Afghanistan: When the NSAs meet
In a sign of its assured diplomacy, New Delhi is sending out a clear signal on its stakes and interests
Convening a meeting of the national security advisers (NSAs) of Russia, China, Central Asian countries, Iran and Pakistan on Afghanistan on November 10 reflects a more assured Indian diplomacy. This initiative is intended to affirm India’s legitimate stakes in Afghanistan’s future.
The historical linkages between India and Afghanistan are strategically relevant. It is only for the last 74 years that the two have not been contiguous. If not for Partition or Pakistan’s illegal occupation of a part of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), India would have had this contiguity. If, without this contiguity and history, Russia’s security stakes in Afghanistan regarding the spillover of terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking, conflict and instability into the Central Asian states and eventually affecting Russia itself are material, India’s much greater vulnerability for identical reasons is even more so.
China’s contiguity with Afghanistan involves territory far remote from its heartland (Beijing and the Wakhan are 3,820 km apart). It asserts its stakes in Afghanistan to primarily prevent activity by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) from Afghan soil directed against its oppressive policies in East Turkestan (Xinjiang).
India’s heartland is, in comparison, much closer to Afghanistan (Delhi is only 990 km from Kabul). India has suffered greatly from cross-border terrorism for over three decades (Russia and China have not), which Pakistan has sponsored throughout and in which the Taliban was complicit in the 1990s. The Taliban’s Pakistanbacked return to power in Afghanistan today revives a serious challenge to India’s security. Its ideology, surcharged by the growing Islamist radicalisation of Pakistan, threatens communal harmony in
India with its around 200 million Muslims (15% of the population) as compared to 10 million in Russia (7%) and a possible 39 million in China (2.85%).
Pakistan has been fixated on limiting or ending India’s role and influence in Afghanistan. It has sought strategic depth in Afghanistan against India based on Islamist zealotry. Pakistan’s ambitions in Afghanistan include neither promoting terrorism nor seeking strategic depth for military purposes against Russia, China, Iran or the Central Asian states. In fact, it will cooperate to limit the terror threat to them. Its target is India, which is why India’s security concerns about Pakistan’s hegemony in Afghanistan are relatively more serious.
Yet, India has not always figured in the forums formed to discuss peace and stability in Afghanistan. That India, Russia and Iran were once part of the Northern Alliance to prevent a complete takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban/Pakistan league in the 1990s has not figured as a strategic backdrop to current dealings with the Taliban. The United States (US) has deferred to Pakistan’s sensitivities about India’s presence in Afghanistan. China has excluded India from its forum. Russia has invited India to talks organised under its auspices, but not always, as in the case of the Troika Plus Talks, on the ground that India has no influence on the Taliban.
India has, however, participated in discussions on Afghanistan within the Istanbul Process, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the G20. It took part in the Regional Security Dialogue organised by Iran in 2018 and 2019, though Iran did not invite India to the second meeting of Afghanistan’s Neighbours in October this year, even though Russia was invited. India’s position on not engaging with a religious, obscurantist, terror-wielding group such as the Taliban accounts, of course, for its reduced role in regional discussions on Afghanistan.
With the forthcoming NSA-level meeting, India is underlining the importance of its own and shared security stakes in the unfolding scenario in Afghanistan. The belief in a reformed Taliban, with promises of an inclusive government, cap on terrorism and respecting the rights of women, minorities and children has proved illusory. The country is in chaos, with severe economic distress. The Central Asian countries are increasingly perturbed. There is consensus, and this includes Russia and China, that the Taliban must honour its promises before receiving recognition. Providing humanitarian assistance to the Afghan population and preventing refugee flows outwards have become priority issues.
Against this background, India’s initiative has come at the right time. Russia and Iran, and, remarkably, all the Central Asian states, even non neighbours of Afghanistan such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have accepted New Delhi’s invitation.
India’s successful initiative is a setback to Pakistan whose NSA, calling India a “peace spoiler”, has rejected India’s invitation and will be absent. Just as well, as his habitual anti-India rants would have clouded the atmosphere and drawn press attention away from the meeting to bilateral India-Pakistan issues.
China, put in an awkward position by Pakistan’s rejection, has so far not confirmed its virtual attendance. If it takes part, it will be isolating Pakistan and exposing a sensitive gap in their regional diplomacy. If it does not, it will be bandwagoning with Pakistan and revealing more openly an intention to develop an anti-India ChinaPakistan nexus in Afghanistan.