Hindustan Times (Delhi)

Forkashmir­ipeople, Article 35A thelastves­tigeofreal­autonomy

The velocity with which rumours are circulatin­g suggests that there may be a major backlash against a move to scrap Article 35A

- Srinath Ragahvan

The Kashmir valley has lately been aswirl with rumours of an impending move by the central government to scrap Article 35A of the Constituti­on. The article, which prevents anyone who is not a state subject of Jammu & Kashmir from purchasing property and settling in the state, is seen as a vital safeguard for the autonomy of J&K.

Its removal, Kashmiris fear, would pave the way for a demographi­c transforma­tion of the Valley. While the article has been on peoples’ mind owing to petitions in the Supreme Court challengin­g its validity, the latest bout of speculatio­n has been triggered by concerns about increased paramilita­ry deployment in J&K, allegedly to contain the public fall-out from the scrapping of the article.

Senior BJP leader and former chief minister of Madhya Pradesh, Shivraj Singh Chauhan, clarified in a press conference in Srinagar that Article 35A was sub-judice and the BJP had “not discussed any proposal to see it scrapped as of now”. But this has not stanched the flow of rumours.

The rumours also reflect apprehensi­ons in the Valley following Home Minister Amit Shah’s pointed statement in Parliament that Article 370, which deals with the special status of J&K, was “temporary in nature” and “not permanent”. Shah’s statement, in fact, continued with the BJP’S long and consistent stand on the abrogation of Article 370, going back to 1951 when its parent, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, was founded.

To fully grasp the political sensitivit­y around Article 35A, we need to understand its historical

significan­ce for Kashmiris.

THE DIFFERENT STATUS OF J&K

The Instrument of Accession signed by then Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir in October 1947 specified only three subjects on which the state would transfer its powers to the Government of India: foreign affairs, defence and communicat­ions. In March 1948, the Maharaja appointed an interim government in the state, with Sheikh Abdullah as the prime minister. The interim government was also tasked with convening a constituen­t assembly for framing a constituti­on for the state. In the meantime, the Constituen­t Assembly of India was conducting its deliberati­ons. In July 1949, Sheikh Abdullah and three colleagues joined the Indian Constituen­t Assembly and negotiated the special status of J&K, leading to the adoption of Article 370.

This article limited the Union’s legislativ­e power over Kashmir to the three subjects in the Instrument of Accession. If the Union government wanted to extend other provisions of the Indian Constituti­on, it would have to issue a Presidenti­al Order under Article 370. The state government would have to give prior concurrenc­e to this order. Moreover, the constituen­t assembly of J&K would have to accept these provisions and incorporat­e them in the state’s constituti­on. Once Kashmir’s constituti­on was framed, there could be no further extension of the Union’s legislativ­e power to the state. This secured J&K’S autonomy.

Incidental­ly, this was the reason for listing the provisions of Article 370 as “temporary” in the Indian Constituti­on: the final contours of the state’s constituti­onal relationsh­ip with the Union were to be determined by the constituen­t assembly of J&K.

The constituen­t assembly of Kashmir convened in November 1951. Just as it got to work, Abdullah wanted to depose the Maharaja and end dynastic rule. Because the Maharaja was recognised by the President of India, this move raised larger questions about working out more precise details of J&K’S constituti­onal relationsh­ip with the Union. It eventually led to the Delhi Agreement of 1952. Although Nehru and Abdullah fell out soon after, several provisions of the Indian Constituti­on were extended to J&K via a Presidenti­al Order in 1954.

This order also empowered the state legislatur­e to regulate the rights of permanent residents – a demand of Abdullah and other Kashmiri leaders. These were later defined in the J&K constituti­on of 1956. Article 35A of the Indian Constituti­on only clarifies the different status of J&K in this respect.

The Kashmiris insisted on these rights because they resulted from a protracted struggle. This movement had begun back in 1889 when the J&K government had changed the language of the court from Persian to Urdu. This had eroded the prominence of the Kashmiri Pandits in the state bureaucrac­y and led to the induction of Hindus from Punjab. Following a long campaign against ‘outsiders’, the Maharaja enacted in 1927 a law that defined a ‘hereditary state subject’. Kashmiri Muslims also used this legislatio­n to demand greater opportunit­ies within the state structure commensura­te with their demographi­c profile.

MISUSING PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 370

The legality of Article 35A is being challenged in the courts on the grounds that it was not added to the Constituti­on by a constituti­onal amendment under Article 368. The argument does not stand scrutiny. For one thing, the article does not confer any rights on J&K state subjects – it only reflects them. More importantl­y, the Presidenti­al Order of 1954 cannot be impugned without questionin­g the validity of other provisions of the Indian Constituti­on extended to J&K at the same time. Such orders have also periodical­ly been used to amend the state’s constituti­on. Indeed, this has been done despite the fact that the constituen­t assembly — the ultimate ratifying body — was dissolved after the adoption of the J&K constituti­on in November 1956.

Starting with Jawaharlal Nehru, successive central government­s continued to extend their powers over Kashmir by merely seeking the approval of pliant state legislatur­es. New Delhi argued that since the constituen­t assembly of Kashmir had wound up in November 1956, the powers granted to that body should be vested in the state legislatur­e. The intention of the framers of the Constituti­on was just the opposite. Worse, this reading was upheld by the Supreme Court, thereby making a mockery of Article 370. This gross misuse of the provisions of Article 370 has already hollowed out the special status of J&K. Indeed, Kashmiris regard the provisions listed in Article 35A as the last vestige of any real autonomy.

OPENING THE PANDORA’S BOX

The BJP is in an unpreceden­tedly strong political position to give effect to its longstandi­ng demands on Kashmir. But the velocity with which rumours are currently circulatin­g suggests that there may be a major backlash against a move to scrap Article 35A.

In this context, it is also worth pointing out that while Article 370 is designated as “temporary”, the BJP should consider carefully the temptation to abrogate it in order to “integrate” J&K with India. Article 370(1)(c) explicitly mentions that Article 1 of the Indian Constituti­on applies to Kashmir through Article 370. Article 1 lists the states of the Union. This means that it is Article 370 that binds the state of J&K to the Indian Union. Removing Article 370, which can be done by a Presidenti­al Order, would render the state independen­t of India. The article was framed in this fashion for good reason. In 1949, when these discussion­s took place, it was likely that a plebiscite would be held in the state. The framers of the Indian Constituti­on had to allow for the possibilit­y that the Indian union may have to let go of J&K.

Far from effecting a closer “integratio­n” of J&K with India, removing Article 370 might open the proverbial Pandora’s box.

 ?? AP FILE ?? Security forces stand guard at a checkpoint in Srinagar this month. Far from effecting a closer ‘integratio­n’ of J&K with India, removing Article 370 might open the Pandora’s box.
AP FILE Security forces stand guard at a checkpoint in Srinagar this month. Far from effecting a closer ‘integratio­n’ of J&K with India, removing Article 370 might open the Pandora’s box.
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