In Uttar Pradesh, does the BJP have an edge?
The stakes are high for all, but the BJP’s will to win and its fusion of leadership, social alliances, and narrative of development and law and order makes it the frontrunner at the moment
For the next six months, politics in India will revolve around politics in Uttar Pradesh (UP). This is not just because of UP’s demography; its geographical expanse and social diversity; its presence in Parliament; and its centrality in India’s development story.
It is also because the politics of UP is seen as the bellwether for the national mood. This is not always true — there have been multiple instances of parties being able to form the government in Delhi without performing well in UP, or parties performing well in UP but not being able to translate it into success in the battle for Delhi. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1999 won 29 of the 85 seats in the state (down from 58 seats in 1998), but was able to comfortably run a five-year coalition government. The Congress won a mere nine seats in 2004 in the state, but went on to lead the Union government. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) swept the 2007 assembly elections, but could not replicate its performance in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections; the Samajwadi Party (SP) swept the 2012 state polls, but was reduced to five seats in the 2014 Lok Sabha polls. Yet, it is true that dominance in state politics can translate into electoral dividends at the national level — as the BJP showed in 2017 in assembly elections and 2019 in Lok Sabha elections.
But beyond the electoral matrix, UP plays a key role in setting the national mood — take key ideological debates, from Ayodhya to farm protests, from the so-called “love jihad” narrative to the representation of Muslims in a democratic polity, and they have all played out in UP. It affects the morale of other parties — remember Nitish Kumar switched from the anti-BJP camp to the BJP umbrella soon after the UP polls of 2017. It affects the ability of the central government to push through its schemes and agenda. And it steels leaders for a national role — Amit Shah’s work in UP in 2014 made him a natural choice for the BJP president, JP Nadda’s work in the state in 2019 enhanced his credibility, Mayawati didn’t succeed but developed national ambitions as a third front leader in 2009, Mulayam Singh’s only stint at the Centre as defence minister in the mid-1990s was due to the SP’s hold in UP politics, VP Singh’s Allahabad by-election victory in 1988 made him a serious alternative to Rajiv Gandhi in the eyes of the Opposition.
All of this makes UP crucial. But it is even more crucial this time around. For the BJP, a comfortable win will re-establish its presence as the national hegemon after a set of state-level setbacks (after 2019, it failed to win Bengal and Delhi; it lost power in Maharashtra and Jharkhand; and it had to form a coalition government in Haryana — Assam has been the only real success). It will be a test of how citizens see the Centre and state’s Covid-19 management. It will decisively establish Yogi Adityanath as a strong national-level leader of the party (he will become the first leader post-Independence to have first completed a five-year term and then get re-elected for another five years in the state), enhance the political stature of the new BJP in-charge for the state, Dharmendra Pradhan, and possibly set him up for a bigger organisational role in the future; and cement state organisation general secretary Sunil Bansal’s reputation as the most formidable second-generation strategist of the party (he aided Shah in 2014 and managed the 2017 and 2019 election campaigns). It will also mute criticism over economic management and democratic record, and make the BJP the clear front-runner for a third term in 2024.
For the Opposition, particularly the SP, which is the key BJP rival in the state, a win will mark Akhilesh Yadav’s arrival as a leader in his own right (he still had his father’s helping hand in the 2012 assembly polls and has lost the three elections in the state since then). It will erode the BJP’s political strength in north India. (It is in coalitions in Haryana and Bihar; Uttarakhand too goes into elections at the same time and the BJP starts out with a disadvantage having shuffled three chief ministers (CMs) in a span of six months; Rajasthan and Delhi in the north, Bengal, Jharkhand, and Odisha in the east are all with non-BJP parties). And it will reinforce attempts at Opposition alliance, and give confidence that the BJP can indeed be defeated.
And so, the stakes are high for all parties. But at the moment — with the caveat that six months is an eternity in politics, alliances are unclear, ticket distribution hasn’t happened yet, campaigning hasn’t begun in full steam, and the situation can well change — the BJP has the edge. Here is why.
The BJP’s multi-caste and multi-class social alliance in the state is its biggest strength. Despite notes of dissent by Brahmin leaders, there is little evidence yet that the party’s core upper caste vote base (20%) has left. Despite demands for a caste census and the lack of a final outcome on sub-categorisation of Other Backward Classes (OBCs), it also appears that non-Yadav backward communities (close to 30%) remain largely with the BJP. The only major exception to this is the Jat community in west UP — farm protests will indeed dent the BJP’s success ratio but the losses may be less than assumed. And despite the effort to project the BJP as anti-Dalit, a substantial segment of the Dalit votes (particularly from nonJatav communities) remains with the party.
If over 60% of members of these communities vote for the BJP, even if over 75% Yadavs and Muslims (who together constitute a little over 30% of the electorate) consolidate behind the SP, the incumbent will be back.
Supplement this social calculus with religious polarisation. If anything, the HinduMuslim divide in the state has only deepened in the last five years, and the BJP’s explicit attempts at Hindu consolidation will continue, as will its effort to project the rest of the Opposition as pro-Muslim. Add to this the question of leadership where the Narendra Modi-Yogi combine, and their inevitable campaign blitz, backed by substantial resources and public relations offensive, will take the BJP’s message to every household in the state. Now, mix it with the narrative on governance and welfare — and a combination of claims on improvement in law and order, supply of electricity and water, provision of income assistance to farmers, and rhetoric about industrialisation will be pushed and amplified. Also, take into account the fact that the BJP has a comfortable margin (it won 312 of 403 seats in 2017), which means that even it loses 100 seats, the party will still return to power, though it will open up the question on leadership and lead to a push for a new CM.
But one party does not win an election. The others have to lose it too. The Congress is a marginal force. The BSP is possibly staring at its worst-ever performance. And while Akhilesh Yadav evokes nostalgia as someone with good intent, who did good work in terms of infrastructure, there is widespread perception that he lacks the energy and drive to take on the BJP machine and has been unable to expand the party’s social base.
Predicting elections is a hazardous enterprise, especially in a fluid, fragmented landscape. It is also unwise, for elections should be used as an opportunity to understand social changes. But there is value to assessing the strengths and weaknesses of parties as campaigns begin. And within that framework, in the state that possibly matters most for India’s future, the BJP is ahead.