What India must do in Myanmar
It is now, more than ever before, that the people of Myanmar are most prepared to transform the union into a democratic federal republic. India must not let go of this moment
On April 02, 1949, at the peak of Burma’s existential crisis in the face of attacks by armed Karen nationalists and communists, India’s ambassador in Rangoon sent an urgent top-secret telegram to Jawaharlal Nehru.
In an “extensive retrograde”, he noted, General Ne Win became deputy prime minister of Burma, making the country a “modified form of military dictatorship” and undermining the authority of prime minister U Nu. Two weeks later, Nehru invited Nu to Delhi and counselled him to fight “one enemy at a time” i.e., target the communists militarily, and conciliate with the Karen nationalists. He also approved a secret weapons shipment weighing 125 tonnes for Rangoon.
India’s support for Burma was geared to prevent State collapse and arrest militarisation of its body politic. Nehru succeeded, but temporarily.
Seventy-three years later, and one year after the military ended Myanmar’s illiberal democratic experiment and the 2008 constitution, Myanmar is experiencing a similar existential crisis. The 2021 ‘February Coup’ exacerbated ethnic minority anxieties, fractured an already weak economy (fuelling an unprecedented hike in drug trade and trafficking), and dislocated an emerging majoritarian electoral compact in the Burman Buddhist heartland, typified by the contentious leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi.
Such is the pushback against the junta—by ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), decentralised people’s defence forces (PDF), and a parallel civilian National Unity Government (NUG) consisting of former legislators—that there is no guarantee the military will retain its power in perpetuity, an intra-military putsch won’t happen, or that a political solution is in the offing.
When viewed in the backdrop of wider strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific, Myanmar’s fast-changing situation raises two questions. One, what will the new constants in its fluid and violent battlefield be? Two, how might regional and global actors approach such constants? China’s cross-sectoral influence in Myanmar, Russia’s weapons supply to the junta, the United States’ diplomatic tilt towards the NUG, a divided Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean)’s impotent political intervention, and India’s tactical diversification of ties with EAOs without disengaging with Naypyidaw offers clues on both counts.
The emergence of unofficial ‘statelets’ grounded in ethnic nationalism and illicit trade could become a constant. This is not new. In Wa state, the United Wa State Army has long been in charge, with the local currency being renminbi, not kyat. Dependent on Beijing, Wa could be a separate country but has never been recognised as such. The Kachins, who’ve done the lion’s share of fighting apart from the Karen and Shan EAOs, are hoping for a similar model with regional support.
But the real shift has been in the Chin and Rakhine states.
Bordering India and Bangladesh, the Chin community has emerged as the junta’s nemesis. The Chin National Front (CNF)—officially allied with the NUG—coupled with local PDFs have bogged down the junta in Chin state. Simultaneously, the Arakan Army (AA) has exploited a post-coup ceasefire to strengthen its military capabilities and created parallel governance mechanisms inside Rakhine state. The Chin and Rakhine fighters are silently coordinating to such an extent that the AA chief is earnestly advocating an independent state and cautiously preparing local and regional ground for the impossible i.e., return of the Rohingya to a safe home environment in Rakhine.
Whether or not an inclusive federal democratic union emerges, Myanmar’s de-facto fragmentation is a reality that no regional power, however ideologically inclined towards and diplomatically invested in the junta, can overlook. In this context, the reaction of international actors has been along expected lines i.e., playing safe. As long as violence and instability from Myanmar doesn’t spill over, all external actors—including China— will remain engaged with Naypyidaw but not commit resources to strategically alter the stalemate.
Chin displacement into Mizoram and the recent attack on Indian soldiers in south Manipur by the People’s Liberation Army (Manipur), PLA-M, a militant outfit on the junta’s payroll, has altered New Delhi’s calculus somewhat. From denying space and sanctuary to EAOs and investing in Naypyidaw, India has adjusted its policy practice by utilising CNF to target PLA-M in Sagaing. Along with Dhaka, Delhi is also being courted by AA which is not only promising to take the Rohingya back but also offering to facilitate India’s land-based connectivity projects.
Such backstage signalling is unlikely to alter India’s prudent balancing strategy driven by a desire for stability and return to democracy in Myanmar. But Myanmar today depends heavily on authoritarian
China that is aggressively hedging its bets including with the NUG. Such dependencies not only inform current battlefield dynamics but will also shape the terms of conflict resolution and the nature of Myanmar’s future political fabric.
Despite the enormity and seeming hopelessness of Myanmar’s national—and international—situation, the last one year has also proven that where there’s will, there’s a way. Few had thought that the people of Myanmar would cripple a barbarous, heavily armed junta with homemade rifles and an iron will. Yet, here we are discussing the colossal failure of the coup more than the disunity in the resistance ranks.
Just as Nehru tried to strengthen constitutionalism and inclusivity in 1950s Burma, India supported Myanmar’s democratic transition—however limited and illiberal—during the 2010s. But it is now, more than ever before, that the people of Myanmar are most prepared to transform the union into a democratic federal republic. India must not let go of this moment.