Fight climate change with political tech

Long problems such as climate change are ones in which there is a long lag between causes and effects. We don’t act early because we’re uncertain about how big the problem is, and it isn’t as salient as the daily emergencies all around us

Science alone won’t stop the planet from overheating. But science coupled with political science just might. That’s the theme of a new book, “Long Problems: Climate Change and the Challenge of Governing Across Time.” It’s by Thomas Hale, an American political scientist who teaches at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government. Hale argues that people are too quick to throw up their hands because the political will to stop climate change is lacking. For political scientists, he writes, “this is not the end but rather the start of the intellectual challenge.” Hale has specific ideas for how to change institutions and procedures so that today’s inhabitants of Earth give more consideration to tomorrow’s inhabitants. He calls them, at one point, “political technologies,” a phrase I like.

Long problems such as climate change are ones in which there is a long lag between causes and effects. They are hard to solve, especially with today’s institutions. We don’t act early because we’re uncertain about how big the problem is, and it isn’t as salient as the daily emergencies all around us. Our hesitation gives an opening to obstructionist forces. Today’s decision makers vow to protect the planet for future generations, but the unborn multitudes are mere “shadows” to them, as Hale puts it.

On top of all that, Hale writes, “Institutions created to address the early phase of a long problem struggle to remain useful as the problem’s structure develops over time.” Case in point: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was created in 1992. The original concept was for countries to make binding commitments to fight climate change. As the organisation has evolved, though, “nothing is agreed until every country agrees on every point,” Hale writes.

That’s not useful. A better approach is the Paris Agreement of 2015, which went into effect the next year. It allows countries to set their own targets for greenhouse gas reductions while triggering a “norm cascade” that induces them to do more and more. Hale likes the Paris Agreement on the whole, though he says it’s not perfect.

Society has already invented institutions and systems that bring future considerations to the fore, Hale writes. The Congressional Budget Office and similar offices in other countries analyse how new legislation will affect economic growth and government finances in the long run. The bond market assesses whether bond issuers, such as governments, will be able to pay back what they owe. Insurance companies — which Hale doesn’t mention — won’t issue policies unless customers take steps to reduce their risks.

On climate, too, there have been efforts to create institutions and processes that help solve Hale’s long problems. Some governments are requiring businesses to incorporate the “social cost” of carbon into their decisions. And the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change brings together the world’s top experts and issues closely followed reports.

There are many more opportunities for political engineering, Hale writes. He approvingly mentions the Finnish Parliament’s cross-party Committee for the Future and the Finnish Government Report on the Future, which interact. He recommends more experimentation in policymaking — as Chinese leaders put it, crossing the river by feeling for stones.

To get the public and lawmakers thinking more about the future, he endorses Britain’s Climate Change Committee, which he writes “has become a significant political force for the long-term interest,” and similar organisations (some of them not as effective) in Hungary, Israel, Malta, Sweden, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates.

To insulate long problems from partisan politicking, he recommends the appointment of a trustee to oversee climate decisions, analogous to the way a politically insulated central bank is delegated the authority to conduct monetary policy. The California Air Resources Board is “perhaps the strongest, though still imperfect” example of such an institution in the realm of the environment, he writes. (Hale told me he’s not aware of anything quite like the California agency elsewhere in the world.)

“Long Problems” is a kind of non-fiction counterpart to Kim Stanley Robinson’s science fiction book from 2020, “The Ministry for the Future,” which took seriously the idea that future generations need to be given as much consideration as our own.

Hale is a co-leader of the Net Zero Tracker, which tracks the decarbonisation progress of countries and companies, and the Net Zero Regulation and Policy Hub. He told me that he has been involved in helping people at the United Nations prepare for a Summit for the Future, which will be held Sept. 22-23. On the U.N. website is an early draft of a declaration to be issued at the summit, which says among other things that “our conduct today will impact future generations exponentially.”

Anne-Marie Slaughter, the chief executive of the think tank New America who was Hale’s adviser on his doctorate at Princeton, shared a byline with Hale and two of his Oxford colleagues on a policy brief, “Toward a Declaration on Future Generations,” that recommends the U.N. appoint “a special envoy or high commissioner” to be a voice for the future. I kind of prefer “envoy” because it sounds like the person has literally come from the future.

No one solution will instantly end the political obstacles to fighting climate change. Some of the ideas in Hale’s book may not pan out at all. But I give him credit for focusing on how to solve problems in which the cause and the effect are separated by decades. Getting the “political technology” right is every bit as important as inventing better solar cells, wind turbines and batteries.

Peter Coy is an Opinion writer The New York Times

— Jayanto Banerjee