Sifting the facts from diplomatic fictions after 75 days of war
WASHINGTON: As G7 countries ramped up sanctions against Russia on Sunday, and Russian President Vladimir Putin prepared to address the nation on Victory Day on Monday, the war in Ukraine is at an inflection point — and the gap between the fiction that marks diplomatic statements and facts on the ground has never been starker.
While all sides have spoken of the need to end the conflict, there is no sign that the war is about to end. And that is because, at the heart of it, the question for the warring parties is not the end of the conflict, but on what terms the war ends, and who is best positioned after the conflict.
Indeed, the war in Ukraine has entered a particularly difficult stage, where the stakes for all sides — Ukraine, Europe and the United States on one side (who have common, though not necessarily identical interests) and Russia on the other — are high. Both believe that they can maximise their advantages and tilt the balance of power in their favour — which, in turn, will give them a stronger hand when serious negotiations actually commence. This also means that the risks of escalation today are possibly much higher than at any point in the war.
Clash in objectives
After retreating from Kiev and its surrounding areas — which undoubtedly marked a setback, even a failure for Moscow — Russia turned its focus on the south and east in April.
While its original war aims were demilitarization and de-nazification — which was interpreted to mean that Moscow wanted the complete defeat of the Ukrainian army and a change of guard in Kiev, neither of which happened — Russia’s aim now appears to be to consolidate control over Donetsk and Luhansk, separatist controlled provinces where Moscow has exercised de facto control since 2014.
It also wants to expand its territorial gains beyond the two provinces in the rest of Donbas region; take over Mariupol, a task in which it has more or less succeeded, albeit after causing tremendous humanitarian suffering; and maintain the land corridor in the east to Crimea.
Russia now appears to be playing for a divided Ukraine, where one part may deepen its integration with Europe, but the more geographically proximate part will integrate with Moscow.
But Ukraine, emboldened after its successful fightback, and the West, tempted by the opportunity to weaken Russia, as US secretary of defence Lloyd Austin put it, believe that they cannot only prevent Russia from succeeding in this latest phase of the war — but even, perhaps, push back Russia from territorial gains it has already made, degrade its capacity, erode its ability to project power, and prevent it from launching a similar aggression in the future.
This has led US President Joe Biden to ask for an additional $33 billion from the Congress to ramp up military and economic assistance to Ukraine. It has led to the promise of supply of weapon systems and defence equipment to Ukraine that the US was initially reluctant to provide.
On Sunday, it led to a further intensification of measures against Russia by G7. And in the past week, it has also led to claims that US intelligence inputs to Ukraine helped the embattled country target Russian generals and sink Moskva, Russia’s flagship in the Black Sea.
The leaks were not deliberate and the White House is upset that this has challenged its otherwise disciplined messaging, which revolved around supporting Ukraine, but in a calibrated manner to prevent escalation, latest reports indicate.
But, irrespective of whether
specific intelligence related leaks were deliberate or not, or whether Austin revising US objectives in the war from preserving Ukrainian sovereignty to weakening Russia for the future was considered policy or not, there is a clear escalation in Western rhetoric and support for Ukraine in terms of military equipment.
Debate on assumptions in the West
This seeming expansion and recalibration of Western objectives, in turn, has led to a debate within Western capitals. All key policymakers in the West agree that supporting Ukraine and ensuring Russia can’t claim victory after walking into another
sovereign country is essential.
But then, there are two schools of thought.
Some in Western capitals, particularly Washington, believe Russia is vulnerable, the Russian military’s strengths were clearly overestimated, Putin can be cornered, Russian ambitions can be tamed for the foreseeable future, and Ukraine can hold its own.
Russia’s dismal economic indicators, the exodus of its professional class, particularly those in the technology sector, its degraded military capacity, and the fact that even other countries that may not be for West’s offensive sanctions regime aren’t necessarily supportive of Russia’s war gives a set of policymakers reasons to believe that this is the
moment to erode Moscow’s power — and by extension, also teach Beijing a lesson about costs of belligerence.
Others believe the US is playing a risky game, for Russian weaknesses are being exaggerated, and when it comes to the south and east, Russia has already notched up successes, and its stakes and interests are so high that Moscow won’t let go even if it has to bear heavy casualties.
“Ukraine cannot defeat the Russian army. Defending territory was one thing, but retaking territory is much harder,” said a retired general in a key Western country, a NATO member. “Yes, Russia suffered military setbacks and the morale of its brutalised troops is low. But it has not deployed all its strength. It’s firepower is high. Ukraine is already devastated and will be in ruins by the end of this. Start looking for a political solution that gives Vladimir Putin a face saver of sorts.”
Russia’s calculus
On the other side, it is not clear if Putin thinks he needs a face saver.
Internally, Russia has bled both in terms of military casualties and economic losses in the past ten weeks, but its bleeding capacity and ability to absorb losses on both fronts is high. There is no threat to regime stability and even the West has, after the first few weeks when it actually thought regime change was possible, realised that Putin is not going anywhere.
Moscow also seems to have calculated that despite the deep economic fractures caused by the war, there is enough of a constituency — China, countries in South Asia, East Asia, West Asia and Africa — which will be willing to engage with Moscow, and
this willingness will only increase with time. Russia still believes that European unity is a passing phenomena, and as energy costs in these countries continue to rise, appetite to sustain the confrontation on behalf of Ukraine will dip.
Whether these assessments are grounded or not is besides
the point; they exist and have led to a set of actions.
Diplomatically, if the US has shown no interest in diplomacy, neither has Russia shown interest in seeking a negotiated settlement at this juncture. Talks have stalled. Neither Turkish nor Israeli efforts, neither German nor French nudges, towards a diplomatic breakthrough have gone far.
The United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres visited Moscow and Kiev in late April, and while it paved the way for some humanitarian relief in Mariupol, it does not seem to have left Guterres any more optimistic than he may have been before his diplomatic foray.
And militarily, if the West and Ukraine think that they can weaken Russia, Moscow appears to believe it has natural historical, geographical, strategic, and cultural advantages to maximise gains in Donbas.
All of this — both Western and Russian assumptions, strategies and objectives — explains why hostilities are not about to end. The war will continue. The moment is, unfortunately, not ripe enough for a resolution. And things will get worse before they get better.
But how this war, where Moscow is undoubtedly facing its gravest strategic challenge of the 21st century, shapes next will depend on what Putin says on Monday, the day that is central to Russian memory of its greatest strategic victory of the 20th century.
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