Omicron: A failure of global governance
WTO’s inability to set norms for a patent waiver; WHO’s inability to redress vaccine inequity; and rampant vaccine nationalism, have all contributed to the emergence of Omicron
At the best of times, the notion of global governance is cynically termed as a mirage. At the worst of times, it is deemed a charade. By common consent, the present is not the best of times. Hence, the shortcomings of global institutions in addressing the challenges posed by Covid-19, including the new Omicron variant, are reinforcing stereotypical perceptions.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is exhibit A in any such accounting. Despite discussions since October 2, 2020, and with more than 100 countries backing the IndianSouth African proposal for a temporary waiver of certain provisions of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, WTO remains deadlocked. Those who oppose the effort argue that lifting patent protections would discourage investment in pharmaceutical research while not doing much to ease the pandemic. Normative decision-making, a key function of global governance, is left unattended.
WTO’s inability to set norms for a short-term waiver to tackle a pandemic exemplifies the ills of the postWorld War II global governance structures. These structures are distant, lacking in capacity to adapt to the changing landscape and fulfill essential objectives. Instead, they take upon themselves tertiary issues. For example, WTO’s failings include the inability to address digital services, cross-border data flows, and internet commerce. Rather, it seeks to add the climate crisis and human rights to the complexities of international trade.
It is not only in normative rule setting that global governance mechanisms are falling short in the face of the pandemic. The World
Health Organization
(WHO)’s inability to act expeditiously when the virus first emerged nearly two years ago in Wuhan is well known. The failure of the WHO-backed COVAX initiative to address the inequitable vaccine distribution is exhibit B in this regard. COVAX was successful in raising nearly $10 billion and has delivered about 500 million vaccine doses to more than 100 countries.
However, it is only about a third of the doses COVAX was to provide to low-income countries by now. This has resulted in just 7% of people in Africa being fully vaccinated, compared with 42% of the global population, according to the Our World In Data project. Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, has fully vaccinated just 1.7% of its population of more than 200 million. Ethiopia has covered only 1.2% of its population. On the other hand, according to the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations, globally, a total of 12 billion doses will be produced by the end of the year. Much of this inventory is sitting in the developed world, where booster doses are the norm. Almost twice as many people in high-income countries had booster shots as those that had first and second doses in lowincome countries. In short, despite COVAX, vaccine distribution has been extremely uneven.
The WHO director-general estimates that 103 countries have not yet vaccinated 40% of their population. More than half of these countries, including 49 of the 54 African countries, are at risk of missing this target by the year end because they cannot access vaccines. This is despite COVAX’s plans to ship 400 million more doses this month. The shortcomings of COVAX and vaccine nationalism of developed countries have ensured gross inequity in access to vaccines, especially in Africa. Infrastructural bottlenecks and some vaccine hesitancy add to the difficult situation.
The dangers of an inequitable rollout of vaccines are underlined by the emergence of the new Omicron variant, first detected in southern Africa. Although its origins are unclear, scientists have often warned that new variants are likely if large parts of the globe are unvaccinated, leaving reservoirs from which potentially vaccineresistant mutations emerge and spread. Quite apart from the humanitarian goal of promoting the global public good, ensuring equitable access is in the self-interest of all states — rich and poor.
Are international financial institutions adequately fostering cooperation in the battle of attrition against Covid-19? A recent assessment by the Wall Street Journal about the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s decision to increase Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to provide for largescale reallocations to developing countries qualifies as Exhibit C. On account of the IMF shareholding formula, only 3% of the $650 billion new general allocations of SDRs flow to low-income countries. Cynical questions are being raised about if, when and how soon promises made by individual states to channel their new SDRs to those truly in need of finances to respond to the economic crisis caused by Covid-19 will be met. Such concerns reinforce gnawing doubts about the efficacy and legitimacy of international institutions.
Amid this, Omicron has triggered a sense of déjà vu. WHO, while designating Omicron as a variant of concern, has hedged its advice. It holds that there is a lack of clarity over the variant’s capabilities of transmission; the severity of disease; and the effectiveness of vaccines to address it will require more data. However, governments are imposing travel restrictions. Major stock indices and financial markets are exhibiting volatility. Trust in global institutions is at a low.
Unlike in the case of the climate crisis, the UN secretary-general is not visibly stepping up. The United States and the European Union are navelgazing. India has signalled its willingness to resume exports, but our domestic challenges due to the ravages of the Delta variant constrain activism in an arena where we could do better. Enter China with its offer of a billion doses to address the stark inequity that Africa faces. When interstate institutions fail, individual states tend to step in. Consequences follow.