Building a ‘strategy of denial’ to thwart China
Beijing is looking to expand its sphere of influence. India and the US must come together to build an “anti-hegemonic” coalition to curb this ambition
After many decades of hoping to avoid a rivalrous relationship with China, both the United States (US) and India now recognise China as their top security threat. This shared assessment is encouraging — but recognising the peril is only the beginning. China is so large, powerful, and ambitious that only a coherent, clear-eyed strategy will prevent Beijing from dominating Asia, to the detriment of India, the US, and many others. The question, though, is what that strategy is, and how India and the US, as the two largest powers in the Indo-Pacific, other than China itself, can best put it into effect.
Fundamental to resisting Beijing’s domination is an anti-hegemonic coalition — a grouping of states opposed to China’s hegemony that is strong and cohesive enough to frustrate Beijing’s ambitions. This coalition can incorporate both informal and formal links; there is no need for an Asian NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). It is only necessary that those countries that oppose Beijing’s regional hegemony work together well enough to deny it. Fortunately, such a coalition already appears to be forming through mechanisms like Quad, AUKUS, and strengthening Japanese-Australian ties.
Getting the military element of this informal coalition right is vital, and here the situation is immediate and grave. China has developed a world-class military designed for power projection, not just defence, and Beijing is willing to use it assertively — as made very clear in Ladakh in 2020.
The most acute danger is that China will use its military strength to collapse this coalition, especially as it sees in places like India and Australia, the limits of its economic leverage. Recognising this, Beijing might try to target one or a few coalition states with its armed might to undermine confidence in the coalition’s strength or will to defend its members. If Beijing were to succeed in bringing enough coalition countries to heel, other states in the coalition might, seeing it as a hollow shell, cut deals with Beijing rather than face its focused ire. If enough do so, it could weaken the coalition and strengthen Beijing’s own enough to allow China to isolate the remaining Asian states and achieve its hegemonic aims — without a major war.
Frustrating this strategy requires a counter-strategy of denial. In brief, if coalition countries know they will receive sufficient aid to prevent Beijing from subordinating them, then they are far more likely to stand up to China. Moreover, Beijing will very likely need to directly attack and impose its will on a coalition state to convince it to give up core goods of independence and autonomy. In light of this, the coalition must, at a minimum, deny Beijing the ability to seize and hold the key territory of a targeted member-state, and more broadly, enable it to stand up to any such Chinese demands to disaffiliate from the coalition and thereby fall under Beijing’s sway.
This is a reasonable and defensive but — given Beijing’s enormous and growing strength — demanding political-military goal.
The question, then, is how the coalition should array its efforts to achieve this goal. First off, the coalition must ensure it is strong enough. This means including enough countries to outweigh Beijing’s own pro-hegemonic grouping, which could include countries like Pakistan and Cambodia. The antihegemonic coalition should be very ecumenical, admitting essentially all who oppose Beijing’s ambitions, regardless of their political, ethnic, or confessional complexion. Natural members include India, the US, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Taiwan, and South Korea, but others may fit the bill too, especially if and as China becomes more powerful or menacing.
At the same time, the coalition must be judicious in the allocation of its pledges and strength. Many countries exposed to mighty China, including US allies in the region and Taiwan, need assurance they will be effectively defended to hold firm. Washington’s credibility, in particular, is thus a precious asset which must be husbanded judiciously.
In light of this, the coalition should operate by focusing its members’ efforts where their interests are most engaged, their resolve is highest, and their strength is greatest. The coalition should not pretend its members’ interests are fully aligned, that they are “all for one, one for all”. Rather, it should seek to work with and leverage States’ efforts where they are most willing and able to stand up to China’s hegemonic aims – the purpose and thus the glue of the coalition.
India and Vietnam, for instance, should not be expected to come to, say, Japan’s defence. Rather, they should be encouraged and enabled to defend themselves against China, while Washington and Tokyo focus on the defence of Japan.
In this context, Washington must concentrate its own military efforts on the defence of the first island chain countries, especially Taiwan. It is here that Beijing is making its primary military and geopolitical effort. If Beijing can split off or subordinate the first island chain countries, it will gain a commanding position in Asia’s economic and strategic centre of gravity, securing a dominant position there and almost certainly also in Southeast Asia. By contrast, if China’s military dominance is checked within the first island chain, to include Taiwan, it will be contained there and Beijing will be forced to negotiate the terms of its continued rise rather than dictate them. As a result, Washington will need to draw down its military engagements and commitments in other theatres.
India, meanwhile, is naturally focused on South Asia and the Indian Ocean area. India faces China directly along its long land border and must address Beijing’s attempts to gain predominance among the smaller nations of the region, while also needing to deal with Pakistan. In light of these multiple serious challenges, New Delhi is unlikely to have the will or capacity to project significant force to, say, the Western Pacific.
Fortunately, though, this leaves a natural arrangement between the two primary military powers in the anti-hegemonic coalition: A division of labour model. Washington along with Tokyo, Canberra, and others would assume responsibility for checking Beijing’s domineering ambitions along the first island chain. New Delhi, meantime, would take the lead in resisting China’s attempt to dominate South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
In this model, Washington would take a supporting role in the greater South Asian region, backing India’s position in the region and strengthening its hand to stand up to China and handle other threats, including Pakistan. This would mean facilitating arms and technology transfers to India, while removing obstacles like sanctions.
Interoperability might be useful in parts, but the idea would be to strengthen India’s hand to operate under its own steam. For India, the approach would concentrate its strategic efforts where its interests are most engaged and its capabilities most relevant. Indeed, it would not really ask India to do other than advance its own interests more effectively in its own region. For the US, meantime, the approach would allow it to concentrate on what for Washington must be the primary theatre: the Western Pacific.
This approach makes a virtue out of necessity. China poses too great of a challenge for unnecessary redundancy or unrealistic ideas of perfect alignment of interests. A division of labour model would be more realistic — and thus effective. India and America should embrace it.
Elbridge Colby is the author of The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (Yale University Press, 2021). As US deputy assistant secretary of defense in 2017-2018, he served as the lead official in the development of the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy The views expressed are personal