Hindustan Times (Bathinda)

What the return of the Rajapaksa family means

Minorities are apprehensi­ve. Institutio­ns may get weaker. And post-war accountabi­lity looks challengin­g

- ALAN KEENAN Alan Keenan is a senior analyst with the Internatio­nal Crisis Group The views expressed are personal

After a campaign many had thought close, Gotabaya Rajapaksa has won a decisive victory in Sri Lanka’s presidenti­al election. Gotabaya, candidate of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) and brother of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, won 52.25% of the vote. His main rival, Sajith Premadasa, candidate of the ruling United National Party (UNP), came a distant second with 42%.

Gotabaya’s victory reveals a dangerousl­y polarised country. While both candidates are from the ethnic majority Sinhalese, Rajapaksa, who ran a strongly nationalis­t campaign, won large majorities among the Sinhalese — enough that he needed few Tamil or Muslim votes. Premadasa’s overwhelmi­ng majorities among Muslim and Tamil voters — who together form a quarter of the population — were not enough to overcome Gotabaya’s big edge among Sinhalese.

Gotabaya was widely seen as the frontrunne­r from the start, backed by his brother Mahinda, who remains popular among Sinhalese voters, but was constituti­onally prevented from running himself. Gotabaya ran on a promise of security, appealing to widespread anger and vulnerabil­ity felt by many Sri Lankans at the UNP government’s failure to prevent the devastatin­g Isis-inspired Easter Sunday attacks on Christian churches and hotels, despite advance warnings. Anti-muslim sentiment, already strong, spiked in the wake of the attack, including two days of rioting against mosques and Muslim properties.

Gotabaya ran a strongly Sinhala nationalis­t campaign, and his promises of security resonated with Sinhala voters, who remembered the key role Gotabaya played as defence secretary in the 2009 military victory over the separatist Tamil Tigers. Given the Rajapaksas’ popularity among the Sinhalese, Premadasa needed overwhelmi­ng support from Muslims and Tamils to have any chance at victory. This made him vulnerable to SLPP charges that a Premadasa presidency would be hostage to minority parties. Premadasa was also hobbled by the unpopulari­ty of the UNP government, headed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesi­nghe, in which he served as housing minister.

Many fear that a Gotabaya-led government could bring renewed energy to the long-running anti-muslim campaign led by militant groups claiming to defend Buddhism. These groups first flourished in 2013 and 2014, with support from the police and military intelligen­ce, which were then under the control of Gotabaya in his role as defence secretary. Gotabaya has always denied supporting militant Buddhist groups, but many Muslims fear their strong backing for Premadasa could see the community targeted for its perceived disloyalty.

Gotabaya’s government will also likely dismiss the long-standing grievances of Sri Lankan Tamils. Gotabaya and the SLPP denounced efforts by the UNP to draft a new constituti­on that would allow greater powers for provinces, claiming this would threaten national security and the Buddhist and unitary nature of the State. Gotabaya has also made it clear he will reject Sri Lankan commitment­s made in the 2015 UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) resolution on reconcilia­tion and accountabi­lity. This sought to establish mechanisms to address crimes on both sides in the civil war, including credible allegation­s that the Sri Lankan military shelled hospitals and civilians prevented from fleeing by the Tamil Tigers.

Gotabaya will likely appoint Mahinda as prime minister. Hours after Gotabaya’s victory, Mahinda issued a statement indicating the SLPP intends to overturn the 19th amendment. The UNP government’s signature achievemen­t, the amendment reduced presidenti­al powers, re-establishi­ng term limits on the presidency and strengthen­ing independen­t commission­s on human rights, police, and judicial and civil services. Should a strong presidenti­al system be revived, there will be greater reason to fear for the increased independen­ce of the judiciary and police that emerged since 2015. The numerous criminal cases pending in the courts against Gotabaya, other Rajapaksas and their associates, as well as police investigat­ions into high-profile political murders and abductions during the previous Rajapaksa government, are certain to go nowhere.

The return to power of the Rajapaksas and their Sinhala nationalis­t agenda pose major challenges to internatio­nal support for post-war reconcilia­tion and accountabi­lity. These will be particular­ly hard to pursue, given the UNP government’s failure to build a domestic constituen­cy for such policies, and the comprehens­ive defeat of Premadasa’s modest appeals to inter-ethnic cooperatio­n. Despite this, Human Rights Council member-states should continue to defend the 2015 resolution and maintain close oversight of Sri Lanka’s human rights record.

India, Japan and Western government­s will also be concerned that the Rajapaksas will strengthen relations with China, which made clear its preference for Gotabaya and the SLPP. Worries that the Chinese-built — and now Chinese-leased — port in Hambantota could eventually be used for military purposes are certain to increase. The Rajapaksas are unlikely, however, to move quickly or decisively in this direction, preferring instead to rebalance Sri Lanka’s engagement­s while seeking good relations with all their donors and trading partners. The Rajapaksas hope they can use their closer ties with China to leverage continued economic support from other government­s.

Attempts by Beijing’s geopolitic­al rivals to challenge greater Chinese influence in Sri Lanka would be stronger if they took the form of principled positions — highlighti­ng any evidence of corruption in developmen­t projects, supporting democratic rights and transparen­cy, and promoting the rule of law — that can be presented as in the interests of all Sri Lanka’s ethnic communitie­s, and more difficult for the Rajapaksas to dismiss on nationalis­t grounds. Foreign donors and internatio­nal financial institutio­ns should also work to coordinate their developmen­t assistance to increase their chances of persuading the Rajapaksa government to preserve independen­t institutio­ns and democratic space so important to sustainabl­e peace.

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