India and Pakistan prefer different kinds of war

New Delhi’s choice is a conventional war but Rawalpindi threatens a nuclear one

On Thursday, Pakistan announced a successful “training launch” of the short range, nuclear-capable Nasr missile. It is no surprise that this launch follows so closely on the heels of Indian Army chief Bipin Rawat’s announcement on reviving the idea of integrated battle groups (IBGS) to launch a quick, conventional assault on Pakistan. IBGS are closely associated with the Indian Army’s Cold Start doctrine that came about in the aftermath of the failure of Operation Parakram (2001-02).

Essentially the tussle is about fighting one’s favourite wars. India is conventionally superior and wants to confine its war with Pakistan within the conventional realm. Pakistan wants to keep the conflict either in the sub-conventional realm (read terrorism) where it enjoys the monopoly in this dyad, or escalate it to the nuclear realm — where it has parity with India — bypassing a conventional war entirely. The Indian Army evolved the Cold Start doctrine of a limited conventional war because it realised that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons would not allow for a full-scale, conventional war. The doctrine was never endorsed by the Government of India but it provided Pakistan with an excuse to build missiles like Nasr, to target Indian formations undertaking conventional strikes.

India’s non-response to 26/11 showed that either the Cold Start had not been operationalised or the army wasn’t confident of pulling it off. General Rawat has now brought the idea up front and centre. He is saying the IBGS will be tested by May. This undoubtedly enhances the credibility of the Cold Start doctrine. Playing exactly to the script, Pakistan is now flaunting Nasr. The use of Nasr carries a number of risks and doesn’t guarantee success. However, deterrence is often in the adversary’s mind. As long as Indian leaders continue to be deterred by Nasr, it will continue to be effective.