Clarify India’s stand on Siachen demilitarisation
At a press conference on January 12, General MM Naravane was asked, if as the Indian Army chief, he thought that the “time has now come to demilitarise the [Siachen] glacier”. The General said: “We are not averse to demilitarise the Siachen glacier but the precondition to that is to accept the AGPL [the Actual Ground Position Line]”. He went on to clarify that Pakistan is yet to accept AGPL and had to sign on “the dotted line” before “any kind of disengagement takes place” of the two armies, which are, “face to face all along the glacier.” He also asserted that Pakistan is “loath” to accept AGPL.
Surprisingly, General Naravane added that “the parallel with what is happening in eastern Ladakh is quite similar” to that on the Siachen glacier; such a “parallel” has never been drawn diplomatically or militarily. India has formally always — and correctly — kept its relations with Pakistan and China in different baskets. Therefore, it is difficult to comprehend why the Army chief drew an entirely uncalled for “parallel.” Is there now a fundamental change in India’s stance on these vital national security issues? It would be appropriate for the government to clarify its position urgently.
Following General Navarane’s comment, former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran, and his then Pakistani counterpart, Riaz Mohammad Khan, have written articles in dailies in the two countries on the Siachen negotiations (2006-07). Both have claimed that Pakistan had, departing from its traditional stance, agreed that the positions occupied by the two armies on the Saltoro Ridge and the Siachen glacier be recorded in a disengagement agreement. That had opened the door for serious negotiations during the foreign secretary-level talks. The dialogue resulted in a draft agreement, involving mutual and phased withdrawal and joint monitoring of the demilitarised zone.
In his book some years ago, Saran recalled that some attendees at a Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting, where these Siachen negotiations were discussed, had vehemently opposed Indian troops giving up their positions on the Saltoro Ridge and the Siachen glacier. They felt that Pakistan could not be trusted. This lack of trust in the context of Siachen runs deep in the Indian establishment. It is valid because the stakes are high, and Pakistan’s conduct on bilateral issues has been marked by hostility and gamesmanship.
Besides, there is also a basic issue: What could India do should Pakistan renege on any Siachen agreement as it has on several commitments in the past, including on abandoning the path of terrorism against this country? I recall a former vice-chief of Army staff, who later became the chief, telling the then external affairs minister, who later became prime minister, if Pakistan occupies the positions given up by the Indian Army, there would be no way of recovering them short of a war. This was prior to the Kargil experience where the nation paid a heavy price to break the back of Pakistan’s misadventure. In his article, Khan may well claim that it would be “practically untenable” for Pakistan “to take military advantage across the Saltoro Ridge”, but prudence dictates that India should not take any risks.
Ever since India thwarted Pakistan’s intention of gaining control of the Saltoro Ridge and the Siachen glacier in 1984, Pakistan’s objective has been to see the Indian Army come down from its positions. There was a time when the cost of maintaining positions on those icy heights was high in terms of human lives. At that stage, there may have been a view that it would be preferable to withdraw forces provided some satisfactory assurances could be gained from Pakistan that it would not seek to occupy the heights. However, by the mid-1990s, the Indian Army gained enough expertise to reduce these costs. Today, there is perhaps no force in the world with the experience of the Indian Army in those forbidding conditions. Consequently, the compulsions of the past no longer apply.
After 2006, the Manmohan Singh government did not indicate weakening on the Siachen issue. What it did not do — and nor did the Modi government — is to take it off the India-Pakistan bilateral agenda.
There was an opportunity to do so in December 2015 when India and Pakistan worked out the composition of the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue. Perhaps recognising that Pakistan would not agree on the dialogue without Siachen on its agenda, the Modi government allowed its inclusion.
The Indian Army chief’s remarks may have rekindled Pakistani hopes on this issue. It is imperative that these be quashed by the government forthrightly stating that there is no question of Indian troops leaving positions on Indian territory, and Siachen is legally just that.