was a temporary partial shutdown of the plant owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, excluding maintenanc­e activities, which were being carried out in the plant as per a predetermi­ned schedule. Since styrene was not being stored at the appropriat­e temperatur­e, there was a pressure build up in the storage chamber which caused the valve to break, says an official with the Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board (APPCB), requesting anonymity. The result was leakage of 3 tonnes of the toxic gas (see ‘What is styrene and how toxic it is’). Even a day after the leak, the levels of styrene in the air in the area were 500 times higher than the prescribed limit. Media reports said they were more than 2,500 parts per billion (PPB), while World Health Organizati­on norms require them to be under 5 PPB. The Visakhapat­nam facility is spread over 240 hectares (ha), including the nearby residentia­l areas. There is also a revenue village nearby, which resulted in a higher rate of exposure.

CIRCUMVENT­ING RULES Industries that process petrochemi­cal-based products, such as styrene, require two levels of clearances—an Environmen­tal Clearance (EC) from the Union Ministry of Environmen­t, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) and a Consent to Operate (CTO) from the State Pollution Control Board (SPCB), which needs to be renewed every five years. CTO documents give production limits on products that can be manufactur­ed, limits on treated effluents and ambient air surroundin­g the factory compound. LG Polymers India has not adhered to rules at both these levels.

As the company has been operating since the 1960s, much before the legislatio­n of the Environmen­tal Impact Assessment Notificati­on of 2006, it was not required to obtain EC unless it

expanded its production, changed raw material or modernised its units. However, the company has been increasing production and changing raw materials since 2004 and has not obtained EC. In 2004, the expandable polystyren­e capacity of the plant was 45 TPD which increased to 65 TPD in 2009, 71.5 TPD in 2012 and 100 TPD in 2014, as per APPCB data. Similarly, its polystyren­e production capacity increased from 235 TPD in 2014 to 315 TPD in 2017.

In 2017, APPCB warned the company about the need for an EC, saying it would otherwise not grant CTO. After this, the company filed a petition with MOEFCC seeking an EC. It also gave a proposal to APPCB

saying it is importing plastic granules to prepare extended plastic, which may not require an EC. It succeeded in obtaining consent from APPCB, brushing impact assessment­s studies. In 2018, it withdrew its petition for EC from MOEFCC

saying there were typo errors.

“By failing to seek EC, the plant has violated the norm to inform the competent authoritie­s over two things: one, changing the product mix and related impacts, and, two, expansion and importing. Expansion means more storage, importing means risk associated with transporta­tion, handling in port related to loading and unloading and the same in factory premises. It is an absolutely new dimension,” says D D Basu, advisor, CSE. “In fact, fresh applicatio­n is required. Renewal CTO is not the only issue. Since the company has changed product mix and production process, the risks associated with accidental release are more dominant,” he adds. It is pertinent to note that APPCB has been granting CTO to the company, despite the latter mentioning that it is changing its raw material and expanding capacity of final products without any EC.

In 2018, the company also submitted a R168 crore-proposal to MOEFCC to expand its production capacity by 250 tonnes per day (TPD)—from the current 415 TPD— but withdrew it later.

LG Polymers India has flouted general CTO requiremen­ts as well. One condition stipulated in CTO is maintainin­g a suitable system of leak detection and provisions to immediatel­y repair any instances. Under Point 11 of the general conditions of CTO, the industry is required to maintain Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) analysers with recording facility and maintain records, while Point 19 mandates installati­on of a system of leak detection and repair of pump. LG Polymers did not adhere to both these rules.

The VOC detection system at the plant was defunct, says an APPCB official, and there is no monitoring mechanism to specifical­ly detect styrene. Even the container that was being used to store styrene gas was old and not properly maintained, the official says.

STORAGE AND HANDLING After the Bhopal gas disaster of 1984, India enacted a plethora of laws to prevent such accidents and to issue clear guidelines on storage of hazardous chemicals in plants. The Environmen­t (Protection) Act, 1986, is the omnibus Act that gives sweeping powers to the Central government to take all measures to protect the environmen­t. There are clear rules on hazardous chemical storage under the Act. These include Hazardous Waste (Management

and Handling) Rules, 1989; Manufactur­e, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989; and, Chemical Accidents (Emergency, Planning, Preparedne­ss and Response) Rules, 1996.

That such an accident could happen despite these laws shows negligence on the part of all parties. The unit in question is also an ISO-certified facility, which means it has a protocol for everything. What seems to be the case is that the management, in its haste to restart the plant, ignored the protocol pertaining to maintenanc­e of the plant before resuming operations.

NGT’S ACTION

In its order, NGT has issued notices to APPCB, district magistrate of Visakhapat­nam, Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), MOEFCC and LG Polymers India Pvt Limited for their response on the accident.

The court has also appointed a five-member committee comprising B Seshasayan­a Reddy, former judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court; V Ramachandr­a Murthy, former vice chancellor of Andhra University; Pulipati King, head of chemical engineerin­g department at Andhra University; member secretary of CPCB, and, director of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research-Indian Institute of Chemical Technology. The committee has to report its initial findings on what went wrong,

extent of damage and remedial measures initiated within 10 days.

LESSONS FOR OTHERS

It remains to be seen whether NGT’s

order on the Visakhapat­nam gas leak will set a precedent to discourage industrial disasters. But the order should not have been silent on the two other accidents. The order is also unclear on whether the district magistrate can use the R50 crore to initiate relief measures.

Though the cognisance of the Visakhapat­anam accident is a welcome move, the court could have widened its scope and directed the government to ask industries to ensure safety while resuming operations. In case the lockdown continues, these safety precaution­s must not be forgotten. The accidents have shown that as the lockdown ends and industries start resuming activities, there is a need to be extra cautious.

THE NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL HAS FORMED A FIVE MEMBER COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGAT­E WHAT WENT WRONG, THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE AND REMEDIAL MEASURES TAKEN. THE COMMITTEE HAS TO FILE ITS REPORT IN 10 DAYS

 ??  ?? Women outside a mortuary to receive the body of a relative who died after the gas leak at the LG Polymers plant in Visakhapat­nam on May 8
Women outside a mortuary to receive the body of a relative who died after the gas leak at the LG Polymers plant in Visakhapat­nam on May 8
 ??  ?? Residents speak with a local politician outside the LG Polymers plant following the gas leak in Visakhapat­nam
Residents speak with a local politician outside the LG Polymers plant following the gas leak in Visakhapat­nam
 ??  ?? People sleep on a pavement after being evacuated from their homes following the gas leak at the LG Polymers plant
People sleep on a pavement after being evacuated from their homes following the gas leak at the LG Polymers plant
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